BACKGROUND: The chain reaction of spectacular and mostly non-violent ‘revolutions’ started in late 2003 in Georgia when the attempt of the Shevardnadze regime to manipulate elections backfired with such a force that the unpopular president had to step down. Russia had no sympathy whatsoever to Shevardnadze but the new government was certainly far worse from its point of view and the method of regime change through street power was deeply disturbing. In only a few months, the next crisis ripened when Georgia’s new president Mikhail Saakashvili challenged Aslan Abashidze, the autocratic ruler of Ajaria, and forced him out through demonstrations in Batumi backed by a show of military force. This provincial ‘revolution’ was probably even more important than the first one, since it swept away a Russian ally who could have received support from a military base sitting right next to his capital. Moscow tried to re-assert its influence in Georgia by getting its candidate elected president in the break-away Abkhazia, but this unnecessary and clumsy interference irritated the Abkhazians so much that they refused to oblige. Russia’s stubborn pressure brought the crisis to the brink of explosion and the last-minute face-saving compromise did little in proving that the Kremlin knew what it was doing. The next and hugely significant breakthrough was achieved in Ukraine in November-December 2004 when Moscow’s determined interference in the presidential elections, defined as the ‘decisive test’ for its ability to dominate the post-Soviet space, failed to secure the desired result. It was a bitter personal humiliation for President Putin but even more importantly, it showed how the colossal power of societal discontent could be mobilized and controlled so that violent outbursts were effectively precluded. The lessons from the Ukrainian ‘orange revolution’ were so clearly applicable to Russia that the Kremlin experts simply refused to draw any and sought instead to take revenge in Moldova. The ruling regime there, however, performed a remarkable turnaround subscribing to a pro-Western ‘revolutionary’ agenda and leaving Moscow even more frustrated. The February parliamentary elections in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were supposed to prove that Central Asia was immune to ‘colored viruses’, and in the former the case was indeed made – but in the latter the revolutionary lightning stroke again. Two features set this event apart in the general trend: the uncontrollable violence, including looting in the capital Bishkek, and the astonishingly small effort it took to enforce the regime change – President Askar Akayev ran from a crowd that was hardly 10,000 strong. Kyrgyzstan has also shown that it is very hard to distinguish between the just cause advanced by ‘democratic opposition’ and the ugly struggle between regional clans competing for dividends in the all-penetrating narco-traffic. The unexpected but entirely predictable explosion in Uzbekistan added to this picture the strike potential of underground Islamic networks that have apparently recovered after the defeat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Afghanistan in late 2001. The black smoke over Andijan was also a reminder that machine gun remained the ultimate instrument of crowd control. Shevardnadze and Abashidze, Kuchma and Akayev preferred quiet retirement, but Putin has made it clear that ‘extraordinary measures’ are entirely justified for rolling back the revolutionary offensive. He understands perfectly well that his own grasp on power is at stake in this contest between ruling bureaucracies and angrily awakened societies.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s counter-revolutionary plans are based on the evaluation of the post-revolutionary internal structures of government as highly unstable, and this is by no means a case of wishful thinking. One year after the victory parade in the streets of Batumi, the economic situation in Ajaria has turned to the worse rather than to the better. Moldova has so far failed to secure any new desperately needed aid from the EU and its renewed effort at negotiating a compromise deal with separatists in Transdniestria has brought few fruits, mostly due to Russia’s not very subtle sabotage. The defeated Eastern opposition in Ukraine is regrouping but symptoms of split among the various political camps in the ‘orange coalition’ are increasingly visible. The sensible plan to review the most blatantly rigged privatization deals has resulted in nasty squabbles for redistributing property, while the desire to assert the rile of the government in regulating the energy market has transformed into politicized pressure on Russian oil companies. It was the recent public row between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko that encouraged Moscow most of all, and indeed the prospects for cohabitation of these two highly ambitious characters until the parliamentary elections next year are very uncertain. The anti-post-Soviet ‘revolutions’ may not quite deserve the term but they have certainly created huge expectations centered on releasing the entrepreneurial energy from the suffocating bureaucratic corruption so much resembling the worst patterns of ‘mature socialism’ in the USSR. Nowhere were these expectations higher than in Georgia – and the scale of disillusionment is in direct proportion. The gap between the tiny Westernized ruling elite and the impoverished society in this country is tremendous, and that makes President Saakashvili’s reform agenda very vulnerable. The tragic death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania has left the young president even more alone facing daily daunting tasks and it is nearly improbable that he would always be able to resist populist temptations. Moscow certainly has good reason to perceive Georgia as the weakest link in the newly-forged revolutionary chain and so it keeps testing Saakashvili’s patience in the dispute around the withdrawal of Russian bases. Any reckless move could trigger a crisis similar to the violent clashes around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, last summer. In fact, conflict manipulation is a key element in Moscow’s plan for derailing the Georgian revolution and removing its flamboyantly independent leader. Any sequence of local clashes in the vicinity of Russian bases could give the Kremlin a chance to prove that is doctrine of ‘preventive strikes’ is not just a declaration of intent.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia needs constant Western attention and support, perhaps aimed not that much on its armed forces as on modernizing the energy infrastructure and rehabilitating the once blossoming agriculture. Another and no less urgent demand for the same resources comes from Kyrgyzstan. The forthcoming presidential elections could mark an important step towards resolving the political crisis there, however, too many of the underlying problems remain unaddressed. The issue is not about the fragile character of the compromise between the northern and southern clans, personified by the union between Felix Kulov and Kurmanbek Bakiev, it is rather that this compromise does not necessarily mean a more democratic power-sharing. A rather unusual double-dependency has emerged in Kyrgyzstan over the last few years: upon the Western aid (distributed largely by NGOs) and upon drug trafficking. In post-revolutionary turbulence, the mechanisms created for reducing the latter dependency – inefficient as they were – have been nearly completely abandoned. It is not impossible, however, to rebuild and strengthen those by using the multiple available entry points for boosting the grass-roots networks that facilitate democracy-building. That requires committed Western effort and plenty of ungrateful hard work that returns little political dividend. It is certainly much easier to proclaim that Belarus is the next ‘revolutionary front’ and open credit lines for the opposition groups that would stage rallies in Minsk and gain much media coverage. The real question, nevertheless, is not about who is next but about the victories that could turn sour. Russia is counting on that but its counter-revolutionary strategy involves far greater risks of destabilization in the Caucasus and Central Asia than it is able to cope with.

AUTHOR’S BIO Pavel K. Baev is with the Peace Research Institute, Oslo.