BACKGROUND: For most of its history, the OSCE was Moscow’s favorite among European organizations, praised by Gorbachev as a key structure of his ‘all-European house’ and portrayed by Yeltsin as an alternative to NATO enlargement. Russia’s most cherished idea about this all-inclusive body has always been to create a top executive body shaped after the UN Security Council, with a few permanent members and veto rights. The majority of member-states, however, see no good reason for granting Russia such privileged status, so Moscow by the late 1990s had practically lost interest in the OSCE’s activities. This indifference has gradually been giving way to irritation, and the OSCE’s less than flattering report on the March 2004 presidential elections in Russia, which ‘did not adequately reflect principles necessary for a healthy democratic election’, was left without comment – but has not been forgotten. It was certainly the OSCE’s quick and firm conclusion on massive falsifications during the October elections in Ukraine that turned Russia’s irritation into anger, and President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Portugal asserted that the OSCE ‘would continue to lose authority at the international arena and lose its very reason for existence’. Further sharp exchanges between Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell took place at the OSCE annual ministerial conference in Istanbul on 6-7 December. It even proved impossible to adopt a traditional joint declaration. Exploiting the requirement for unanimous support, Moscow then voted down the approval of the OSCE budget for 2005 (approximately euros 200 million) and indicated that its proposals for reforms in the Organization were negotiable but the demand to discontinue the monitoring of Georgia-Chechnya border as ‘mission accomplished’ was not. It should be noted that Russia’s frontal assault against the OSCE is not supported even by its closest allies. For that matter, President Akayev expressed his gratitude to the OSCE for the help in strengthening Kyrgyzstan’s law enforcement system on November 29, the same day as Lavrov’s harshly critical article appeared in the Financial Times.

IMPLICATIONS: The pattern of Russia’s attack against the OSCE is quite consistent but it is still unclear why the small team of monitors (70-strong in winter and 150 in summer) in Georgia was singled out as the main target. It is one thing to refuse the permission for the OSCE monitors to go to Chechnya where they would have uncovered new evidence of gross human rights violations, but it is an altogether different issue to discontinue the international presence at the border, which Russia should be interested in keeping under close observation. Indeed, the OSCE has been able to check many signals on the alleged movements of Chechen rebels from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia to Chechnya and back. The unavoidable conclusion is that Moscow does not want its claims about a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge to be independently checked. In the aftermath of the Beslan school massacre, Russian officials, and first of all Defense Minister Ivanov, issued several threats to deliver ‘preventive strikes’ to terrorist bases beyond the country’s borders. Despite Putin’s ambitious claims about ‘wonder missiles’ and improved power projection capabilities, it is sufficiently clear that Russia’s strategic reach remains limited to its immediate neighborhood. All these statements could certainly amount to nothing more than a grand strategic bluff. Veteran Russia watchers may remember that back in Fall 2000, then Defense Minister Igor Sergeev threatened to deliver air strikes on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan; Russia, nevertheless, has refrained from any participation in international peacekeeping operations in this country. In the Georgian case, however, this bluffing, which started back in September 2002 with Putin’s ultimatum, seems to have accumulated to a critical mass. The desire to ‘teach a lesson’ to Georgia’s dynamic President Mikheil Saakashvili, who scored an impressive victory over Russia recovering control over Adjaria and did not blink during the risky escalation in South Ossetia during last August, could become irresistible. Much like in the confrontation around Tskhinvali, Moscow would prefer to have no witnesses to its brutal ‘pedagogy’, so the OSCE must leave. CONCLUSIONS: Since Beslan in early September, Russia has not seen a major terrorist attack, but there are few doubts that another one would again strike deep and painful. The Kremlin cannot afford yet another demonstration of its inefficiency and helplessness, so a strike against Georgia could be in the cards. Russian Defense Ministry has announced plans for deploying the first battery of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which could become an instrument of choice. An additional benefit would be to prove the effectiveness of this weapons system to potential buyers, mainly in the Middle East. Moscow currently denies plans to export these missiles to Syria, but the prototypes have been exhibited in several arms shows in the region. The strike, if it happens, is certain to trigger massive international criticism. Yet President Putin is confident in his ability to manipulate the counter-terrorist cause and has a potential trump card in his sleeve: Russian troops for Iraq. As for the OSCE, Russia is firm set to continue pushing it into irrelevance and this organization, quite unfortunately, is vulnerable to this pressure. Georgia now desperately tries to shift the monitoring operation under an EU aegis, but the newly-expanded Union has its hands quite full in the Balkans and seems to be in no rush to pick up a confrontation with Russia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a Senior Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).