On June 24, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that he will reinforce a long-term development strategy until 2020. The same day, a group of renown officials, academics and NGO activists came up with a new political bloc, "United Kyrgyzstan". Both the 2020 Strategy and United Kyrgyzstan are conspicuously reminiscent of policies pursued by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who enjoys the widest popularity among Kyrgyz politicians and society.
Instead of setting three-year goals for national strategic development as has been previously practiced, Bakiyev suggested to introduce a long-term strategy to last until 2020. The strategy will reflect the style and concept of a similar strategy in Russia, where Putin successfully promoted "Russia - 2020" shortly before leaving his presidential post this year. In neighboring Kazakhstan, too, the strategy "Kazakhstan - 2030" presented by president Nursultan Nazarbayev already in 1997 proved to be successful and long-lasting.
This is by far not the first case when Kyrgyz leadership copies policies from Russia and Kazakhstan. Legislation in the security domain, electoral and criminal codes, education and other areas are often similar to those elaborated by the Russian and Kazakh leaderships. "This reflects the general lack of political expertise and experience among political officials in power", comments one Kyrgyz expert, a professor at a university in Bishkek. "This is almost like inertia – to follow the examples set by the Kremlin and sometimes even avoiding taking own initiatives in politics", concludes another Kyrgyz expert from the NGO sector. Both Putin and Nazarbayev have been enjoying far greater popularity in Kyrgyzstan compared to Bakiyev or his predecessor Askar Akayev.
The 2020 Strategy also suggests that the Bakiyev government is trying to deal with long-term trends instead of solving revolving present-day issues. By introducing the 2020 Strategy, Bakiyev is putting his presidency in perspective, suggesting that his policies are designed beyond his hold on power. Bakiyev suggested the government to work on the strategy for the next two months and present their ideas to him. The entire government apparatus is now entitled to focus on the strategy and come up with their suggestions by September 1.
So far, the 2020 strategy did not set any benchmarks or specific goals but is rather a collection of slogans for future economic, political and social development. It aims at improved understanding of macro-economic trends that impact inflation in Kyrgyzstan, modernization and reform of the national economy, increasing the efficiency of state institutions, investing into human capital and enhancing the local government. Except for the lack of focus on the defense sector, these goals are vastly similar to those proclaimed by the 2020 Strategy in Russia and Kazakhstan-2030.
Bakiyev might follow his Russian and Kazakh counterparts in making a forward-looking development strategy a part of a national ideology. While ideologies are a central part in all Central Asian states and usually reflect incumbent leaders' perception of their power and the identities they wish to nurture in the society, Bakiyev has been rather unsuccessful in building ideological grounds for his power.
However, unlike Putin and Nazarbayev, Bakiyev's 2020 Strategy might lack similar vibrancy due to Kyrgyzstan’s weaker economy. Bakiyev's previous three-year plans at best were fulfilled only 30%-60% of their stated objectives.
As regards Kyrgyzstan's opposition, mimicking Russia's strongest political party, "United Russia", implied to declare their ambition to become a significant political force to unite like-minded political parties under one umbrella. United Kyrgyzstan is set to promote a consolidated approach to the problems of corruption, inflation, lack of energy in the country and potential social instability. If United Kyrgyzstan indeed succeeds in uniting political force in the country and supports the 2020 Strategy, it will become an obvious copy of United Russia.
Amid criticism, the 2020 Strategy in Kyrgyzstan may still lay the foundation for national leaders to design long-term policies. To date, Kyrgyz leaders set only short-term goals lacking broader perspective. Similarly, Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon and Uzbek president Islam Karimov have rather sought rationalizations in past experience to explain the present and make prognoses limited to a few years. Thinking a decade ahead, even though imitating stronger neighbors, might prove a useful exercise for Kyrgyz politicians.