Second, the Russian-Georgian conflict, not to mention any instability in Armenia’s northern neighbor, would cut the most important communication link between Armenia and the outer world. As the land borders of Armenia with two of its neighbors – Azerbaijan and Turkey – are closed due to political reasons, Armenia can trade goods with the outer world only through Iran and Georgia, the latter serving more than half of Armenia’s foreign cargo turnover. Third, worsening Georgian-Russian relations could hinder vital supplies from Russia from reaching Armenia, first of all natural gas, which flows to Armenia through a pipeline crossing the territory of Georgia. Fourth, the large Armenian community of Georgia may be involved in the conflict, especially the Armenians living in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of southern Georgia, whose living standards are poor and who are traditionally pro-Russian. The latter danger becomes more acute given the perspective of construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railroad, which is to traverse the region, bringing fears among local Armenians that the region would fall into the sphere of Turkish influence. Finally, of vital importance for Armenia are not only its good relations with the immediate parties of the conflict, Georgia and Russia, but also with the western countries and in particular the United States. These relations might suffer should Washington protect Georgia more actively in its conflict with Russia.

Not surprisingly, the tension among Russia and Georgia provoked vivid discussions in the Armenian political elite. For the second time in less than a year, politicians – even those belonging to the parties of the ruling coalition – raised the issue of the necessity of a revision, or at least clarification, of the terms of the “Strategic alliance” with Russia. The first instance was in January, when Armenian politicians were surprised to learn that the “strategic partnership” with Russia did not protect Armenia from a sudden doubling of the price of the Russian natural gas. There is a consensus in Yerevan that in its actions, Russia does not always take into account the interests of its only ally in the Caucasus. The criticism was especially high after Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma, said in an interview with a local newspaper that Armenia “does not support its strategic partner [Russia]” in its conflict with Georgia. If Armenian-Georgian relations are an obstacle for Russia’s relations with Armenia, we [the Russians] have the right to call on Armenia to choose: either you have normal relations with Russia or you have normal relations with Georgia,” Zatulin said.

The Armenian leadership has managed to escape such a pitfall, at least for the time being. The transport blockade of Georgian territory did not harm Armenian cargoes, as formally Russia banned only contacts with the Georgian transport operators, and Armenian businessmen never used their services. Ironically, Russia’s earlier actions had indeed hurt the interests of Armenian business, but this did not attract significant attention. It was the closure of the Verkhnii Lars (Upper Lars) checkpoint on the Russian-Georgian border last June, the only land link between Russia and Armenia. By closing it under the pretext of “repairs”, Russia sought to activate an alternative route through the territory of pro-Russian South Ossetia, not controlled by Georgian authorities. However, Tbilisi prohibited foreigners from using this route (and there were no other foreigners except Armenians which needed it), whereas the citizens of Georgia were free to use it. Thus, Armenian carriers were forced to switch to other existing options, namely, through the Black Sea ports of Georgia to Russia or Ukraine, causing another wave of grumble in Armenia. In any case, these latter routes were not affected by the Russian October sanctions against Georgia, and the Armenian businessmen did not suffer anew.

Armenia’s gas supplies are also unlikely to suffer, even if Georgia and Russia fail to reach a purchase agreement for the next year, similar to what happened last winter in the Ukraine. First, Georgia is unlikely to take gas set for Armenia, as this would be seen as an obvious hostile action in Yerevan. Second, in December, Armenia will inaugurate an alternative gas supply pipeline, from Iran, which can in principle fully cover the needs of Armenia, enabling Russia simply to cut its supplies through Georgia.

As for the Samtskhe-Javakheti issue, the surprise October arrest in Yerevan of Vahan Chakhalian, a radical leader of the Javakheti Armenians, was interpreted by most of experts as a gesture aimed to show the Georgian leadership that Yerevan would not support any actions capable to destabilize that sensitive region.

Yerevan has managed to keep stable relations with both conflicting parties, which was demonstrated in a series of recent contacts, including the Russian-Armenian summit meeting in Moscow in late October and a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Georgia, also in Moscow. The relations with Washington have not suffered either, as evident from the recent statements of American officials that the Millennium Challenge program of Armenia will not be interrupted despite the calls of human rights watchdogs.