Bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have hardly been friendly and constructive since the 1990s, but now, with Tajikistan seeking to become a leading power exporter and Russia agreeing to finish the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric station (represented by RAO EES instead of the privately owned Rusal), energy politics may cause even further tensions with Uzbekistan.

During the proceedings of the Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Bishkek, Uzbek president Islam Karimov expressed worries over transnational water issues. Consequently, he asked for guarantees that the construction of new hydroelectric stations will not disrupt established water-sharing practices – and that the interests of the downstream states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) will be taken into consideration.

This intervention could be read as one of the series of moves designed to oppose Russian, Chinese, and Iranian plans in developing hydroelectric stations in Tajikistan. Tajikistan, the main winner in this economic plan, awaits considerable investment and solid future profits from these projects, including a much needed economic boost and the improved living conditions thereof.

Water management was highly centralized during Soviet times; the upstream republic of Tajikistan was instructed to accumulate water in its reservoirs in winter and to release it downstream at the beginning of the irrigation season to Uzbekistan. In return, Uzbekistan provided the upstream neighbor with the fuel and natural gas needed for the winter. This barter of water for energy solved both the Uzbek need for uninterrupted water supplies during the agricultural season (mainly, cotton plantations) and the Tajik energy deficits appurtenant to the country’s dearth of resources.

After the collapse of the USSR, when both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan gained their independence and began competing for the much-needed foreign investments they needed in order to pursue economic development, the centralized management of water resources proved highly inefficient. For Tajikistan, the Soviet-era balance of water usage meant partial stopping of its hydroelectric stations, the main source of energy during the winter season – to save water for the Uzbek irrigation season. This meant that Tajikistan bought much-needed energy and gas from Uzbekistan; this dynamic changed dramatically when Uzbekistan started raising prices, to the level of world prices. The intergovernmental annual agreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan arranging the water for gas and other fuels barters are rarely fulfilled and, through the years, they became the fount of all kinds of international disputes. Finally, Uzbekistan raised prices of gas from US$55 to US$100 per thousand cubic meters of gas, thus managing to stop gas flow into Tajikistan every time the recipient could not afford to pay the steep price.

Thus, Uzbekistan gradually resigned from selling Tajikistan gas or energy, alluding to Tajikistan’s high debt for gas and energy, as well as its incapability to pay for these commodities. This created successive energy crises in Tajikistan, the country now being faced with net energy deficits. The answer to the problem took the form of a new number one priority: to become energy independent. In pursuit of this goal, Tajikistan has been quite successful in finding investors. Following this early success, Tajikistan seeks international recognition of water as a valid commodity to be bartered against neighbors’ fossil fuels. The special edge of this endeavor hinges on Uzbekistan consuming most of the region’s water. Naturally, this gave rise to Uzbek objections, resting on the claim that water naturally flows across boundaries and is thus a shared rather than private good.

Fortunately, these disputes are not irresolvable: cooperation and compromise in managing and sharing transnational water resources is likely to lead the two countries to some form of agreement. The contracts on the barter of water for some fossil resources, inasmuch they are fulfilled in due time, without any violations, could make the countries cooperate on sharing water resources. The rational use of water, as well as reforms in agriculture, can point to another resolution of the dispute: Kazakhstan lowered its need for irrigation twice, first by undertaking agricultural reforms and, second, by changing the draining system and water pipes, to increase efficiency. Uzbekistan may choose to follow this path: proofing irrigation channels with anti-infiltration coverings, alongside the replacing of obsolete irrigation systems, will certainly decrease the demand for water significantly – and there is an added advantage here, as regards living standards, as the population involved in agriculture direly needs more efficient methods of securing their basic income.

Finally, the possibility of the SCO solving the problem in the common interest should not be forgotten, as it could feasibly be accomplished by developing a new regional economic strategy for shared water use, something direly in need, given the significant economic changes in the Central Asian economy after the fall of the Soviet Union. But whether or not initiatives in this direction will be pursued is yet to be seen.