The war between Russia and Georgia of August 8-13, 2008, has dramatically changed the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, and one of its consequences are new security challenges for the states of the region. Armenia, the smallest and potentially one of the most vulnerable countries of the region faces the following new threats.

First of all, a conflict started between two countries, which are both friendly to Armenia  and are of vital importance for it, as Georgia provides Armenia the bulk of its land communications with the outer world, and Russia is Armenia’s principal military and economic partner. Worsening of relations with either of them would endanger Armenia’s security, even if the problem of getting vital supplies were the only consequence. Armenia already has had problems (so far brief and not significant) with supplies of grain and oil products through the territory of Georgia (the August 16 explosion of the railroad bridge between Tbilisi and Gori being only one of the reasons) and pumping of the Russian natural gas was also briefly reduced. Continuing instability at the Black Sea port of Poti, with is the main gate for exporting and importing Armenian goods looks currently as a serious danger for Armenia.

Second, the conflict may create difficulties for Armenia to follow its foreign policy doctrine, known as “complementarity,” which envisages keeping good relations with both Russia and the West. So far Armenia has been successful in its efforts to keep military ties with NATO along with those with Russia, as well as in cooperating with EU (as a member of the European Neighborhood Policy) having Russia as the main trade partner and investor. Worsening Russia-NATO relations may force Armenia to choose between the two, and the choice will inevitably be in favor of Russia. Thus, Armenia may be forced to abandon its ties with NATO, which was not only a way to acquire modern technologies of military management, but also a channel for cooperation with members of NATO and its Partnership For Peace program, a process which provided an opportunity for improving the whole climate in the region. For example, Turkish troops might visit Armenia for military exercises.

The freezing of ties between Russia and the European Union may appear unlikely, but Armenia still may be forced to restrict its cooperation with the EU due to political reasons. A separate aspect of these difficulties may be the necessity for Armenia to choose between Russia and the U.S., also an important partner in the country’s development programs. The United States provides Armenia with aid not only in the economy (with the Millennium Challenge Account as its largest component), but in many other spheres, including military assistance.

Third, Georgia’s August 8 incursion into South Ossetia was the first case of an attempt to solve by force one of the three “frozen conflicts” in the South Caucasus since May 1994 (the establishment of the ceasefire in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh). The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia used to be the least “hostile” among these three, as people were mostly free to travel between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, whereas no such freedom existed in Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabkah, the other two conflict areas of the South Caucasus. Hence, the August armed clash greatly endangered the perspectives for peaceful settlement and reconciliation of the conflicts of the region. Although this Georgian attempt failed due to the Russian intervention (and many politicians, including the French president Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated that they cannot be solved by force), concerns are high in Armenia that Azerbaijan may follow the example of Georgia and try to seize quickly the Nagorno Karabakh region.

There are unconfirmed data that Armenian troops are at a state of high alert, both along the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders and on the line separating the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan. The parties involved in the Nagorno Karabakh issue have made statements in favor of continuing efforts to find a peaceful settlement, but Yerevan is concerned that the possibility of a hostile solution for the conflict was never excluded by official Baku. So the negotiation process over Karabakh, not very successful so far, can encounter additional difficulties.

Fourth, an unexpected aspect of the new geopolitical situation in the Caucasus region is the Turkish initiative to create a regional security forum (“platform”) to help decrease tension in the region. The Turkish leaders have said that Armenia’s participation in the putative body would be desirable, and they have also supported undertaking urgent measures to help reach a peaceful settlement to the frozen conflicts. Moreover, the Turkish position concerning the establishment of relations with Armenia has become more tolerant, as some officials in Ankara may be inclined to exclude a Karabakh settlement from the list of preconditions for normalization of ties with Yerevan.

Of course, this is in line with Armenia’s goals, while another positive aspect is that the Turkish plan received initial support from Russia. However, the Turkish initiative – which is aimed at increasing Ankara’s influence in the region – can in fact generate jealousy not only in Russia but also in the United States, and Armenia may get into additional trouble. In addition, Armenia has been suspicious over the Turkish initiatives, as Turkey has always had a pro-Azerbaijani stance on the Karabakh issue.

Given all of the above-mentioned, Armenia has been very cautious during and after the Russian-Georgian war. Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan extended his condolences and pledged to send humanitarian aid to the Presidents of both Russia and Georgia. Extensive diplomatic contacts are being held with Russia, and there are reports that Armenia may seek to act as a mediator among the two conflicting parties. Finally, the August events apparently increased the possibility of an unofficial Armenian-Turkish summit, as Turkish president Abdullah Gul is reportedly inclined to accept Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to attend the Armenia-Turkey soccer game on September 6 in Yerevan. The final pattern of regional security is still far from complete.