On November 25, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev sacked Minister of Energy Saparbek Balkibekov. The decision came amid a split in the pro-regime Ak Zhol party over the worsening crisis in the hydro-energy sector. Several Ak Zhol members have publicly questioned the president on whether the crisis was caused by corruption among high-ranking officials.

Bakiyev replaced Balkibekov with Ilyas Davydov, a senior hydro-energy engineer who has an ambiguous reputation.  Several Kyrgyz experts have rushed to call this cadre change as a deal replacing one problem with another, as they accuse Davydov for previous involvement in petty corruption deals.  It seems that by removing Balkibekov, the president calmed concerns within his party but did not move decisively to eliminate corruption in the sector.

The current catastrophically low water level in the Toktogul Reservoir and constant malfunctioning of the Bishkek thermal energy station TETs-1 that requires urgent repairing caused shortages of electricity throughout the country. Yet, the main cause of the crisis remains poor management and pervasive corruption in the sector. Corruption continued throughout this year despite the crisis having become the most devastating in decades.

The crisis is rapidly turning into Bakiyev’s main concern since even his closest supporters from the party were divided about the solution to the problem. As far as opposition groups are concerned, the crisis also became their central point among allegations against Bakiyev’s regime.

Bakiyev’s removal of Balkibekov shows the president’s attempt to stay on top of the power pyramid amid gathering rage among the populace. Balkibekov has long been accused of corruption in the hydro-energy sector. By eliminating Balkibekov from the scene, Bakiyev hoped to prevent further accumulation of anger against his leadership, not least within his own political party.

Meanwhile, rolling blackouts have been continuing in Kyrgyzstan with ten to 14 hour electricity shutoffs a day. The shutoff period will increase to 20 hours in the coming weeks, according to government reports. The crisis is hurting the country’s economy as most businesses are bound to reduce their activity or shut completely. Several cases of deaths related to lack of electricity in hospitals were reported already.

Several sporadic protests broke out in Bishkek’s outskirts, demanding the government provide electricity. The crowds were peacefully dispersed by representatives of the local government. But aware of the public frustration with the crisis, some opposition forces are seeking to mobilize more supporters to stage bigger protests against the regime. In particular, opposition members Azimbek Beknazarov, Topchubek Turgunaliyev, Nurlan Motuyev, Anvar Artykov, and former Ombudsman Tursunbai Bakir uulu have pledged to remove Bakiyev by any means, including mass protests. Although not offering concrete policy recommendations or solutions to the crisis, the leaders are nevertheless able to use the crisis in their own political ambition.

Another influential group of opposition members comprised of former parliament speaker Omurbek Tekebayev, the leader of the Akshumkar party Temir Sariev, the Social Democratic Party, Omurbek Babanov, and former foreign minister Alikbek Jekshenkulov condemn the crisis as well, yet prefer more peaceful ways of dealing with it.

Balkibekov is likely to continue his career in the hydro-energy sector, given that he is alleged by Kyrgyz analysts to be among the masterminds of financial schemes in the sector – according to some, the third person in the informal hierarchy of the energy sector. Two other influential figures are Bakiyev’s son Maksim, and the former financial director of Electricheskiye Stantsii, Aleksey Shirshov. Incumbent Prime Minister Igor Chudinov is purportedly another major player in the sector. This collection of men, including the president, is often informally referred to as an “energy mafia” in Kyrgyzstan.

The established schemes could provide huge monetary benefits to the few people involved in the sector; but dealings in the energy sector are difficult to trace, let alone prevent. Davydov is therefore a mere figurehead in the government who would be able to benefit from his new government post with higher remuneration, but unable to alleviate the crisis.

Exactly how long Bakiyev will be able to prevent the opposition from organizing mass public unrest remains unclear. But his cadre politics remains populist and short-sighted. To secure his hold on power the president needs, above all, to restrain his own inner circle’s appetite.