Due to the likely closing of the U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan, announced in February 2009, and a worsening security situation on the main land route from Pakistan due to Taliban attacks on cargo vehicles, the U.S. stepped up its efforts to secure alternative supply routes for the NATO troops serving in Afghanistan. NATO and the U.S. did not have to look for new solutions but rather activate a framework agreement for transiting non-lethal cargo signed between Russia and NATO on April 4, 2008. Although at this stage it is unclear exactly which countries will be involved in the transit, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Latvia have already given their official consent. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, Russia’s consent will be given as soon as it receives details on the cargos. As it has been announced that the goods will be delivered by railroad, the main transit route will likely be for the cargo to enter the European continent in Latvia, from there through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Considering that Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian country with a rail connection across the Afghan border, at Hayraton-Termez, it will probably serve as the main entry point for the goods. 

According to Ria Novosti, once the transit route becomes operational, 700 wagons will be sent weekly via this line, carrying commercial supplies such as construction materials, water, fuel and medicines. This development raises the issue of the capacity of the transit countries to inspect 700 wagons every week. Due to the commercial nature of the cargo, the U.S. and NATO forces will not be responsible for controlling the wagons’ contents. Therefore, a high risk appears of increased smuggling of precursor chemicals needed to extract heroin from opium from Europe into Afghanistan and illicit drugs from Afghanistan into Europe in the returning freight cars. Acetic anhydride, the key chemical for the conversion of opium into refined heroin has a commercial value of US$1 per liter in Europe, but US$600 per liter in Afghanistan.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world's opium and accounts for 82 percent of the global area under opium poppy cultivation. The route that the supplies will be traversing is part of the "northern route", which has been used by drug traffickers since at least the mid-1990s to smuggle drugs originating in Afghanistan to Russia and Europe via Central Asia. According to various estimates, about a third of all Afghan opiates are smuggled via this "northern route."

There are a number of factors that will make the new freight route appealing to drug traffickers once it is activated. First, the weak Afghan government and its law enforcement bodies have almost no capacity to fight drug trafficking effectively or discourage smugglers from using the trains to hide and smuggle drugs or precursors. Second, the returning trains will likely be going to Europe directly, without stops en route to load cargo and be subjected to inspections. This will appeal to the traffickers, since Europe is their main and most profitable destination. Third, the railroad is the cheapest way of smuggling drugs, offering large volumes and no middlemen. This could even increase the traffic on the northern route since it can bypass the tough enforcement of the Iranian route as well as the controls in place at other points on the Central Asian borders.

Since Central Asian countries have become a major transit route for Afghan drugs, crime and corruption has increased in the region, along with significantly increased drug abuse and related diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. Use of intravenous drugs in the region is causing one of the fastest growing HIV/AIDS rates in the world. In addition, crimes such as drugs and weapons trafficking, money laundering and terrorism are interrelated and pose a threat to the stability and development not only in Central Asia but to all the countries on the trafficking routes from origin to destination. Therefore, it is reasonable to question the logistical, political and human preparedness of the institutions in the transit countries to avert potentially negative consequences. The volume of the planned freight transit will definitely overwhelm the personnel at the border checkpoints of the transit countries and – lacking modern scanning equipment - reduce the capacity of customs officers to make a detailed search of each wagon without seriously impeding the movement of the goods. That is why it is crucial for the transit countries to step up their counter-narcotics capacities through their own resources or, if such resources are lacking, through donor assistance, by means of raising this issue with the U.S. Government and NATO. It is necessary to reinforce surveillance capacity throughout all checkpoints and plan counter-narcotics operations in advance. Ignoring this issue at this stage could turn the supply transit route into a main supply line for opiates to Europe, and precursor chemicals to Afghanistan.