The official visit of Russian president Dmitri Medvedev to Armenia on October 20-21 had  one, serious political result (perhaps the only one): the proposal to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet in Moscow in an attempt to find a way out of the deadlock in the Nagorno Karabakh issue. This was in line with the policy of Moscow to consolidate its positions in the South Caucasus through expanding its influence along the axis Baku-Yerevan-Ankara. Meanwhile, the results of the August war between Russia and Georgia made this task even more urgent. Although Russia won the war in Georgia, the war has in fact weakened its positions in the region, as its relations with Georgia, a central country in the South Caucasus, froze. This made Russian contacts with other countries of the region, primarily Armenia, difficult, so Russia urgently needs to strengthen its positions “beyond Georgia”, i.e., along the hypothetical axis Baku-Yerevan-Ankara. A meeting on this topic will take place on November 2 in Moscow.

Formally, Russia has good relations with all three countries of this hypothetical axis. Armenia is Russia’s strategic partner in the military-political spheres and Moscow has serious economic interests in this country, including the perspective of joint processing of uranium and the construction of a new nuclear power plant. The future of Russian-Azerbaijani ties also seem positive, especially since after the August war Baku has begun paying more attention to the prospects of exporting energy through routes bypassing Georgia, and to the option of exporting at least part of Azerbaijani oil and natural gas through Russia. Finally, relations between Moscow and Ankara are also fairly good (not least due to extensive bilateral trade) and can be improved further, especially given the worsening relations between Turkey and the United States due to the problems in Iraq). Unfortunately, the interstate relations among the states of this axis are not good. Armenia and Azerbaijan are involved in the frozen conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Turkey also keeps its land border with Armenia closed and rejects normal relations with Yerevan, citing its solidarity with Azerbaijan as a pretext.

The August war seemed to create some ground for optimism that a search for a way out of these deadlocks may at least be intensified. All the parties involved recognized that, given the increased tension caused by the Russian-Georgian conflict and the recognition by Moscow of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the preservation of another frozen conflict in the region, Nagorno Karabakh, has become even more dangerous than before. In addition, the “football diplomacy” between Turkey and Armenia, i.e., the unofficial visit of Turkish president Abdullah Gul to Yerevan shed some hope that the relations between Yerevan and Ankara may come to a breakthrough. The time seemed favorable for a new attempt to push the Nagorno Karabakh peace process forward. In case of at least modest success, Russia would be expected to enhance its positions in the region, and the general situation there would be improved as well.

However, the events following Medvedev’s statement in Yerevan leave little ground for optimism. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia turned from their earlier vague statements on their willingness to reach a breakthrough to tough declarations that they will not change their previous positions on the future status of Nagorno Karabakh, which have always been mutually exclusive. Ilham Aliyev said in his inauguration speech on October 24 that any form of independence of Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan would be excluded. The Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian on his part replied on October 26 that a solution of the conflict is only possible if Azerbaijan recognizes the right of self-determination of the Nagorno Karabakh people. In addition, Armenia stresses the importance of following the Madrid principles proposed by the Minsk group co-chairs last December, which envisage holding a referendum in Nagorno Karabakh about the status of the enclave, whereas Azerbaijan would not support such a referendum. Finally, Turkish officials have said that the previous policy of Ankara, whereby relations with Armenia are conditioned with progress in the Nagorno Karabakh issue in favor of Azerbaijan, has not changed.

One principal difference between the scheduled Moscow summit of November 2, 2008 and previous similar meetings in Key West, USA in 2001, and Rambouillet, France, in 2006 is that now the Minsk group co-chairs are not as united as before. One of the negative consequences of the August war was a split between Russia on one hand, and France and the USA, on the other. Although all the three co-chairs have expressed commitment to support the peace process further, the lack of unity among them may also be a factor hindering the progress. The western countries may not be happy to see stronger Russian positions in the South Caucasus due to a breakthrough in Karabakh.

Finally, progress in the Nagorno Karabakh issue on November 2 is possible only on secondary issues, which are not directly related to the core problem of the enclave’s status.