Wednesday, 28 October 2009

TURKISH-ARMENIAN PROTOCOLS SINGED, BUT NORMALIZATION PERSPECTIVES REMAIN UNCLEAR

Published in Field Reports

By Haroutiun Khachtarian (10/28/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On October 10, Turkey and Armenia signed Protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening their common land border in Zurich, Switzerland. To enter into force, the Protocols must be ratified by the parliaments of both countries; however, tension around the issue has already risen. The key problems which have so far prevented normal relations between the two neighbors, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (which involves Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Turkey has supported Azerbaijan through closing its border with Armenia and embargoing Armenian imports), and the issue of international recognition of the massacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide, surfaced even before the Protocols were signed.

On October 10, Turkey and Armenia signed Protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening their common land border in Zurich, Switzerland. To enter into force, the Protocols must be ratified by the parliaments of both countries; however, tension around the issue has already risen. The key problems which have so far prevented normal relations between the two neighbors, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (which involves Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Turkey has supported Azerbaijan through closing its border with Armenia and embargoing Armenian imports), and the issue of international recognition of the massacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide, surfaced even before the Protocols were signed. While the Protocols contain no direct reference to these problems, Armenia and Turkey have conflicting positions on the possible links between them and the normalization of their relations. The signature ceremony itself was on the brink of failure as the Armenian foreign minister, Edward Nalbandian, learned that his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu, intended to question the Genocide issue in his speech following the signature ceremony, and to link normalization between Armenia and Turkey to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The protocols were signed after a three and a half hour delay, as the top diplomats of the U.S., France, and Russia persuaded the two ministers to hold no speeches after the signature.

The Turkish government sent the protocols to the parliament for ratification on October 21. Although the ruling Party of Justice and Development holds a majority in the parliament, it is not certain that the protocols will be ratified. Some party members may well join the opposition in its criticism of the government, claiming that normalization with Armenia would harm the interests of Azerbaijan. The Turkish government calls on Armenia and the OSCE Minsk group to reach at least a minimal measure of progress to secure the Armenian-Turkish normalization.

Azerbaijan has sharply criticized the normalization process stating that opening the border between Turkey and Armenia at this stage and under current circumstances will have negative consequences not only for Azerbaijan and the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but for the South Caucasus as a region. In its efforts to prevent the ratification, it exerts intense pressure on the Turkish government using not only an unprecedented  political campaign, but also economic measures, such as increasing the natural gas price for Turkey and to abandon the Nabucco gas project via Turkey and to export Azerbaijani gas to Russia instead.

In contrast, the National Assembly of Armenia is not expected to have problems in ratifying the protocols, despite sharp criticism from the opposition and many organizations of the Armenian Diaspora. The position of Armenia regarding the obstacles to normalization was declared in a special statement by President Serzh Sargsyan on October 10, shortly before the signature ceremony in Zurich. The statement entitled “Address of the President of Armenia to the people of the Republic of Armenia and to all Armenians,” (hinting at the large Armenian Diaspora’s importance to the government) laid out the following basic position of Armenia: first, no relations with Turkey can question the reality of the patricide and the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian nation [in 1915]. It is a known fact and it should be recognized and condemned by the whole progressive humanity. Second, the issue of the existing border between Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of international law. The Protocols do not go beyond that. Third, these relations cannot and do not relate to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is an independent and separate process. Fourth, the Armenian side will react adequately if Turkey protracts the process of ratification or raises conditions for it. Armenia is signing these Protocols to create a basis for the establishment of normal relations between our two countries.

The Armenian parliament plans to ratify the protocols only after the Turkish ratification, fearing that the Turkish parliament may raise additional preconditions. Meanwhile, Turkish officials continue to make controversial statements, seeking to deny the opposition’s concerns. Besides the efforts to link the normalization process to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, plans have been proposed to investigate the Genocide issue through a “Joint commission of historians,” including Armenian ones. Some representatives of international media have confused this Commission of historians with the intergovernmental sub-commission “on the historical dimension,” stipulated by the Protocols. Although the Armenian government has repeatedly denounced such a plan (the above-mentioned statement by President Sargsyan reads: “The relevant sub-commission to be established under the intergovernmental commission is not a commission of historians”), some analysts and media outlets have claimed that Armenia has given up the goal of gaining international recognition for the 1915 massacres as Genocide for the sake of normalizing relations with Turkey. Opposition inside Armenia and its supporters in the Diaspora use such reports to enhance their criticism against the Armenian government. The introduction of a new resolution in the U.S. Senate on October 21 played into the hands of the Armenian position.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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