On 16-17 April 2009, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) held a session in Yerevan, Armenia. While Uzbekistan is a member of the regional military-political bloc along with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, it declined the invitation to the meeting. The republic’s foreign policy agency stated that there is no rationale for the participation of Uzbekistan’s representatives in the course of the session. The “explanation” obviously explained very little, but spurred an ardent debate on the future of Uzbekistan’s membership in the CSTO and its possible intention to leave the organization.

The session’s agenda included a discussion of foreign policy cooperation among the CSTO member states and common problems of international security. The parties planned to approve a memorandum on cooperation between the secretariats of the CSTO and the UN to discuss joint activities of the CSTO member states “on assisting in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and counteracting the spread of drugs coming from the state’s territory”. As the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reported, the issue of interim results for arranging Collective Rapid Response Forces would also be discussed at the session. Thus, the range of planned topics for discussion should not have been controversial to any of the CSTO member states.

It was in light of these considerations that Uzbekistan’s refusal to attend the session was viewed as a possible step towards suspending its membership in yet another Russia-led organization. It should be recalled that in November 2008, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in EurasEC, similarly motivated by a lack of rationale. Some flavor to this was added by a skeptical statement made in the beginning of April by Uzbekistan’s ambassador to Russia, Ilhom Ne’matov, claiming that lately a lot of sessions and conferences are held by the member states of the EurasEC, CSTO, CIS and SCO “in which all the same persons take part and agendas are duplicated”. Thus, he articulated that Uzbekistan is not content with the performance of these organizations. In addition he mentioned that there is still a “water issue” between Uzbekistan and Russia.

In light of the latter statement, many local political analysts took Uzbekistan’s demarche from the CSTO session as a straightforward statement that Tashkent looks “Westward” concerning certain issues of security. Thus, for instance, the senior staff assistant of the East Asian Countries Research Centre noted that Uzbekistan refused to take part in several regional initiatives that touched upon the issue of Afghanistan. Thus, for instance, Uzbekistan did not representatives either to the SCO conference on Afghanistan earlier in March, nor to the UN-backed conference on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31. Meanwhile, there is information that preparations for transporting American non-military goods to Afghanistan has begun on Uzbekistan’s territory. These facts provide quite a solid ground for all kinds of speculations.

Nonetheless, if the choices are compared, leaving the CSTO does not seem to be the best option for Uzbekistan. Currently, it is among the three post-Soviet states that make the most significant expenditures on defense. In 2009, Uzbekistan plans to spend about US$1.2 billion, amounting to 3.4 percent of its GDP. One of the advantages of CSTO membership is that the member states may purchase Russian armaments and military equipment at reduced prices. Thus, leaving the organization would bring Uzbekistan certain losses, while it is unclear yet if such a move would bring any gains.

Upon completion of the session, the Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolay Bordyuzha, was fast to deny the rumors about Uzbekistan’s intention to leave the organization. He noted that Uzbekistan reacts to all the normative documents worked out by the organization and, in fact, is highly interested in activities conducted by the CSTO. And eventually one of the CSTO representatives provided an exhaustive explanation for Uzbekistan’s decision as mainly being based on procedural considerations: Uzbekistan proposed to have another meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in June, and therefore it viewed it as unnecessary to hold two such important events within such a short period of time.

Interestingly enough, Kazakhstan did not attend the session either. However, there was not even a sign of doubt concerning its status in the CSTO or any speculations on Kazakhstan’s intentions to suspend its membership. Thus, the facts and speculations presented lead to a few conclusions: either it is indeed the changing nature of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy maneuvers that constantly keeps Russia and other CIS counterparts worried about the reliability and stability of Uzbekistan’s adherence, or there is indeed some ground for the assertion that the reasons for Uzbekistan to remain in the CSTO are insufficient.