Kyrgyzstan’s civil society has been flourishing since the early 1990s. Today, it represents a diverse community of activists promoting democracy, human rights, and inter-ethnic peace in the country. At times, the ability to civil society groups to influence public opinion through workshops, publications, and mass demonstrations outmatch that of state institutions. Local NGO leaders learned to frame their agendas to make their messages accessible to a wider public.
Although most NGOs are still financed by foreign organizations and located in larger cities, their activity and diversity has been visibly growing. Some Kyrgyz experts asserted that the state was no longer capable of reacting to civil society’s professionalism.
The trend of NGO professionals turning to politics began in early 2005, when dissatisfaction with former president Askar Akayev’s leadership reached its peak. Several NGO leaders joined the opposition and helped to mobilize masses against Akayev’s regime. Several months later, when the new regime led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev turned out to be a great disappointment due to its endemic corruption and clientelism, NGO leaders helped political activists stage more protests. At that point, wealthy political leaders and businessmen began financing NGO groups in order to bring in changes in Bakiyev’s government. There was, indeed, several populist NGO activists and organizations promoting nationalism or their personal viewpoints.
The mass protests organized in November 2006 by the For Reforms movement comprised opposition political leaders and NGO activists, and marked the culmination of civil society’s ability to impact the state. Such leaders as Edil Baisalov from the NGO Coalition For Democracy and Civil Society, Raya Kadyrova from Tolerance International, Asia Sasykbayev from Interbilim Center, and a number of other activists facilitated the opposition’s efforts to push through constitutional reforms to decrease presidential powers.
However, since then, President Bakiyev has worked to distance civil society from the political process. As the political voices of professional NGO leaders became louder, and corruption was prospering in state institutions, Bakiyev’s regime began to gradually suppress non-state actors. The government either intimidated NGO activists or offered them membership in the pro-regime Ak Zhol political party. Some non-state democracy activists received warnings from law enforcement agencies, while others were openly persecuted.
In December 2007, Baisalov was arrested for revealing a ballot paper on his personal blog and charged with two criminal allegations: “Impeding the implementation of voting rights and work procedures of the electoral commission†and “Causing material losses by fraud and abuse of trustâ€. He was in the party list of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, which represents the moderate opposition. Baisalov fled Kyrgyzstan to avoid a trial.
Another young activist, Maxim Kuleshov, was arrested and beaten by the police for organizing a pro-democracy meeting in Bishkek without notifying the mayor. Kuleshov opposed Bakiyev’s constitutional project, the constitutional referendum, and the December 2007 parliamentary elections. Both arrests intended to warn other young activists and revealed the regime’s fear of young charismatic leaders.
In addition to curtailing opposition and non-state actors, the government is trying to impose limitations to the parliament’s functioning. According to new regulations, parliamentarians will be allowed to speak up only if they initiate a question, represent a parliamentary committee, or a fraction. This new regulation curbs the ability of a majority of parliamentarians to take an active part in parliamentary debates.
A number of independent mass media outlets might soon experience pressure from the government. Already today, only a few print media outlets are considered to be independent from the government’s control. There are no independent TV channels with the only channel broadcasting in Kyrgyz language representing views of the regime.
The regime seems to fear any possibility of mass mobilization against it. As the next presidential elections of 2010 near, the regime appears on track to increasingly suppress civil society groups. However, shutting the voices of civil society is unlikely to succeed. To some extent, pro-democracy civil society groups represent an important economic sector in the country’s larger cities, providing thousands of people with jobs.
The next elections will bring both opportunities and challenges to Kyrgyzstan’s civil society. Bakiyev has surrounded himself with powerful politicians interested in the continuity of his regime. At the same time, the elections will constitute an opportunity for opposition and civil society to pressure the regime to hold fair elections.