Georgia's president Mikheil Saakashvili voiced the proposal for Georgia is to become a logistical hub for NATO's Afghanistan mission in a phone interview with the Associated Press on January 29th.

This represents a second attempt on Saakashvili's part to create a corridor via Georgia and Central Asia to Afghanistan for Western military shipments by opening the country's Black Sea ports and airports to NATO warplanes and naval vessels. The Georgian plan expects NATO ships to cross the Black Sea to its ports, loading their cargo onto trains bound for Azerbaijan, and from there shipped across the Caspian Sea and driven across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in freight trucks. Tbilisi also offers refueling facilities for NATO cargo planes at its airports. The proposal has not attracted any substantial responses either from Brussels or the Pentagon since it was first voiced in February 2009. For now, Pakistan remains a major supply route, allowing NATO to ship more than 2,000 containers per month into Afghanistan.

The other option envisages transportation of nonlethal cargo by railway, connecting the Baltic States to Afghanistan via Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Though this route is considerably longer, it is also more secure, averting Pakistan’s Khyber Pass and potential Taliban attacks.

In addition to these two complementary transit routes, the U.S. last year sealed an agreement with Russia foreseeing the transit of lethal military equipment through Russian airspace to Afghanistan. However, in spite of a predicted 4,000 flights a year, only a few shipments have so far been allowed.

Stemming from this, it could be assumed that the Georgian offer would contribute to the development of new supply lines that do not cross Russia. However, whether Georgia’s infrastructure and logistical facilities are capable of carrying the bulk of NATO lethal cargo and how the combination of mixed transport means (seaports, trains and freight trucks) will reflect on expenses, is a different question. At first glance, it does not seem that a route via Georgia would be more viable or cheaper than the already existing Northern routes. Nevertheless, against this argument some Georgian officials and independent analysts claim that a considerable part of NATO shipments has already transited Georgia due to protracted negotiations with Russia over the transit issue and Russian unwillingness to fully comply with previous agreements.

Saakashvili’s revival of the transit issue is thus intended to increase the political significance of the route. But U.S. considerations on this issue are both political and technical. In this regard, the absence of first-class infrastructure in Georgia gives rise to several logistical hurdles, while the mixed means of transportation makes the route expensive and still will not imply the exclusion of Russia from U.S. Afghanistan strategy. Besides, due to the ongoing U.S. “reset policy” with Russia, the U.S. is likely to avoid irritating the Kremlin, hoping that the Northern route will be fully opened for NATO cargo.

What kind of dividends does the Georgian leadership seek by raising the issue, especially if Georgian Seaports and airports have already been open for the Alliance to the extent that Georgian infrastructural capacities allow?

Some experts presume that by revitalizing the question, Saakashvili is seeking to boost Georgia’s significance as a NATO partner and its perspectives of future membership. This is obviously connected to Georgia’s contribution of about 1,000 troops to Afghanistan, representing the highest per capita-troop contribution to the conflict zone among NATO members and partner countries.

While Georgia’s NATO aspirations are essential, its immediate intentions are more straightforward. First, Saakashvili explains Georgia’s devotion to the Afghanistan mission by saying that the sooner the terrorist threat is neutralized, the quicker the U.S. will be able to substantially protect Georgia. Second, through raising the transportation issue, Saakashvili seeks to demonstrate that Russia is not interested in a NATO success in Afghanistan, having prolonged the fulfillment of the transit deal. The expectation seems to be that NATO’s serious consideration of an alternative transportation route will either push Russia to cooperate with the Alliance or indicate that a reset of U.S.-Russia relations is a waste of time. A third and more important reason for the proposal is that the Georgian government seeks an increased NATO presence on the Black Sea, which it perceives as the easiest and perhaps only way to restrain new Russian interventions in Georgia.

Zurab Nogaideli, former Georgian PM and leader of Movement for Fair Georgia, recently launched open consultations with Russian PM Vladimir Putin, which resulted in a cooperation agreement between Fair Georgia and Russia’s ruling party United Russia. While Fair Georgia is a small party, the government is concerned that Russia will seek to destabilize Georgia through utilizing the country’s continuous severe political divisions. In order to reduce the risk of Russian military provocations, Georgia hopes to increase the NATO presence in the region as much as possible. This approach is backed by the government’s belief that the U.S. naval presence in Black Sea prevented Russian troops from moving on Tbilisi during the August war in 2008.