Wednesday, 19 January 2011

KAZAKHSTAN PREPARES TO EXTEND NAZARBAYEV’S MANDATE UNTIL 2020

Published in Field Reports

By Georgiy Voloshin (1/19/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

A few weeks after the OSCE Summit in Astana had reiterated the commitment of Kazakhstan and other member states to democracy and the rule of law, a group of Kazakh citizens put forward an audacious proposal to extend President Nazarbayev’s current mandate until December 6, 2020 without holding presidential elections in 2012. The popular assembly organized in the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in eastern Kazakhstan consisted of 850 representatives from 14 regions as well as the cities of Astana and Almaty who unanimously voted for the commencement of an endorsement campaign. According to Kazakhstan’s constitution, a referendum may be organized upon the condition that at least 200,000 signatures are collected and submitted to the Central Election Commission for verification and approval.

A few weeks after the OSCE Summit in Astana had reiterated the commitment of Kazakhstan and other member states to democracy and the rule of law, a group of Kazakh citizens put forward an audacious proposal to extend President Nazarbayev’s current mandate until December 6, 2020 without holding presidential elections in 2012. The popular assembly organized in the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in eastern Kazakhstan consisted of 850 representatives from 14 regions as well as the cities of Astana and Almaty who unanimously voted for the commencement of an endorsement campaign. According to Kazakhstan’s constitution, a referendum may be organized upon the condition that at least 200,000 signatures are collected and submitted to the Central Election Commission for verification and approval.

In their address to the President, the delegates specifically underscored that Kazakhstan had “gone a long way from being a fragment of the vast empire to becoming a regional powerhouse and an economic and political leader in the former Soviet space”. They also recalled Kazakhstan’s successes in demarcating its national borders without endangering relations with its neighbors. The litany of achievements – from the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1991 to the 2010 OSCE chairmanship – was attributed to the political will and courage of Nazarbayev, whom the initiative group finally asked to remain in power until the end of the new decade to ensure further breakthroughs. The Central Election Commission was quick to recognize the legitimacy of such a proposal by registering the group’s appeal on December 27.

The next step was taken by the Parliament. Ural Mukhammedzhanov, the Chairman of the Majilis, the lower chamber, voiced the counter-proposal of some deputies to amend the Constitution so as to organize a national referendum granting Nazarbayev the right to exercise his supreme powers for another 10 years. A second suggestion turned out to insert the word “Elbasy”, which in Kazakh means “the leader of the nation”, into the body of the Constitution, though the recently amended law “On the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan” already contains this explicit wording. At the same time, Nazarbayev decided to veto the proposal on January 6 by issuing a decree in which he clearly rejected a new formula.

Notwithstanding the President’s veto power, the two chambers of Parliament summoned to a plenary session on January 14 unanimously adopted the amendments, while the Constitution stipulates the need for an 80 percent majority vote to override the presidential veto. The Central Election Commission also contributed to the pro-referendum campaign by declaring that more than 5 million endorsements had been collected, far more than the 200,000 duly testified signatures required by the law. In turn, the Kazakh President’s political advisor Ermukhamet Ertysbayev publicly deplored the fact that the Parliament had “imposed” its will on the head of state, but according to his view the legislature could not have acted differently, as the contrary could mean a full neglect of the population’s volition. Ertysbayev also admitted that if the ruling NurOtan party had participated in the campaign from the very beginning, the number of endorsements obtained might easily exceed 8 million, which is the whole bulk of Kazakhstani voters. Thus, the possibility of a referendum was confirmed by a person close to Nazarbayev himself.

The response of Kazakhstan’s OSCE partners was prompt and unequivocal. Speaking at his farewell press conference on January 6, before any amendments to the Constitution had been voted, the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland, who is expected to end his stint in Astana in the next few weeks, expressed the U.S. Government’s position on the issue. “For people to have a democratic voice in their country, they should have a bigger choice than simply ‘yes’ or ‘no’” in a referendum. There should be a choice between different ideas and different personalities”, Hoagland said. On January 14, the European Union made public its vision of the situation, emphatically stressing that “any decision to extend the presidential term in office until 2020 would be in contradiction with Kazakhstan's commitment to democracy and good governance”.

At the same time, the director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Ambassador Janez Lenarcic told the journalists that “the purpose of the planned referendum is inconsistent with Kazakhstan’s international obligations”.

“It is particularly distressing that this referendum initiative appeared only weeks after Kazakhstan as the then-chairman hosted an OSCE Summit that in strong terms reaffirmed all OSCE commitments, including those on democratic elections”, Lenarcic noted.

Despite the generally pessimistic attitudes of foreign observers, some public associations in Kazakhstan, such as the “Lawyers for fair elections” group, decided to mount vigorous campaigns to defend the idea of a referendum. 
Read 2738 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

  

2410Starr-coverSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Greater Central Asia as A Component of U.S. Global Strategy, October 2024. 

Analysis Laura Linderman, "Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach," Civil Georgia, September 7, 2024.

Analysis Mamuka Tsereteli, "U.S. Black Sea Strategy: The Georgian Connection", CEPA, February 9, 2024. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, ed., Türkiye's Return to Central Asia and the Caucasus, July 2024. 

ChangingGeopolitics-cover2Book Svante E. Cornell, ed., "The Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus" AFPC Press/Armin LEar, 2023. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, Stepping up to the “Agency Challenge”: Central Asian Diplomacy in a Time of Troubles, July 2023. 

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AM

Silk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.



 

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter