Indian President Pratibha Patil’s three-day visit to Tajikistan, ending on September 9, was largely ignored by international media. Arriving in Dushanbe at the second part of a two-nation tour of Russia and Tajikistan, Patil said India was interested in developing broader cooperation with Tajikistan to ensure regional, energy, and food security. In a rare honor, she was the only foreign leader attending celebrations of Tajikistan’s Independence Day on September 9. Although Patil’s tour of Tajikistan did not make international headlines, many in Dushanbe viewed the visit as heralding a new era of India’s engagement in the country.
India has recently sought to consolidate its close historical ties with Tajikistan in order to counterbalance China’s rising influence in Central Asia and to maintain a strategic relevance to the region regarded as part of its ‘extended neighborhood’. More importantly, New Delhi views Dushanbe as a crucial partner in preventing a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and limiting the export of Islamist ideologies in the region. Tajikistan has been India’s main point of entry into Afghanistan since the late 1990s. Both Dushanbe and New Delhi supported the Northern Alliance forces which battled against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Until 2002, India maintained a medical facility at Farkhor, on Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan, where injured Northern Alliance fighters were treated. It was mainly through Farkhor that India channeled its assistance to the Northern Alliance in the form of warfare equipment, intelligence and spare parts for Soviet-made attack helicopters.
According to Tajik foreign policy analyst Rashid Gani Abdullo, after the fall of the Taliban regime India was determined to maintain a point of access to Afghanistan. Since 2002 India has invested more than US$20 million in the reconstruction of the Soviet-era airbase at Ayni, roughly 15 kilometers outside Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe. The airbase attracted international attention in 2006 when the news spread that New Delhi was negotiating to deploy 12 military jets at Ayni, thus turning it into India’s first military base beyond its borders. Both Dushanbe and New Delhi have since denied that India sought an airbase at Ayni, with Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon announcing that Tajikistan would not host any foreign bases other than Russia’s on its territory.
Abdullo argues, however, that India never abandoned its ambition to set up a base in Tajikistan. According to the analyst, New Delhi needs the base at Ayni in order to improve its response capability to potential crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to be able to project power in energy-rich Central Asia. Most analyses link Dushanbe’s refusal to host an Indian military base to a strong opposition from Russia. Hence, as Dushanbe’s foreign policy latitude vis-à-vis Moscow appears to be rapidly growing, the likelihood of New Delhi acquiring an outpost in Central Asia increases.
Other experts argue that India’s intensified interest in Tajikistan is part of New Delhi’s “uranium diplomacy”. Already the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, India needs to continually increase its energy supply in order to sustain economic growth. New Delhi aims to more than double its nuclear power capacity by 2012, which currently accounts for roughly three percent of India’s energy supply. India recently obtained permission from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NGN), the 46-member body controlling global atomic commerce, to buy nuclear fuel and reactors for civilian use. New Delhi has already signed uranium import pacts with Russia and France, and is looking for additional sources of nuclear fuel.
It is not clear whether Tajikistan has economically viable uranium reserves to offer to India. It was previously believed that Tajikistan depleted its uranium ore deposits while supplying the Soviet defense industry. The status of Tajik uranium ore reserves was classified during the Soviet period. However, in an annual address to the parliament in April 2008, President Rakhmon said Tajikistan contains 14 percent of the world’s uranium reserves. Later that year, the parliament amended national legislation, allowing foreign companies to extract uranium ore in the country. There have been subsequent reports of Russian and Chinese companies intending to mine uranium in Tajikistan. New Delhi could outpace Moscow and Beijing in gaining access to Tajik uranium by acting faster and paying more.
The recent Chinese expansion in Tajikistan coinciding with declining Russian influence has signaled the rising importance of economics in Dushanbe’s relations with regional powers. New Delhi has been slow in appreciating such dynamics. Trade turnover between India and Tajikistan in 2008 was only US$57 million, according to official statistics, and its aid and assistance to Dushanbe is estimated at US$20-25 million. Indian companies have invested US$ 17 million in the reconstruction of the Varzob-1 hydroelectric power station, which supplies part of Dushanbe with electricity, and US$5 million in the construction of a five-star hotel in the Tajik capital. Following the Indian president’s visit, it was announced that Indian companies plan to invest US$16 million in the construction of a cement plant in northern Tajikistan and US$12 million in the development of gas fields in the country’s south. In order for New Delhi to gain access to the airbase at Ayni and to Tajik uranium reserves, it would need to go beyond its already strong collaboration with Dushanbe in defense and education, and focus more on the economic dimension of cooperation.