Following the Tulip Revolution in March 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s civil society groups noticeably increased in numbers and scope of activities. Today, the number of Kyrgyz civil society organizations and individual civic activists is high not only by Central Asian standards, but also in comparison with other post-Soviet states.

However, along with high civic activism, Kyrgyzstan is drowned in political populism voiced by various civic and political groups, as well as individual advocates. As Edil Baisalov, a known civic activist, notes, “today, a government official, former minister, and a 65-year old woman – all have an opportunity to voice their individual political agenda”.

Most civic activists condemn the divide between political elites into northern and southern clans or pressure the government to fight corruption. Especially, anti-corruption slogans allowed numerous political actors to quickly gain popularity.

Meanwhile, although Kyrgyzstan’s political domain is filled with populism and loud voices, the progress towards meaningful changes in the state’s functioning and state-society relations is rather sluggish.

Local civic groups and activists are able to use a range available means of reproducing their messages, from pint mass media outlets to internet forums. Among all, however, street protests have become an effective and popular tool in voicing political agendas. For two years since the Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan has experienced dozens of large and small street protests staged almost on a monthly basis.

On April 11, two leading opposition blocs, the United Front and For Reforms, organized yet another mass demonstration in Bishkek to pressure the president to curb corruption and adopt a new constitution. The on-going demonstrations show that local political leaders have sharpened their skills in staging mass gatherings. The demonstrations’ basic tool-kit includes organization of transportation for demonstrators from rural areas, setting up yurts and tents, serving warm meals, providing drinking water, handing out uniforms and posters to protestors, and arranging entertainment programs by inviting popular singers and musicians.

Importantly, Kyrgyz activists value the importance of peaceful demonstrations and seek to avoid violence and looting. With that, political leaders, as well as protestors gathering at mass demonstrations, often represent the same group of people. There is indeed a “rent-a-mob” element in all protests organized since March 24, 2005.

The government and individual politicians have also learned ways of countering mass demonstration http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=4634. For instance, in the November 2006 demonstrations, the government mobilized hundreds of public employees, including law-enforcement representatives, against opposition forces. As most Kyrgyz experts agree, the government-hired mobs intended to provoke the opposition into starting a fight. Before the April 11 demonstration, the opposition sought to warn the public that pro-government political forces might hire groups of sportsmen and criminal leaders to provoke fights among opposition demonstrators, as well as to stir looting throughout Bishkek.

Amid civil society’s hyper-activism, the state exhibits a limited propensity to enhancing its own functioning by delineating powers between its institutions and actors, as well as by curbing corruption. The state, thus, is not able to respond to the society’s demands besides giving verbal promises. As one Kyrgyz expert observes, unlike current president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, his predecessor, Askar Akayev, was able to effectively deter his opposition’s demands by framing erudite answers, though also often being a populist himself. Bakiyev, on the other extreme, proved unable to address even the mainstream public with any convincing arguments. His ad hoc speeches to the public have turned into a source of mockery for their inconsistency and colloquialism.

Civil society activists, however, also often see their role as simply confronting the state, as opposed to finding ways for collaboration. Activists such as Baisalov suggest that holding early parliamentary elections is a possible solution to Kyrgyzstan’s swelling populism. If the next parliamentary elections will be held on the basis of party lists instead of single-mandate constituencies, political parties will be forced to consolidate.

In the current demonstrations, political forces should learn that absolute victories in political struggle do not necessarily secure stability. In contrast, finding political compromises should emerge as a new value among political actors in Kyrgyzstan. To date, political compromises have been associated mainly with political losses.

Potentially, opposition forces in neighboring Central Asian states could find it useful to learn from their Kyrgyz counterparts’ experience in staging popular protests. According to one Kyrgyz civic activist, Kazakhstan’s opposition leaders regularly express their excitement with the political activism in Kyrgyzstan