On August 1, during the summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Kyrgyzstan, the presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev signed a Memorandum “On the intentions of the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic to further develop and enhance the bilateral legal base regulating the presence of Russian military forces on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the dislocation of additional Russian military forces on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic”. The Memorandum provides the framework for setting up a new military unit in Osh, Ferghana, under the aegis of the CSTO, which would include up to a battalion of military staff as well as an educational center for the preparation of Russian and Kyrgyz soldiers. On August 3, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement expressing decisive disagreement with Russia’s intentions. The Uzbek authorities explained that a Russian base in the Ferghana Valley could cause increased militarization in the region as well as nationalistic confrontation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the presence of Russian military forces on the territory of the CSTO member-states aims to maintain stability and security in the region from the threats of international terrorism. While it seems that there would be no serious reasons for Uzbekistan to worry about the presence of a CSTO ally on the territory of its neighbor, several speculations about Uzbekistan’s increased discontent with these plans have circulated in local media lately.

One of Uzbekistan’s major concerns is that Russia want to place the unit in an area that is “quite complicated and hard to predict”, where the borders of three Central Asian states come together. Indeed the Ferghana Valley is one of the most problematic areas in the region, famous for its high population density, huge shortage of resources and propensity for the emergence of extremist groups. Therefore, Uzbekistan fears that the base could cause increased militarization, a rise of nationalistic attitudes, as well as an increase of extremist forces that could cause serious destabilization in the region. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to these concerns that the unit’s location was not yet finalized. However, it seems that Uzbek authorities not only worry about the location of the Russian military base, but also about the intensified Russian military presence in the region.

Uzbekistan views Russia’s plans to deploy a military unit to the Ferghana Valley as an expansion of Russian military influence in the region. As U.S. political scientists Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Sanderson stated, Uzbekistan does not trust Russia, especially after the actions of the Russian army in Georgia in August 2008 that “made a strong impression on the Uzbek politicians, strengthening their feeling of vulnerability”. Drawing similar parallels, some experts assume that an increased Russian military presence in the region would create obstacles for Uzbekistan to bully its neighbors.

Vladimir Anohin, Vice-president of the Geopolitical Issues Academy, identified Uzbekistan’s open opposition as a “political game” by which it signals to the U.S. and NATO that it is capable of confronting Russia. Evgeniya Voyko, a foreign policy expert of the Political State of Affairs Centre, noticed elements of “political jealousy” in the statement of the Uzbek authorities. She states that Uzbekistan aspires to have a special role in Central Asia, especially concerning Afghanistan. Therefore, it seems to be disgruntled that the Kyrgyz Republic seeks to contribute and take on an important role.” Moreover, it may be interpreted as a signal from Russia that it does not consider Uzbekistan as its favored partner in the region.

The agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan was concluded as a part of the CSTO cooperation. Uzbekistan is still a member of the CSTO, and therefore no measures could be taken against it. As the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: ”The Russian military presence is of a defensive nature, and is in no case directed against other states”. Uzbekistan, however, has been a slack CSTO member lately, providing plenty of reasons for expecting its coming withdrawal from the block. For instance, it rejected to join the Common Rapid Response Forces (CRRF) initiative under the CSTO. Thus, many experts assume that the present situation may serve as yet another reason for Uzbekistan to leave the CSTO.

Last but not least, a development that may shed light on the current situation may lie in the fact that Uzbekistan appears willing to adopt “peaceful negotiations” instead of military strategy concerning Afghanistan. This was mentioned for the first time during the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 and then repeated at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Yekaterinburg in June this year. Specifically, President Karimov proposed to establish a new international mechanism – a “six plus three” Contact Group under the aegis of the UN. The group would consist of the six states that border Afghanistan plus Russia, the U.S., and NATO. Thus, by opposing the deployment of the Russian military unit in Kyrgyzstan, it is possible that Uzbekistan is articulating discontent not with the presence of Russia in the region as such, but the method that was chosen to ensure stability and peace.

Even though Russian authorities agreed to review the location of the Ferghana military base following Uzbekistan’s protests, the Kyrgyz authorities have recently stated that they will insist that the base is established in its south. Therefore, Uzbekistan can be expected to either present more serious reasons for why the base in Ferghana is inappropriate, or react more harshly to the issue, for example through withdrawing from the CSTO.