BACKGROUND: In areas badly affected by organized crime and especially the drug trade, a process has unfolded that is best described as the criminalization of states. Two focal points of this phenomenon can be identified: the Andean region and Central America on the one hand, and the Central/South Asian region on the other. As is well known by now, the Colombian cocaine cartels managed to exert an increasing influence on the country’s politics in the early 1990s, to the extent of financing a successful Presidential election campaign. Mexico’s high-level corruption problems are also well known. In this context, the vague concept of corruption is unsatisfactory to understand the processes occurring. The term State Capture is more appropriate, used to describe attempts by organized forces, whether legal or illegal, to buy, control, or otherwise influence administrative decisions, legislative acts, decrees, court verdicts, or state policy in general. This term nevertheless does not differentiate between the types of interests that seek to influence state institutions. When organized crime infiltrates the state in order to influence or affect its decision-making mechanisms, the process is qualitatively different than ordinary state capture, amounting to a criminalization of the state. In recent years, the former communist states of Eurasia have been particularly badly affected by this phenomenon, to a great extent because of the particular pathologies within the Soviet administrative system. The crippling effect of drug addiction, crime and corruption on the functioning of the already weak states of Central Asia is increasing rapidly, and endangering societal and economic security as well as political stability. Yet the effect of drug trafficking is not limited to this. Through a mix of corruption and violence, organized crime figures and networks in these areas has grown to a position of influence such that they have sought a commanding influence, in fact a degree of control, over the decision-making structures in certain states. The worst hit have been weak states hit by protracted internal conflict, such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Georgia until the Rose Revolution. The first two have seen a growing influence on their political systems by individuals and networks deeply involved in the Eurasian heroin industry. The appointment in 2004 of Ghaffor Mirzoyev, a former warlord with known past involvement in the heroin industry, as head of Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency, only illustrates this point. Indeed, voluminous accusations of high-level participation in the drug trade by high government officials raise the question whether these states are infiltrated by criminal interests to an extent that merits the use of the term “narco-state”.

IMPLICATIONS: Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s developed into a major transit corridor for Afghan drugs smuggled northward through Tajikistan. In particular, the southern areas of the country were badly hit by this development. However, few indications existed that the highest political levels had been seriously affected by organized crime networks. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, drug control experts estimate that a handful of individuals connected to the drug trade in the southern areas gained immunity and influence by being elected to parliament. Among these were two persons accused of being leading drug kingpins of Southern Kyrgyzstan. As these individuals step in where the state is absent in rural communities and distribute welfare, build roads and mosques and provide electricity, they enjoy significant popularity among the local population – which, together with the intimidation of potential rivals explains their repeated election to parliament. At the lower level, there is widespread involvement of law enforcement agents in underreporting drug seizures or selling confiscated drugs, especially among the counter-narcotics forces of the Ministry of Interior. Field research indicates that most drug dens in the country are known to the law enforcement authorities, and that previously confiscated drugs are sold there. But at this lower level of the state authorities, the problem is mainly related to the dismal working conditions and compensation obtained by officials. Indeed, local officials bluntly argue it is immoral to ask them to fully invest in their job considering the extremely low salaries, the lack of backup and resources of all kinds including fuel for cars, and the dangers involved in this line of work. Indeed, both the Kyrgyz state and the international community have grossly disregarded the law enforcement agencies. As a result, as in other former Soviet states, they remain the most unreformed and corrupt institutions of the state. Unfortunately, the lower level corruption is not Kyrgyzstan’s only problem. With the 2005 elections and their violent aftermath, the power of organized crime leaders in the country’s politics grew. Southern Kyrgyzstan’s drug barons are known to operate paramilitary forces, under the guise of martial arts sport clubs, in particular the “Alysh” (traditional wrestling) clubs. In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, 2,000 young people from the Alysh clubs were gathered and fed for 25 days, stormed state offices in Jalal-Abad and Osh, and later reached Bishkek. Initially, the “People’s movement” of Kyrgyzstan did not want to align themselves with these organized criminal figures. But they lacked substantial funds and a wider popularity among the southern clans. Furthermore, the lack of a clear structure within the opposition movement made it possible for criminal leaders to infiltrate the movement and provide financial support. The allegations against specific individuals are found in open sources, especially the Kyrgyz and Russian media. Clearly, given the nature of the process, direct evidence is difficult if not impossible to obtain. Lingering allegations have been voiced for a number of years against numerous figures, most regularly against Bayaman Erkinbayev, one of the richest and most influential men in Southern Kyrgyzstan whose control of martial arts clubs was crucial in the initial phases of the protests in southern Kyrgyzstan. As Erkinbayev is an announced presidential candidate, the need to address these allegations is apparent. While the allegations remain to be proven, they form part of a larger trend spreading deep into the state hierarchy. In recent months, several government appointments have created consternation. Most importantly, the appointment by interim president Kurmanbek Bakiev of Dastan Sarygulov as state secretary was taken as a cause of concern, given Sarygulov’s past high-level involvement in the gold mining business scandals surrounding the disappearance of large quantities of gold revenues.

CONCLUSIONS: At the bottom of the problem is the fact that the state is impotent and its role is taken over by local potentates with very dubious connections. The general population is not interested in knowing the real background of their deputies, as long as they keep providing services. The present political chaos and vacuum of legitimate power in Kyrgyzstan, and the ongoing power struggles within the political elite, perfectly suit the legalized criminal figures, who have been quick to fill this vacuum. The country’s southern regions have practically come under the influence of criminal groups who are well placed in the higher echelons of state institutions. In fact, they have already started to remove their opponents. Thus on April 5, 2005, killers gunned down Colonel Uran Aliev, the head of the Osh regional department of MoI to combat state crimes. The perhaps most worrisome element in this development is the tacit acceptance by political observers in Kyrgyzstan of the presence and influence of criminal figures in the country’s political system. This matter-of-factual acceptance of the criminalization of the political scene indicates a risk that Kyrgyzstan’s political development will approximate that of Tajikistan, where the influence of drug lords over politics and society is well known. Whether Kyrgyzstan will be able to shake off the influence of criminal groups over politics or will turn into a narco-state is too early to tell. What is clear is that unless this problem appears on the radar screen of the international community, very little is likely to change.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Svante Cornell and Niklas Swanström lead the Research Project on Narcotics, Organized Crime and Security conducted by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Research and Policy Center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University, Sweden.