As Kosovo announced its independence and a number of countries rushed to recognize its, official Baku has watched with a great deal of concern and suspicion the developments around this Balkan “state.” Many in Azerbaijan are concerned that the independence of Kosovo is creating a very negative precedent for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and could potentially result in Azerbaijan witnessing the same fate as Serbia did.

Nine years ago, when the Kosovo conflict erupted, few in the international arena could imagine that Kosovo would eventually become an independent state. Many countries continued to recognize the territorial integrity of Serbia and hoped that the Kosovo issue would not become a unique, but powerful violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity. The latter is one of the most important pillars of the current nature of the international relations.

However, as the independence of Kosovo became more and more real, countries that have their own domestic conflicts of a similar nature refused to agree with the idea of that secessionist areas can be rewarded with eventual statehood.

Azerbaijani politicians have attempted to downplay the parallels between the Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Khazar Ibrahim, spokesman for the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, stated to media outlets on February 20 that “Kosovo is an intra-state conflict, whereas Karabakh is an inter-state conflict.” Others, such as Azerbaijani political analyst Taleh Ziyadov in his article to the Georgian newspaper The Messenger, pointed out that the two conflicts are different because Kosovo’s status was guided by a UN resolution, whereas no such specific resolution exists for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, except for those resolutions adopted in 1993 calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, despite differences in the nature of the two conflicts, it is clear that the Kosovo case could become a powerful political, if not legal, precedent for the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. American politicians have rejected these parallels, out of fear that the independence of Kosovo, which official Washington recognizes and supports, could backfire for the settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus and ruin the fragile stability in this region.

While in Azerbaijan last year, Daniel Fried, the U.S. Assistant secretary of State for Eurasia, made it clear that the U.S. Administration does not see and will not consider Kosovo as a precedent for any other conflict. On the day when Kosovo announced its independence, the U.S. embassy in Baku issued a statement in which it once again assured the Azerbaijani public that the U.S. recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and does not consider the status of Kosovo as a role-model for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite these assurances, a majority in Azerbaijan appears to believe that the West is playing a double-standard game, and that it could, some day in the future, treat the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the same way. Azerbaijani commentator Vugar Seidov published an article in the Russian website rumbler.ru in which he accused the U.S. of double standards and even drew attention to the press release of the U.S. embassy, in which the latter cautioned the Azerbaijani government from diverting away from the established peace process and using other means to solve the conflict. Seidov called it a “threatening warning.” Such opinions further damage the public standing of the US and the West in general among the Azerbaijani public.

Both the official and non-official rhetoric these days in Baku is that hopes for a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are all in vain, and that the negotiation process under the umbrella of the OSCE – with the help of Western mediators – are all fake attempts by the West to steal time. Many call for more hard-line positions in the negotiation process, and others even urge a rejection of Western mediation and a return to the military option for the resolution of the conflict and the restoration of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories.

Indeed, as the negotiation process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict drags on for year after year, less and less people inside the country maintain their faith in the peace process. Increasing numbers of people believe that the eventual resolution of the issue lies with the military. They urge the authorities to empower the military capability of the country. On the other hand, the principle of territorial integrity, which has been the main argument of the Azerbaijani authorities, seems to be fading and losing its significance. It is high time to start paying attention to other forgotten elements of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, such as ethnic cleansing and human rights violations, if official Baku wants to win the case.