Wednesday, 24 August 2005

SECURITY CHALLENGES TEST KAZAKHSTAN’S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS

Published in Field Reports

By Marat Yermukanov (8/24/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Deeply alarmed at the chain reaction of popular groundswell against discredited regimes in CIS countries, Kazakhstan’s ruling power adopted the tactic of maneuvering between stubborn resistance to Western influence on what is considered “domestic affairs” and closer partnership with European democratic institutions. Fearing the aftermath of the disastrous regime change in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan violence in Uzbekistan, Kazakh security services launched a large-scale hunt for migrants from Central Asian countries particularly targeting persons suspected of involvement in the Andijan riots. This pursued the double goal of vamping up the soured relations with Tashkent after repeated Uzbek accusations against Kazakhstan for allegedly harboring members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and minimizing the threat to Kazakhstan’s political stability from the increasing stream of refugees.
Deeply alarmed at the chain reaction of popular groundswell against discredited regimes in CIS countries, Kazakhstan’s ruling power adopted the tactic of maneuvering between stubborn resistance to Western influence on what is considered “domestic affairs” and closer partnership with European democratic institutions. Fearing the aftermath of the disastrous regime change in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan violence in Uzbekistan, Kazakh security services launched a large-scale hunt for migrants from Central Asian countries particularly targeting persons suspected of involvement in the Andijan riots. This pursued the double goal of vamping up the soured relations with Tashkent after repeated Uzbek accusations against Kazakhstan for allegedly harboring members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and minimizing the threat to Kazakhstan’s political stability from the increasing stream of refugees.

In its excessive zeal to justify the massive expulsion of refugees seeking shelter in Kazakhstan, the National Security Committee (NSC) even admitted what had been categorically denied before. Shortly after the brutalities in Andijan the NSC officials told to the press that some members of the Jamaat of Mojahedeens of Central Asia extremist organization which operated in Kazakhstan were perpetrators of the Tashkent bomb blasts last summer. Reportedly, the terrorist gang included Kazakh nationals, four female suicide bombers among them, former militants of the IMU. The National Security Committee report says over the last four years 20 members of foreign terrorist organizations were extradited from the country.

In the present context, it looks more like a dubious cooperation with Uzbek security services than a mere act of preventing potential terrorist threats. This ambiguity can best be illustrated by Lutfulla Shamsuddinov’s case, an Uzbek human rights activist detained in Almaty on July 1 on suspicion of being one of the string-pullers of Andijan events. The detention of the dissident put Kazakh authorities in an awkward situation. Under the UN 1951 Convention on the status of refugees, Kazakhstan had to provide shelter for Shamsuddinov who in Uzbekistan, however, was on the wanted list of terrorists. Finally, on July 12, after long bargaining with international human rights organizations, Kazakh authorities handed the suspect over to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reaping praises from European Union for this face-saving move. Aware that the unfriendly act would provoke accusations from the Uzbek side, the Prosecutor-General’s Office of Kazakhstan asked Uzbek authorities for “understanding” the delicate circumstances.

With an eye to the coveted presidency of the OSCE in 2009, Kazakhstan has to observe human rights commitments strictly and show consistency in implementing comprehensive political reforms. Kazakhstan’s path to closer cooperation with the European Union, OSCE, NATO and other organizations is strewn with contradictions as ever before. On the one hand, the regime has to adapt itself to the demands from international democratic institutions, on the other, it has to ensure its political security in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections. The massive crackdown on NGOs, the belligerent calls from pro-presidential parties, verbal attack on the Soros Kazakhstan Foundation from Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev, undemocratic amendments to the laws and disrespect for the rights of refugees point to uneasy relations with the European Union. Kazakhstan’s moves towards partnership with the European Union is curiously synchronized with efforts to build a sort of political and economic alliance with the rulers of Uzbekistan within the union of Central Asian nations projected by Nursultan Nazarbayev. Alliance with Tashkent obliges Astana to extradite dozens of Uzbek citizens, human rights activists fleeing their country, a step totally incompatible with European standards. The council for cooperation between the European Union and Kazakhstan was articulate enough in demanding recently that Kazakh authorities should discriminate between fighting terrorism and respecting human rights and effectively control the migration process.

Kazakh authorities found themselves ill-prepared to cope with the predictable massive inflow of refugees from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the Astana city police, the number of illegal migrants from Central Asia, mainly from Uzbekistan, doubled in six months of the year. It is not ruled out that Uzbeks sheltering in refugee camps in Kyrgyzstan and subjected to ethnic discrimination from the impoverished locals will head for Kazakh cities, aggravating the already delicate situation in the country’s job market. If not addressed timely, this uncontrolled migration process is likely to create interethnic tension in the volatile region.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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