Wednesday, 19 October 2011

GEORGIAN BILLIONAIRE ANNOUNCES POLITICAL AMBITIONS

Published in Field Reports

By Maka Gurgenidze (10/19/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

In written statements released on October 7 and 12, Georgian tycoon and philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili publicly expressed his intention to win the 2012 parliamentary elections by an absolute majority. Although the Civil Registry Agency launched procedures for revoking the Georgian citizenship of the billionaire-turned-politician, depriving him the right to establish and finance a political party, Ivanishvili’s announced ambitions triggered vast speculation on a probable redesign of Georgia’s political landscape.

Ivanishvili, who amassed the major portion of his US$ 5.

In written statements released on October 7 and 12, Georgian tycoon and philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili publicly expressed his intention to win the 2012 parliamentary elections by an absolute majority. Although the Civil Registry Agency launched procedures for revoking the Georgian citizenship of the billionaire-turned-politician, depriving him the right to establish and finance a political party, Ivanishvili’s announced ambitions triggered vast speculation on a probable redesign of Georgia’s political landscape.

Ivanishvili, who amassed the major portion of his US$ 5.5 billion capital in Russia in the 1990s, returned to Georgia and settled in his native village of Chorvila ten years ago. He has financed hundreds of charitable and small-business ventures and has kept a low public profile. Ivanishvili maintained that he had “no political interests” and that his close to ten years of residence in Georgia proved it.

However, “President [Mikheil] Saakashvili’s total monopoly on power” prompted him to form a political party and run in the upcoming parliamentary elections since “without personal involvement it would have been very difficult to achieve needed results,” the statement says. For this purpose, Ivanishvili outlines his political goals as establishing cooperation with “healthy political forces,” increasing the possibility for restoring Georgian jurisdiction over the breakaway regions, creating an independent judicial system and a genuinely attractive investment climate. Stressing the significance of agricultural projects, Ivanishvili also plans to invest US$ 1 billion in the sector. From a foreign policy standpoint, he outlines the need “to start sorting out relations with Russia” and “deepen friendship and integration with the United States and European Union.” To persuade the public of the honesty in his intentions, Ivanishvili pledges to sell assets located in Russia accounting for one third of his total capital and abandon his Russian and French citizenships.

Ivanishvili also suggests buying television stations with news broadcasting licenses, primarily the channels Kavkasia and Maestro TV, for three times their market price. He intends to create a “public information center” to deliver impartial stories to the public and promises to return the stations to their previous owners for a symbolic price of 1GEL in maximum two years.

Further, Ivanishvili declares his openness to cooperate with Our Georgia – Free Democrats Party (OGFD), the Republican Party, and the former public defender and now chairman of Georgian Party Sozar Subari, but rules out cooperation with the Georgian Party itself. He also excludes cooperation with the “pseudo opposition” under which he names the Christian-Democratic Movement, Labor Party, New Rights Party, National Democratic Party, Georgian Party, Democratic Party of Georgia and European Democrats.

Ivanishvili’s emergence in Georgian politics was assessed by representatives of the National Movement as an attempt by the Kremlin “to buy Georgia’s future” whereas Ivanishvili himself was designated as Russian PM Vladimir Putin’s stooge in Georgia. “Our response is that Georgia’s freedom and Georgia’s democracy and the choice of the Georgian people is not for sale,” ruling party lawmaker Nugzar Tsiklauri said. In order to prevent the infiltration of “Russian money” into Georgian politics, the funds for “qualified electoral entities” should be further increased, said the ruling party chairman of the parliamentary committee for legal affairs Pavle Kublashvili.

Meanwhile, the Civil Registry Agency at the Georgian Justice Ministry revoked Ivanishvili’s Georgian citizenship drawing on article 32 of the law on Georgian citizenship. The article says that obtaining citizenship of another state by a Georgian citizen results in the loss of Georgian citizenship. Nevertheless, the abolition of Georgian citizenship also requires a presidential order which was not available on the state online registry of legal acts by the time the revocation took place. Eka Beselia, a lawyer acting on behalf of billionaire said “We demand a clear and concrete explanation and at the same time to receive the legal act based on which the authorities have decided that Bidzina Ivanishvili is no longer a Georgian citizen.”

Ivanishvili’s unexpected transformation from apolitical into a political figure shook the ruling party’s dominance in politics. His emergence on the political scene makes it more likely that competition between political forces will grow and become more dynamic in the near future. However, this does not mean that Ivanishvili will be able to win upcoming elections. Apart from financial resources, a political leader also needs a strong human network unified through the same principles and aspirations. His current lack of human resources might be the major impediment for Ivanishvili who searches supporters among unpopular opposition parties and the so-called “red intelligentsia”. Given the ruling party’s accusation on his links to the Kremlin, Ivanishvili urgently needs to convince the electorate that he will be a trustworthy political leader strictly separated from Moscow’s intrigues. To this end, his abandonment of Russian and French citizenship and sale of Russian assets are hardly enough.

Ivanishvili’s party could nevertheless become attractive to a new generation who has not been able to make their careers within the ruling party but have the ambitions and education to become members of a new political team.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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