Two events took place in the South Caucasus in the second half of August 2010, which at first glance seem to have symmetrical effects on the two countries of the region which are involved in the most difficult regional conflict. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance treaty on August 16 during Turkish President Abdullah Gül’s two-day visit to Azerbaijan. Three days later, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid a state visit to Armenia, which also resulted in signature of new agreements on cooperation. However, the two deals are different in value, despite the apparent similarity.

The available information shows that the Turkish-Azerbaijani treaty does not contain any principal novelties; it just confirms the friendly relations between the two countries which have de facto existed for a long time. The treaty includes vague formulations about friendship and cooperation including “a comprehensive military cooperation between the two countries”. It cannot be regarded as a new factor in the region and the new Russian-Armenian agreement is not a “symmetrical answer” to that.

The Russian-Armenian documents provided a series of new specific elements which will enter into force after being ratified by the parliaments of both states. Most importantly, they extended the terms of the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia. Its 25-year deployment in Armenia stipulated in the treaty of March 16, 1995, was extended to 49 years. In addition, four new elements appeared which were of special interest to Armenia.

First, the base will undertake to guarantee Armenia's national security in its entirety, and not just along its borders with Turkey and Iran as before. Second, Russia takes on an obligation to supply Armenia with modern weaponry. Third, at least four Armenian enterprises will obtain licenses to establish service centers and joint ventures on technical servicing and repairs of military techniques on Armenian territory. Armenia will thus apparently produce weapons which Russia cannot transport across Georgian territory. Fourth, new impetus was provided for large investment projects in Armenia. In particular, the construction of a new unit at the Medzamor nuclear power plant is reportedly planned to start in 2011 with Russian technology. This new unit will replace the nuclear reactor currently in operation, which will be closed in 2016. Russia has also pledged to continue its investments in the rail transport system of Armenia, both in modernizing the existing railways and in constructing the Iran-Armenia railroad, another project of strategic importance for Armenia.

Thus, with the new agreement Russia has secured guarantees that it will remain a key player in the South Caucasus region for a long time, as its military base in Gyumri will be present in Armenia at least until 2046 (forty nine years from the 1997 ratification of the 1995 treaty). The U.S. seems to accept that Russia formally extends its presence in the region – the statement of State Department spokesman Mark Toner on August 26 being telling in this regard.

In return, Armenia received additional security guarantees. First, the documents signed during Medvedev’s visit are generally interpreted in Yerevan as additional evidence that Russia will support the Armenian side in case if Azerbaijan initiates military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, as frequently threatened by Baku. Thus, Yerevan hopes that the agreement makes a resumption of violence in the region less likely. In addition, Yerevan seems interested in developing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as this organization intends to set up military forces that will intervene if the security of its member states is endangered. The mechanisms for quick responses were among the principal issues discussed during the informal CSTO summit held in Armenia on August 20-21, immediately after the end of Medvedev’s visit. Hence the Armenian interest in hosting both Medvedev’s visit and the CSTO summit. It appears that these events were rather difficult to organize. In particular, Medvedev’s state visit was officially announced only on August 16, three days before it started. Evidently, Medvedev was not sure that the visit would take place, while Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan was highly interested in holding the state visit and the CSTO summit at the same time.