By Marat Yermukanov (8/24/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Deeply alarmed at the chain reaction of popular groundswell against discredited regimes in CIS countries, Kazakhstan’s ruling power adopted the tactic of maneuvering between stubborn resistance to Western influence on what is considered “domestic affairs” and closer partnership with European democratic institutions. Fearing the aftermath of the disastrous regime change in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan violence in Uzbekistan, Kazakh security services launched a large-scale hunt for migrants from Central Asian countries particularly targeting persons suspected of involvement in the Andijan riots. This pursued the double goal of vamping up the soured relations with Tashkent after repeated Uzbek accusations against Kazakhstan for allegedly harboring members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and minimizing the threat to Kazakhstan’s political stability from the increasing stream of refugees.

By Zoya Pylenko (8/24/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The constitution of Kyrgyzstan provides for freedom of religion. However, according to the 2004 International Religious Freedom Report 2004 of the U.S.

By Hasan Ali Karasar (7/27/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The very moment former President Askar Akaev called the protesters in the South as alcoholics and narcotic addicts and even Islamists, many people thought the same thing: Akayev is gone! This very “Soviet” label used for any kind of civil unrest in the former Soviet Union demonstrated the fragility of Soviet bureaucracy to anything “civil.” However, as the main opposition leaders repeated several times, they were not expecting Akaev to retreat so easily. Many agree that a short show-off to the masses and couple of political promises would very quickly have changed the course of the events.