BACKGROUND: During his years as President, Askar Akaev has generated both loyal supporters to his regime and uncompromising opposition leaders. One of the sources of the regime’s stability has a combination of political pluralism maintained in the country and the government’s pervasive engagement in the private sector. Situations of semi-democracy such as the one in Kyrgyzstan are, as Thomas Carothers has noted, not necessarily an intermediary stage to the greater liberation of politics and society. Accordingly, states with a dominant ruling elite and a weak opposition attain a “dysfunctional equilibrium” where some degree of political pluralism allows the entire system to be perpetuated on collectively accepted rules of functioning. With low popular support, but a strong class of neo-businessmen and a political elite allied with similar powers abroad, the political system continues to exist without risking to be overthrown in elections. The pre-election tilts in Kyrgyzstan between government and the opposition candidates attracted a higher attention of international observers than either Tajikistan’s or Moldova’s elections, which are scheduled the same day. After the recent elections in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan has the highest likelihood to become the first Central Asian state since independence in 1991 to resolve the political succession problem peacefully. Yet the Kyrgyz government and local NGO experts view the possibility of change with different degrees of skepticism, both accusing each other of acting with the help of foreign financial sponsorship. After mass gatherings of opposition members in the center of Bishkek in late January, president Akaev accused its leaders of attempting to instigate intrastate tensions similar to the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s. In response to this criticism, former Foreign Minister and leader of “Ata-Jurt” movement Roza Otunbaeva pointed at the enormous external debt accumulated during the years of Akaev’s presidency as one of the sources of his political power.

IMPLICATIONS: In an interview with the opposition newspaper “ResPublica”, ex-speaker and former presidential candidate Medetkan Sherimkulov said that irrespective of the outcome of the elections, the Kyrgyz government will seek to benefit from the results. In case of mass mobilization in the aftermath of unfair elections, the government would accuse opposition forces of destabilizing the country’s security. Likewise, if the elections do not entail any significant movements among civil forces, the government will acclaim itself of being capable to sustain peace in the country. Sheremkulov also thinks that an alleged north-south tension in Kyrgyzstan should be interpreted as the results of the regime’s cadre politics and not as a conflict between the Kyrgyz ethnic majority and the Uzbek minority. In spite of protests on the streets of Bishkek against the decisions of the current parliament on discriminating election laws and although some international observers have stated that the mass mobilizations are attaining a regular character, there is little sign of attempts among top businessmen with close ties with the government to secure accumulated capital due to possible reconfigurations of the political system. “It will not be easy to entirely eliminate the influence of the regime on the country’s main businesses” says a leading business woman as she confirms that the parliamentary elections are unlikely to bring significant changes to the settings of established informal business networks. In the public sector, the most underfinanced institutions of health and education have been experiencing increased attention from the government as well as parliamentary candidates. The Kyrgyz National University is one of the examples where students and faculty members were offered enhanced living and working conditions during the past few months. The newly-formed coalition of four pro-governmental parties “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” led by the president’s daughter Bermet Akaeva gained 20% of seats in the elections to local governments held in October 2004. The President’s 28-year old son Aidar Akaev and 32-year old Bermet Akaeva, two relatives of the first lady Mairam Akaeva and the son of the Prime Minister Nikolai Tanaev have all registered to run in the elections. The “University” electoral district where Bermet Akaeva is balloting has been a staging place for a number of intrigues between the opposition and governmental forces. Roza Otunbaeva and the editor of “Obshchestvennyi Reyting” newspaper Bolotbek Maripov were both denied registration at the district due to a residence qualification law adopted by the parliament. After repeated concerns in the local and foreign mass media, the law was called off and Maripov was allowed to enroll though the registration period ended. But Otunbaeva was charged for organizing unsanctioned demonstrations and had to testify before the city court. The son of well-known opposition member Kunai Sheremkulov also registered at the “University” electoral district. The Kyrgyz opposition, considerably more active within constitutionally established frames in comparison with Uzbekistan, is experiencing problems of lack of cohesion, insufficient membership and problems to find a unifying political ideology. It is rather a fragmented group of politicians, mostly with an academic background, formed around individual leaders as opposed to ideas. Some seek to advocate the interests of agrarians, the largest segment of the working society in Kyrgyzstan, but the movements are often organized top-down. Pro-governmental candidates are equipped with considerably better financial support from the government compared to the opposition forces. CONCLUSIONS: There is a record of domestic mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan. Previous revolts in the country were stirred at several occasions, including after the imprisonment of opposition leader Feliks Kulov, when dozens of people went on hunger strikes. The imprisonment of a member of parliament from the southern region, Azimbek Beknazarov, resulted in six civilian deaths in 2002. A recent anti-governmental protest against the decision of the Central Electoral Committee to deny Roza Otunbaeva registration to run in the elections also provoked demonstrations. The capacity of Akaev’s government to bring political change with minimal costs to society might be lesser than in Kazakhstan, a country with a similar extent of political openness. But the state apparatus, in order to adapt in the new domestic and international environment, has also showed a great ability to shield itself from unstable situations by introducing quick institutional changes. The parliament’s structure has been changed twice, two referendums amended the constitution by broadening the president’s powers, and civil unrest that was violently interrupted by law enforcement structures in Aksy in 2002 showed the state’s flexibility to halt the rise of anti-regime forces by various means. Although domestically and abroad the perception of political competitiveness in Kyrgyzstan remains, in extreme situations such as civil protests against the government, the opposition forces tended to perform generally weaker than the government. Recent developments in Kyrgyzstan suggest that the next unicameral parliament will be overweighed by pro-governmental candidates and, moreover, include direct family members of the current regime holders. Unlike in Uzbekistan, some opposition leaders who succeeded in the country’s earlier political life have been allowed to take part in the elections by gaining genuine support among the population. But figures such as Otunbaeva who were able to raise larger civil activity in the country were thrown out from the process long before the election date.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a PhD Fellow at the Graduate School of Social Sciences, Germany.