Wednesday, 03 June 2009

WHOSE ‘SPHERE OF INFLUENCE’? EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT IN PRAGUE

Published in Field Reports

By Karoly Benes (6/3/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

 

On May 7, 2009, European leaders gathered in Prague to sign a Joint Declaration on the Eastern Partnership (EaP), planning to foster closer political and economic ties with six former Soviet states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership, a joint Polish-Swedish initiative, aims to bring democratic reforms, trade liberalization and a visa facilitation process for the involved partner countries, through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The initiative has met strong Russian condemnation, as President Dmitry Medvedev’s opinion showed: “We tried to convince ourselves [that the EaP is harmless], but in the end we couldn’t.

 

On May 7, 2009, European leaders gathered in Prague to sign a Joint Declaration on the Eastern Partnership (EaP), planning to foster closer political and economic ties with six former Soviet states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership, a joint Polish-Swedish initiative, aims to bring democratic reforms, trade liberalization and a visa facilitation process for the involved partner countries, through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The initiative has met strong Russian condemnation, as President Dmitry Medvedev’s opinion showed: “We tried to convince ourselves [that the EaP is harmless], but in the end we couldn’t. What bothers us is that for some states this is seen as a partnership against Russia.”

To ease Russian fears, EU leaders participating in the Summit were eager to emphasize the fact that Eastern Partnership is not directed against any country. EU High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana said: “This project is not against anybody, whoever thinks it is against somebody is wrong.” Paradoxically, it seems that the more the EU tries to brush away the Russian doubts, the less Moscow believes that the Partnership is not intended to interfere its ‘sphere of interests’. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: “There are those who may wish to present the invited participants [to the EaP Summit] with the choice: either you are with Russia, or with the European Union.” Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek rejected these allegations: “The current political climate in Europe is not comparable to the Cold War era. I used to live in the Soviet block and it was not of my own free will. These countries have decided to participate of their own free will, so I see a real difference there.” Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra also expressed his opinion: “They are our close Eastern neighbors and we have a vital interest in their stability and prosperity. This is an offer, not an EU projection of force.”

Despite the eminent EU interest to facilitate the stability in its Eastern neighborhood, like the South Caucasus, fostering democratic transition and economic cooperation, the common protocol picture taken of the heads of states at the Summit was skimpy, since ‘big names’, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, and Silvio Berlusconi stayed away from Prague on that particular day. It was especially noteworthy that almost all heads of the Mediterranean EU states were absent (including Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), which is telling of the fact that they see the Eastern Partnership either with indifference, or as a competitor to the French-brokered Union for Mediterranean, competing for the same financial sources under the umbrella of the European Neighborhood Policy. According to some rumors, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s absence was a retaliation for Czech Prime Minister Topolanek having skipped the Mediterranean Union summit in Paris last year.

However, Berlusconi had a better reason to stay away from Prague, sending his Minister of Welfare to represent Italy. Less than two weeks after the summit, he met with Vladimir Putin at the Black Sea resort of Sochi to sign a contract on the Russian South Stream gas pipeline project, which aims to transport gas from Russia to the European market bypassing Ukraine, and to double its planned capacity from 31 billion cubic meters per year to 63 bcm, as requested by Italian energy giant ENI. In the light of this development it is not surprising that Berlusconi did not intend to participate in the Eastern Partnership Summit, and the ‘Southern Energy Corridor Summit’ that followed on May 8. The Corridor is intended to decrease the EU’s energy dependence on Russia, fostering cooperation between the EU and the partner countries in the field of energy security and facilitate the EU’s Nabucco gas pipeline project, a natural rival to the South Stream project.

Partner countries also have diverging expectations toward the Eastern Partnership. While Ukraine and Georgia have explicitly been seeking EU membership, the Eastern Partnership perspective could be insufficient for them compared to bilateral negotiations on accession. Belarus, Armenia and Moldova have stronger ties with Moscow, and may find the Eastern Partnership too ambitious. Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko’s participation in the Prague Summit had been controversial since the idea of the country’s involvement in the Partnership emerged. Finally, making a clever choice, he stayed away from the Summit, thus avoiding inconvenient questions concerning his authoritarian regime. Moldova’s communist leader Vladimir Voronin was also absent, due to the violent police crackdown on demonstrations following the elections in April, which were sharply condemned by several EU members.

One of the main purposes of the Eastern Partnership’s multilateral mechanism is to build mutual understanding and trust among the involved states, a primary example being a bilateral meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, held on the margins of the Summit.

Despite difficulties and diverging opinions, the Eastern Partnership was officially launched with the Prague Summit. The multilateral framework of the cooperation has been set up and the main objectives have been defined. Now, it is Sweden’s turn to take over the management of the project, taking over the EU Presidency in July 2009.

 

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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