The recent Tianshang-2006 military exercises composed of Chinese and Kazakhstani border troops and involving fighter aircraft, artillery, armored tanks and sophisticated weapons, was assessed by the deputy chairman of the Kazakh National Security Committee (KNB) Vladimir Bozhko as indicating the willingness of both countries to join forces in fighting terrorism. According the scenario of the drill, a group of terrorists were located, surrounded and destroyed after a short resistance, and passengers of a bus taken hostage by terrorists were successfully released. The head of the Chinese delegation, Zhan Jun De, praised the skills of the Kazakh airborne troops.

But military cooperation between Kazakhstan and China, for all intensity of contacts and joint exercises, contributes little to raise the defense capabilities of Kazakhstan. Kazakh military purchases from China are insignificant, and China’s strategy in dealing with its northern neighbor is geared almost exclusively towards reinforcing its economic security in this vital region rich in energy resources. On August 26, at the second session of the Kazakh-Chinese subcommittee for energy cooperation in Beijing agreements were reached to complete the feasibility study of the gas pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. Beijing ardently supported the construction of the second phase of Kenkiyak-Kumkol oil pipeline, as well as the cooperation in deep processing of oil and gas.

China cannot afford to neglect the security of its oil transportation facilities in areas bordering with Kazakhstan, and would like to see Kazakh security forces on its side in fighting what Beijing categorizes as Islamic extremists and separatists in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. It appears, however, that Astana, having enough to deal with in its Caspian backyard, prefers to steer clear of what it regards as China’s domestic problems. Almost simultaneously with the Kazakh-Chinese exercises, the armed forces of Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Caspian region codenamed Rubezh-2006 with the same stated objective of eliminating presumptive terrorist foes.

For all its importance as a “strategic partner”, China’s next moves in Central Asia are unpredictable for Kazakhstan and Chinese military might poses an open threat to the Southern parts of the country. Therefore it is in the interests of Astana to use its expanding relations with other Asian countries and the West as a counterweight to deter the Chinese drive in the region. The warm welcome given to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koijumi during his two-day visit to Kazakhstan on August 28-29 carried this subtext. The first ever visit of a Japanese Prime Minister, which was assessed by President Nazarbayev as an event of “historic importance”, took place against the background of continuing strained relations between Beijing and Tokyo. The Japanese leader noted that his country is set to develop cooperation with Kazakhstan above all in the energy sector, particularly in joint development of nuclear energy. Obviously, with shrinking opportunities to profit from Middle Eastern oil resources, Japan will play a greater role in the Caspian, which is definitely not to the taste of Beijing.

The Kazakh government also faces growing pressure from nationalist forces to pursue a more cautious policy towards China. On August 25, the Zhas Qazaq independent newspaper carried a lengthy open letter to President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev. It alerts the government to the fact that Chinese authorities subject ethnic Kazakhs in the Xinjiang and Altai regions to religious and racial discrimination, barring Muslim believers from government offices and enforcing the Chinese language in the public service sector. The authors of the letter view the wide-spread practices of forced assimilation of the Kazakh population with the Hans, and distortion of historical facts in history textbooks intended for Uighur and Kazakh schools, as an attempt by the authorities to destroy ethnic languages and culture.

At the same time, Beijing does not show open enmity towards ethnic minorities, and carries out the policy of ethnic assimilation with extreme caution, not to provoke protests. In many Kazakh-populated regions, 18-hour radio broadcasts, and two TV channels in Kazakh create an impression of racial equality. This seems to be a part of Chinese policy to maintain friendly relations with Kazakhstan and rein in mounting ethnic sentiments in a volatile environment.