BACKGROUND: On December 26, 2004, official figures registered approximately 85% of the 14.32 million registered voters in Uzbekistan voting to elect the 120-member Legislative Chamber of the reformed bicameral Oliy Majlis (Parliament) and Kengashes (Councils). A total of 527 candidates from different parties filed applications. The opposition parties Birlik, Erk and Ozod were unable to participate in the election, having been barred in accordance with article 23 of the Central Election Commission Election Laws requiring eligible parties /candidates to provide signatures of at least 8% of the registered voter in districts contested to demonstrate an essential voter support base. The CEC had disqualified candidates, arguing they filed applications with false signatures. However 518 candidates from five political parties, independents and in coalition with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party contested. The OSCE office in Tashkent claimed that the CEC denied it access to registration documentation related to approximately two-thirds of nominated candidates from opposition initiative groups, who were unable to contest. In spite of this significant setback, other evidence from the electoral process since March 2004 suggests attempts at limited government dialogue with the opposition. The Birlik, Irk and Ozod opposition parties were officially permitted to stage public demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy and OSCE office on November 26 and December 1, 2004 respectively. In the Uzbek context, this was a novel development. Since the electoral preparations began in March 2004, the OSCE first decided not to send any observers; then resolved to send a Limited Observation Mission (LOM) of 20 members at the last minute, approximately two weeks before the election. On Election Day, foreign observers wanting to exchange notes with OSCE monitors found the LOM invisible at the polling stations. However, discussions among the 250 observers from 35 countries (58 of which were from CIS countries) confirmed a feeling that the brief OSCE statement focused on its limited pre-election day activities and opposition activities and less so the nine-month long overall electoral process and the actual polls on Election day. The relative absence of the LOM at the polling stations, and the speed of the OSCE press release the very next day, led to speculations among observers that the OSCE statement may have been prepared by its Tashkent office alone without involving the LOM. In the same spirit, a BBC broadcast on the morning of Election Day predicted “a lower voter turnout because of the rejection of opposition party candidates” before voting had even begun. Yet at numerous polling stations, independent foreign observers present at the polling stations witnessed crowds lining up to cast ballots.

IMPLICATIONS: Three separate groups of international observers offered opinions and impressions on the conduct of the elections on December 27. The CIS observers’ group was led by Vladimir Rushailo, and predictably lauded the process and called elections free and transparent by international norms in a press conference. Rushailo only admitted to minor problems and claimed OSCE officials agreed with the CIS observers group’s conclusions. Secondly, a statement issued by Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj, head of the OSCE’s LOM acknowledged the mandated 30% quota for women in the House of Representatives as a significant development. However, he criticized the elections for not being democratic by OSCE standards, citing the lack of “political pluralism by blocking opposition parties from contest and depriving voters from genuine choice”. This statement acknowledged the limited scope of LOM to operate only in five electoral districts selected a week prior to election, but not on polling day. The third category was a group of independent foreign observers who were personally present at polling stations in large numbers. They were not asked for a joint public press statement. Their common opinion is hence impossible to establish, though most consulted by this author were impressed by the professionalism in actually carrying out the elections. Comparatively speaking, the CIS mission’s credibility suffers from its record in earlier elections, seeming to be soft-hearted in monitoring, perhaps given similarities in political culture among the various CIS countries. The strength of OSCE statement was its acknowledgment of some major developments, particularly on women participation, yet its greatest weakness was the inadequate scope of the LOM, which had not been able to observe the entire electoral process. The CEC has yet to comment on the OSCE’s statement that it denied the OSCE access to registration information. Yet the OSCE’s statements reflect a simplistic view of the contestants in the election, especially of the five parties that were indeed allowed to contest the election. The OSCE and international media has routinely dismissed these parties simply because of their cordial relations with the ruling party. However, particularly in societies where a political party culture is nascent and only gradually evolving, these parties cannot be simply dismissed citing lack of pluralism. Although at their creation, these parties may have had little separate identity, they have since developed into political parties with different characters and ideological bases, indeed establishing their own contacts with like-minded political movements in the west and elsewhere. Although this does not amount to the creation of a western-type multi-party democracy, it does allow voters a modicum of choice and signifies the gradual political evolution taking place in Uzbekistan. A full-fledged observer mission with active participation at polling stations and possible mutual exchange of thoughts between OSCE/LOM and independent foreign observers could have helped to clarify these critical issues.

CONCLUSIONS: OSCE criticism of the referendum held in 2002 was a major impetus for the electoral laws applied since then and the pre-election political education and awareness campaign. Interaction with voters at polling stations and common folks in city markets, who voted early before opening shops, enabled independent observers to conclude that elections were conducted in an orderly manner within the gradually reforming operating levels of political culture in Uzbekistan. Meetings with officials and local experts suggested that a simultaneous creation of relatively liberal think tanks working together with parliamentary reform and gradually liberalizing electoral processes reflected a commitment toward gradual political development. These approaches were stated especially by representatives of the Center for Political Studies, a liberal think-tank at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, which considered Uzbekistan would learn more from the OSCE’s constructive criticism. Uzbekistan’s elections may not have been conducted at standards established by the OSCE. Yet different political cultures cannot be judged uniformly outside their operating domains. Comparing Uzbekistan’s elections with West European elections is unlikely to provide contextually correct conclusions. A deeper understanding of regional realities indicates that the elections were a step forward in the electoral processes, hence forming a part of a gradual approach toward the creation of pluralism. Despite the controversy over the rejection of opposition parties, the December 26 elections introduced different political parties with their own identities, notwithstanding their coalition with the ruling party, and a commendable electoral management.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Aftab Kazi is a Senior Fellow of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. He participated as an independent international observer during the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan.