Wednesday, 05 October 2011

LANGUAGE CONTROVERSY IN KAZAKHSTAN SPARKS SOCIAL ANXIETY

Published in Field Reports

By Georgiy Voloshin (10/5/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Since early September, Kazakhstan’s domestic politics have focused on a language controversy stemming from the publication of the so-called “Letter of 138,” in which a number of politicians, cultural workers and associative leaders called for an amendment of Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s constitution. The current reading of its second clause says that “the Russian language is officially used in state organs and local government authorities along with the Kazakh language.

Since early September, Kazakhstan’s domestic politics have focused on a language controversy stemming from the publication of the so-called “Letter of 138,” in which a number of politicians, cultural workers and associative leaders called for an amendment of Article 7 of Kazakhstan’s constitution. The current reading of its second clause says that “the Russian language is officially used in state organs and local government authorities along with the Kazakh language.” According to the initiator of this demarche, a former Member of Parliament and a famous poet, Mukhtar Shakhanov, many Kazakhstanis are confused about the interpretation of this article, sometimes believing that both Russian and Kazakh are official languages in the country, whereas the constitution reserves this privilege only for Kazakh. In an interview to journalists given in the wake of the publication of “Letter of 138”, Shakhanov even referred to the unwillingness of some Kazakhstanis to properly study Kazakh, as they may wrongly think that “their President is Putin and their official language is Russian”.

The letter addressed to the president, the Prime Minister, and the speakers of both parliamentary chambers immediately caused social anxiety and caused a high number of comments to Internet-published articles about the language situation in Kazakhstan’s schools and public bodies. To the frustration of the Letter’s authors, a few signatories later publicly disavowed their presumed claims, saying that they were only petitioning for the strengthening of the role of the Kazakh language, not for the exclusion of Russian from the constitution. The speaker of the Majlis (lower chamber), Ural Mukhammedzhanov, spoke against any radical measures risking social destabilization, whereas his colleague from the Senate, Kairat Mami, refuted the existence of any draft laws aiming to reduce the use of Russian either this year or in 2012. “In our circumstances, national solidarity is based … on the possibility and right of many Kazakhstanis to speak Russian,” he said. “The language issue is a question of social consolidation. I believe that artificially instigated discussions on this subject negatively influence the current state of stability in our society.”

Most of the deputies criticized the proposed amendment, judging that any imposed measures could lead to the deepening of social mistrust and language-based discord in a country where Russian remains the most commonly used language, with Kazakh mainly used in the southern and western regions. Though President Nazarbayev did not make any comments with regard to the “Letter of 138”, his advisor for political issues, Ermukhamet Ertysbayev, expressed his personal opinion about the perniciousness of opening discussions on something that is “both off today’s agenda and highly artificial, unnecessary either for Kazakhs, or for Russians, or for any of the other 130 ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan.” In Ertysbayev’s view, the proposed changes are a hundred paces away from the top of the list in terms of required improvements in politics, economy and cultural life. Nazarbayev’s advisor also added that the Russian language, which is one of the six world languages used by the United Nations, could not simply be displaced from anywhere.

The majority of local experts believe that this and other attempts to “reconfigure” the existing language landscape are sponsored by some shadow forces interested in further destabilization and growth of nationalist sentiments. “This is their first test of the pen, a wild blackmail of Nazarbayev, Russians, and Russian-speaking Kazakhs,” commented Aigul Omarova, the chief panelist at a recent round table on social solidarity in Almaty. According to Ms. Omarova, the idea of publishing the letter is closely tied to the recently revealed terrorist activities in the country’s west, as well as critical reactions to Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan. She also emotionally deplored the involvement of the poet Shakhanov in the language controversy, given his previously supposedly neutral track record in terms of language policy.

In mid-August, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Culture unveiled its new draft law on the status of the Kazakh language for civil servants. Apart from previously promised changes about the required level of proficiency in the state language, this document also stipulates that all official correspondence shall be conducted only in Kazakh, thus leaving many citizens with no choice as to which language to use, as Article 7 may suggest. In compensation for the toughening of language rules, the Ministry announced a forthcoming free-of-charge distribution of Kazakh-Russian phrasebooks published in millions of copies for more than US$ 1 million. The ensuing discussions revealed the prevailing reticence of the Ministry’s partners for language policy, which testified to the need of preserving the status quo and elaborating a milder program of high quality language education. At the same time, President Nazarbayev signed on September 1 a decree ordering the closure of a Russian-language broadcasting service in one of the country’s national channels, Kazakhstan TV.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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