Wednesday, 28 June 2006

KAZAKHSTAN’S SATELLITE LAUNCH: POLITICAL WINDOW-DRESSING VERSUS ECONOMIC RATIONALE

Published in Field Reports

By Marat Yermukanov (6/28/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The start of the first Kazakh communication satellite KazSat went off smoothly as planned and representatives of Russian and Kazakh space agencies applauded enthusiastically as the satellite launched by the Russian Proton K rocket carrier reached its orbital location. The successful launch of KazSat is a matter of political importance for Astana, which regards it as a significant step towards joining the 50 most competitive countries in the world, something obsessively strived for by the leadership. Only a short while ago, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were considering the possibility of cooperation in the sphere of space and aviation technology.
The start of the first Kazakh communication satellite KazSat went off smoothly as planned and representatives of Russian and Kazakh space agencies applauded enthusiastically as the satellite launched by the Russian Proton K rocket carrier reached its orbital location. The successful launch of KazSat is a matter of political importance for Astana, which regards it as a significant step towards joining the 50 most competitive countries in the world, something obsessively strived for by the leadership. Only a short while ago, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were considering the possibility of cooperation in the sphere of space and aviation technology. But these good intentions could not develop into real partnership between the industrially underdeveloped states.

Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the Russian Rosskosmos space agency proved to be more fruitful. The Kazakh government first announced its plans to construct its own commercial telecommunications satellite in 2004, but lacking the adequate technology to construct it, the government had to place an order with Russia’s Khrunichev space technology center, while some French space technology companies offered technical assistance in the construction of the satellite.

Undoubtedly, close cooperation in developing space technology has significant political advantages for Kazakhstan and Russia. But many specialists in Kazakhstan already question the economic feasibility of the project. Serik Burkitbayev, a former transport and telecommunications minister, believes that the KazSat launch is intended to produce a short-term propaganda effect while the economic gains for the development of telecommunications system are minimal. The satellite is located at a longitude of 103 degrees east of Indonesia which makes it impossible for satellite signals to reach Central and North Kazakhstan. To ensure adequate reception of satellite data, all ground stations should be readjusted and updated. It also requires the construction of a whole range of telecommunications facilities to receive and process satellite signals, and most importantly, a young generation of educated specialists if Kazakhstan is to materialize its ambitious plans to become a space nation in Central Asia.

The first satellite, the object of national pride, cost the budget of Kazakhstan $65 million. Whatever critics may say, the launch of KazSat signifies a great technological leap and promises considerable economic benefits for the country, which heavily relies on foreign satellite services for agricultural and telecommunications data. Services provided by American and Russian satellites devour enormous budget resources, over US$20 million annually. Simple calculations show that three years of uninterrupted service will pay off the cost of the satellite, designed to operate in orbit for twelve years. It is expected that KazSat will allow Kazakhstan to substantially reduce costs for Internet and mobile phone services in coming months and places the country among the main satellite services providers in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov, known to have strong ties to Moscow’s business elite, has long been toying with the idea of attracting Russian intellectual and industrial potential to develop Kazakhstan’s space technology. Last year, Kazakhstan set up the Kazkosmos state-controlled company, and initiated an agreement with Russia’s Rosskosmos space agency to carry out the $125 million Baiterek project to create the first rocket-launching facilities. Bilateral agreements also provide for training of Kazakh engineers and scientists at Russian training centers in Dubna and Shabolovka.

The record of Kazakh-Russian space cooperation is full of contradictions and controversies. While at high-level talks both sides lavish high-flown words about “fruitful partnership” rows over the payments for Baikonur cosmodrome leased to Russia have never subsided. Kazakh residents of the Russian administered town of Baikonur are reportedly treated as second-rate citizens. Russian authorities can no longer ignore the mounting public protests against Russian military presence in the area. On May 3 this year, Russian military authorities announced that military units would leave Baikonur by 2008. Apparently the entire infrastructure of the launching site will be relocated to the Plesetsk cosmodrome, in the Siberian part of Russia.

The ongoing row around Baikonur creates problems for Kazakhstan’s national space program, the implementation of which depends to a great extent on the use of facilities at the cosmodrome on its territory. But by launching the KazSat satellite, Kazakhstan made a significant step towards space technology which is to set in motion the space and aviation industry.

Barely after emotions calmed down after the launch of KazSat, President Nazarbayev announced that the Kazakh national space agency was working on the second space vehicle KazSat 2, which is planned to be put in orbit in 2008. The projects are too daunting not to be treated with some skepticism. Can Kazakhstan’s economy afford huge spending required to maintain the image of a space nation? At any rate, the successful launch of KazSat boosts national morale and conveys a sense of economic wonder. Kazakhstan can’t hope for anything more at this stage.

Read 2724 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

  

2410Starr-coverSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Greater Central Asia as A Component of U.S. Global Strategy, October 2024. 

Analysis Laura Linderman, "Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach," Civil Georgia, September 7, 2024.

Analysis Mamuka Tsereteli, "U.S. Black Sea Strategy: The Georgian Connection", CEPA, February 9, 2024. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, ed., Türkiye's Return to Central Asia and the Caucasus, July 2024. 

ChangingGeopolitics-cover2Book Svante E. Cornell, ed., "The Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus" AFPC Press/Armin LEar, 2023. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, Stepping up to the “Agency Challenge”: Central Asian Diplomacy in a Time of Troubles, July 2023. 

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AM

Silk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.



 

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter