Wednesday, 05 October 2005

CHILLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIA

Published in Field Reports

By Gulnara Ismailova (10/5/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Both stations are thought to monitor Iranian airspace, allowing Washington to be timely informed about any launches of the Iranian strategic missiles.

That American military installations are built in Azerbaijan is unpleasant news to Russian experts. Explained by the struggle against terrorism, the U.

Both stations are thought to monitor Iranian airspace, allowing Washington to be timely informed about any launches of the Iranian strategic missiles.

That American military installations are built in Azerbaijan is unpleasant news to Russian experts. Explained by the struggle against terrorism, the U.S. is seen as surrounding Russia with radar stations for the distant detection of missile launches.

At the same time, official representatives of the Azerbaijani government and military leadership have failed to confirm this information. In the opinion of local politicians, these actions can deteriorate relations between Moscow and Baku. Etibar Mamedov, a leader of the “New Policy” block, argued that parliament should make proper decisions and legislation should be duly amended in order to establish American bases in Azerbaijan. But he said that at the same time it is necessary to consider the reaction of Russia and Iran. Ilgar Gasimov, head of the movement \"In the name of Azerbaijan\", said it would be strange if Russia did not react to the presence of U.S. military forces in Azerbaijan. \"Sanctions which Moscow can apply will affect Azerbaijan dramatically\"

In late 2003, rumors of the possible introduction of a visa regime between Russia and Azerbaijan leaked. At the time, the parties managed to overcome their disagreements. However, official Moscow in January 2005 introduced new procedures for CIS citizens by mandating the use of international as opposed to internal passports. This became another step of the Kremlin in relation to its Caucasian neighbors, including Azerbaijan.

Commenting on the situation, the Chairman of the Islamic committee of Russia, ethnic Azeri Heydar Djamal, raised fears that Russia could introduce a visa regime with Azerbaijan in connection with American military plans in the region, assessing it as a serious tool of political and economic pressure. No less than two millions Azeris earn money in Russia and send it to their families back home, he noted.

Recently, several hundred Azeris living in Russia have become victims of police brutality. A group of police special forces conducted sudden raids on a market near Moscow where most traders hail from Azerbaijan. Police brutalized many Azeris and demanded they leave Russia. Tens were severely injured and hospitalized. During these pogroms, more than 200 Azeris have been detained. This was not the first incident between Azeris and representatives of Russian law enforcement bodies. In October 2002, an Azerbaijani citizen, Qasim Ajdarly, was killed by special divisions of the police in a Russian shopping mall from injuries incurred by police beating. The Russian Public Prosecutor initiated proceedings to investigate any wrongdoing, but no result has been achieved.

Commenting on the increasing intolerance toward Azeris in Russia, Baku political scientist Rovshan Novruzoglu noted that in some cases murders or beatings of Azeris occur either with active police participation, or with promises police will not interfere. \"Such cases have become common on Russian streets and have taken on a massive nature\", Novruzoglu said.

According to economic expert Ingilab Ahmedov, the introduction of a visa regime and economic sanctions by Russia could have serious consequences. Foreign trade between Russia and Azerbaijan amounted to close to $760 million in 2004, and Russian investments in Azerbaijan’s economy amounted to $120 million last year. \"Azerbaijan is vulnerable in its economic relations with Russia. Moscow could create discomforting conditions for Azerbaijani citizens working there as day laborers and in markets. By blocking borders, Russia could create problems for the export of Azerbaijani agricultural products and for trade relations. We can feel Russian pressure in the geopolitical sense as well, including demonstrations of force in the Caspian Sea and problems with gas supply”, Ahmedov emphasized.

As evidence of possible Russian economic pressure, it became known that in spite of numerous promises by the Russian government to allow to Azerbaijani vessels to pass through the Volga-Don canal connecting the Caspian Sea with world seas, this question has not been resolved. The first round of negotiations on the issue between Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov and his Russian counterpart ended without positive results. According to the chief of information of the State Caspian Sea Shipping Company Vugar Sadigov, no Azerbaijani vessel has passed through the canal since the beginning of the year. \"Three ships transporting oil equipment for British Petroleum were allowed to pass from Azov to the Caspian Sea. Now they are moored in an Azerbaijan port and cannot go back. Some figures in Russian official circles are not interested in normal relations with Azerbaijan and lobby their own interests. At the same time, Azerbaijan carries material losses”, Sadygov stated.

Responding to information on American radar stations in Azerbaijan, Russian news agencies distributed reactions by the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to Interfax, ministry spokesmen considered the establishment of U.S. radar stations 130 km from the Russian border as undesirable, even though it would not affect the Russian military’s readiness. Russia would also need to consider the type and capacity of such as radar station and the reason for its construction before responding.

Meanwhile, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov confirmed the Kremlin’s decision to construct two new military bases on the territory of the Russian North Caucasus, near Russia’s border with Azerbaijan and Georgia. \"New bases will be mountain brigades complemented with helicopters. They will have special weaponry in order to protect the Russian border with the countries of the South Caucasus in cooperation with border guards”, Ivanov declared.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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