Wednesday, 30 May 2007

NAZARBAYEV PREVAILS OVER POLITICAL COMPETITORS, FAMILY MEMBERS

Published in Field Reports

By Erica Marat (5/30/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On May 21, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev amended the constitution by considerably reducing chances for other candidates to win presidency and allowing himself to remain president for life. Several days later Nazarbayev arrested his elder son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev and stripped him of his ambassador position and his businesses. On May 28, the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign affairs announced an international arrest of Aliyev through Interpol.
On May 21, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev amended the constitution by considerably reducing chances for other candidates to win presidency and allowing himself to remain president for life. Several days later Nazarbayev arrested his elder son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev and stripped him of his ambassador position and his businesses. On May 28, the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign affairs announced an international arrest of Aliyev through Interpol. Nazarabyev's attack against his son-in-law came as a surprise to many in Kazakhstan and abroad. The president illustrated his intolerance towards any disloyal political or economic force, despite if they involve blood connections.Previously Aliyev has repeatedly hinted at his wish to run for president. Aliyev's chances to win presidency were indeed very weak, but he was capable of strengthening his influence by mobilizing local businessmen. He was also allegedly involved in the disappearance of his business rivals Zholdas Timiraliyev and Abilmazhen Gilimov. Both Timiraliyev and Gilimov are former executive representatives of Nurbank, a bank controlled by Aliyev.In 2001 Aliyev provoked a conflict between heads of security structures and local entrepreneurs.  This led to a consolidation of political opposition to Nazarbayev's regime. Then, Nazarbayev was able to peacefully eliminate his son-in-law by sending him as an ambassador to Austria and suppressing the conflict.Although the recent crisis around Aliyev was seemingly alleviated as well, he still continued to exercise substantial role among business and political elites in Kazakhstan. Aliyev's influence in the business and political circles began to rise in the mid 1990s when he was appointed to head taxation and anti-corruption authorities. He and his wife Dariga Nazarbayeva quickly became media magnates by seizing control over several public and private TV and radio channels, as well as newspapers. Both also controlled numerous businesses in the energy and oil sectors, services and banks. In 2006 Aliyev suggested creating a monarchy in Kazakhstan, hinting at the importance of the current ruling elite led by Nazarbayev. According to him, "democratic monarchy" would meet "historical and cultural" peculiarities of the Kazakh society. His proposal was widely interpreted as an attempt to inherit the state power after Nazarbayev retires. Dariga, although sharing control over some businesses with her husband, was more active in the political domain. She was the primary leader behind initiating a political party Asar in 2003-2004 that largely followed her father’s platform. At the time of Asar’s creation, the party’s key goal was to mobilize political resources before presidential elections in December 2005. Dariga has been effective in shaping public opinion about various political issues, including the image of Nazarbayev and her own. Neither Nazarbayev's recent constitutional amendments, nor his persecution of Aliyev raised mass concerns in Kazakhstan. The country's rapidly growing economy and successful reforms in the welfare system secure Nazarbayev domestic and international support. Nazarbayev's good relations with the west avert criticism of his regime. Previously several opposition members were stripped of their public positions or assassinated.Nazarbayev's younger son-in-law Timur Kulibayev has also been successfully expanding his economic influence in the country. He is known to control Kazakhstan's largest energy sites as well as banks, including KazMunaigaz and Kommersbank. Both Aliyev and Kulibayev head the most influential financial groups in Kazakhstan, controlling the country's key economic sectors. Allegedly, they are able to appoint local government members, as well as support desired political leaders, including opposition leaders. Corruption in Kazakhstan’s public and economic sectors is the main reason for attack for Kazakhstan's opposition. Yet, according to transparency international, Kazakhstan's corruption index in 2006 was 2.6 compared to other Central Asian states' index average of 2.1 (with 1 being the most corrupted and 10 – the least). Similar to Nazarbayev's family, other Central Asian leaders’ family members emerged as influential entrepreneurs in their own countries. Uzbek president Islam Karimov's two daughters have been aggressively extorting large businesses previously controlled by public officials and criminal leaders. Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon's relatives are also known to have vested interests in the local key economic sites. Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev's son has a reputation of a corrupt businessman who illegally benefits from large and medium businesses in Kyrgyzstan. All Central Asian presidents' family members enjoy immunity from law-enforcement and a certain degree of political influence. Among other Central Asian leaders, the family of Kyrgyzstan's former president Askar Akayev was perhaps the most controversial. Akayev's children, wife and son-in-law competed over economic and political influence in the country, thus stealing loyalty of public officials and businessmen from the president himself. Such an intra-family competition was at the core of Akayev government's weakness. Some experts even see the March 24, 2005 Kyrgyz government collapse as a direct outcome of Akayev's inability to control his own family members from corrupt deals. By arresting his son-in-law, Nazarbayev eliminated even a slightest chance of repeating Akayev's mistakes.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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