The publication in the Finans magazine sparked a mixture of indignation and surprise in the parliament of Kazakhstan. Apparently, the article was nothing more than a media canard released, as nationalists suspect, by the Kremlin to test the reaction of Astana to this possibility. The article in Finans was generally ignored by the government of Kazakhstan as one of many irresponsible provocations used by Russian political factions, and no official statement was made. For all its incredibility, the publication did cause some stir among parliament members who, although they generally dismissed the “behind-the-scene unification deal” as disinformation, were left guessing about the source of the publication. The article could have been submitted by opponents of president Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Well-informed sources in the Russian State Duma rule out the possibility of unification of two independent states as a total absurdity. A representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Kamynin, announced that the issue of unification had never been raised by Kremlin policy makers and Russia respects the sovereignty of Kazakhstan.
Although Moscow played down political implications of the publication the stone was thrown to stir up great Russian ambitions still alive among Russians in Kazakhstan and members of the People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan. But pro-Moscow movements that were active in the early 1990s are perceptibly running out of steam as Kazakhstan is moving toward economic and political stability, bringing all ethnic groups into the process of what Astana calls the democratization of society. It is evident for the Russian community that Kazakhstan will not sacrifice its armed forces, national currency and territorial integrity for the sake of a doubtful union with Russia.
The embarrassing point is that the publication in the Finans was timed to the meeting of Central Asian leaders with Vladimir Putin in Saint Petersburg. The main outcome of the talks was the announced decision of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization to join the Eurasian Economic Cooperation organization. While benefits from the integration of Moscow and Minsk are questionable for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, there are considerable gains to be derived for the Kremlin, poised as an epicenter of integration of Central Asian states torn apart by disagreements over energy and water resources, and a volatile border situation. To the great satisfaction of Moscow, the adamant Uzbek president Islam Karimov displayed more flexibility in talks with Kremlin in the face of the growing international criticism after Andijon massacre and spoiled relations with the United States. However, the unpredictable and constantly changing mood of Tashkent puts the viability of the alliance between Eurasian Economic Cooperation and Central Asian Cooperation Organization in doubt. Kyrgyz leader Kurmanbek Bakiev is cautious in developing relations with Moscow and apparently reluctant to part with the U.S. air base on the territory of his country.
All these controversies taken into account, Moscow views Astana as one of the remaining few loyal partners, if not a potential member of a visionary union. In economic terms, this vision reflects reality. Russian oil companies Lukoil and Sibneft are penetrating deeper into Kazakh oilfields. Astana responded positively to the call of the Russian prime-minister to integrate energy resources of the Eurasian Economic Cooperation member states. But at this stage, Kremlin can hardly count on more concessions from Kazakhstan.