On July 23, President Bakiyev was re-elected for a second term with 76 percent of the vote, while his major opponent from the united opposition, Almazbek Atambaev, former prime minister, received 8 percent. Bakiyev’s victory was hardly a surprise. It was quite firmly believed from the outset of the election campaign that President Bakiyev enjoyed a greater popularity than the other five candidates. However, his victory highlighted that Bakiyev’s popularity rested less on the economic situation, and more on the ostensible political stability and the opposition’s weakness.       

And yet, although there was no strong opposition to pose a serious challenge to his regime, administrative resources were used nationwide, ballot stuffing and multiple voting occurred, and supporters of the opposition candidates were intimidated and threatened on several occasions. The ruling party, Ak Zhol, was closely and wholeheartedly engaged in the campaign. Many budget workers, including university and schoolteachers, formed a “cheap, obedient army” of pro-Bakiyev activists. 

At some universities in the southern region of Osh, classes were reportedly extended into July so that the students would be present on the day of elections. Pro-governmental media outlets spearheaded by the national state channel, NTRC, provided extensive coverage of Bakiyev both as a candidate and the incumbent, while often running contentious video materials degrading the image of Almazbek Atambaev, representing the United People’s Movement as a single candidate.    

The OSCE election observation mission stated that, “the presidential elections failed to meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections, including the commitment to maintain a clear separation between party and state,” in short, evaluating the conduct on Election Day as a “disappointment.”

The issue of possible public protests scarcely seems to be a headache for the government, with its new regulations for holding peaceful rallies passed in 2008. No less importantly, the population displayed a general apathy towards politics, kindled by the opposition's weakness and cemented by a growing awareness that Bakiyev, unlike his predecessor, is ready to defend his regime by harsher means. It is worth noting that a military facility was used for detaining about 40 participants of the opposition's protest march, organized on July 29 in Bishkek to protest the election results. Bakiyev’s opponents hardly represented a genuine challenge.

Bakiyev’s confidence was reinforced by the recent profitable deal as a result of his maneuvering between the U.S. and Russia over the Manas air base, which his opponents in vain tried to term “incompetence” on the president’s part. However, the main concern of Bakiyev’s team vis-à-vis the elections was a low turnout, which could essentially show a low level of legitimacy for his regime. In this respect, the use of administrative resources was crucial. In addition, a low turnout could technically trigger a second round of elections or, at worst, instigate a cycle of failed elections.  The Electoral Code stipulates that at least 50 percent of the eligible voters must participate in an election for it to be valid, and if no candidate receives an absolute majority, a second round is held with the two candidates that earned most of the votes. The OSCE election observation mission stated that, “this [50 percent] requirement increases the risk of potential electoral malfeasance...”

It is also worth mentioning that the election was held in the middle of summer, a period of high mobility of the population. Many people travel for a summer break or to work abroad as seasonal workers. Official estimates suggest that about 75,000 people would visit or work at sanatoriums on the shores of the Issyk-Kul Lake alone. However, it is harder to estimate the larger group of people consisting of average visitor and internal migrants that come to Issyk-Kul for seasonal works or vacation.

Another inaccuracy was related to the number of voters that were out of the country on the Election Day. The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 140,000 eligible voters abroad, and 2,7 million within the country. Nevertheless, the actual number of labor migrants is still disputed, with unofficial estimations putting the figure close to one million. Indeed, most of them are eligible voters.  But scattered throughout different regions of Russia and Kazakhstan and engaged mostly in menial labor, they are difficult to locate and they themselves may well have limited information on the election. Nevertheless, the turnout of those abroad reached 84 percent. It is also noteworthy that even though Batken oblast sends the largest portion of the labor migrants in comparison with other regions, the CEC announced that its turnout reached 90 percent.

Changes were made to the Electoral Code in January 2009. New provisions did not require inking of voters’ fingers, which could have been effectively used to prevent multiple voting. Also, voter registration no longer required a court order for voters to cast their ballot at a different polling station. During voting, unique ID numbers were not recorded, except for basic information such as name, date of birth, and address.  As voters list were not available for public display, the final number of voters remained unknown until the polls were closed. And, according to the OSCE observation mission, no crosschecking of voters list was conducted regionally or nationwide.

Bakiyev obviously does not embody the goals of the March 2005 events, but the general apathy towards politics, the high ambitions and disunity among opposition leaders, and the growing belief that the Bakiyev regime is ready to resort to any means to defend itself, made Bakiyev the best choice so far. Whether voluntarily or not, the governmental structures certainly played a key role in his landslide victory. It undermines democracy and the principles of free and fair elections.  Resulting despair and lack of finances will definitely push more opposition members to give up political activism or enter government bodies, unless an opposition with upgraded structure and strategy emerges.