But in common with the Chinese educational style of memorization and recitation, whether or not the message ever sinks more than skin deep is irrelevant. Airing the problems experienced between the nations vis-à-vis each other is tantamount to the sin committed by airing such thorny issues as the Falun Gong, whose name even lingered over is a crime sanctionable by prison. To allude to ill feeling between ethnic groups or imply dissatisfaction with the government’s method of handling ethnic relations can be interpreted as encouraging separatism. But no amount of window-dressing can disguise the fact that problems exist that no amount of propaganda can purge.

The more Chinese migrants who flood into Xinjiang every day, the greater the problems will be. Attempts by the government to dilute the Uyghurs, Xinjiang’s native people, only stoke the fires of belligerence and discontent.

But there are two sides to this problem and a realistic assessment of what is happening in Xinjiang needs to account for both. It is not difficult to engage a Uyghur on the wrongs of Chinese migration, the invasion of his territory with Chinese imperialists, the Uyghur right to independence and their daily struggles for recognition amid the onslaught from the east. Foreigners are sitting targets for an army of Uyghur malcontents seeking a sympathetic ear. Few invitations to dinner pass without a reference to the latest injustice wrought by the “invaders,” a critique of Han facial features, their eating habits and manners. Few Uyghurs would waste their breath in praise for the Chinese or do so within earshot of another Uyghur. This would be tantamount to betrayal.

In fact for a Uyghur, the Chinese are an obsession. Very few actions are done, very few problems are understood and very few decisions are made by Uyghurs without a negative reference to their hated cohabitees.

The Chinese on the other hand expect the Uyghurs to fall in with their ways. The difference between the Chinese in Xinjiang and traditional ruling colonialists is that most Chinese are preoccupied themselves with the business of their own survival and many barely subsist. Thousands are drafted into dubious building “contracts” and discarded after six months without pay when government tax concessions for construction companies expire, and still thousands of others barely survive doing filthy menial tasks around the city.

Professional Chinese are difficult to draw on the subject of their Uyghur neighbors. They too are getting on with life in an increasingly competitive and materialistic China. They fret about their “one child” who they push through school, squeeze into further education using every bit of ‘guanxi’ (connections) they can muster and pay exorbitant amounts under the table on graduation for a coveted job. They too struggle with inequalities, human rights issues and pressures to join the Communist Party.

Uyghur reluctance to fraternize with their ‘unclean’ foe discourages individual friendships and socializing. Uyghurs tend to be viewed from a distance as a novelty, a minority group that is good at singing and dancing, and famous for its ethnic food. Government propaganda concerning the ‘East Turkestan Terrorists’ has installed a wariness and fear of the Uyghur people and most Chinese tend to give them a wide berth.

Most Chinese in the capital have no understanding of the Uyghur culture, have never attempted even the rudiments of the language and a vast proportion would be oblivious as to the nature of, or even existence of the gulf between the races.

Their benign indifference combined with paternal condescension keeps many Chinese from regarding Uyghurs as equals. The consequent Uyghur inferiority complex and intransigence creates a climate of mistrust and intolerance. Few Chinese companies will employ Uyghurs as a result, in fact most state categorically that Uyghurs should not apply, thus breeding hostility.

A young Chinese professional returning from a short holiday among Uyghurs in the south of Xinjiang returned “amazed” that Uyghurs were a culture and people in their own right. Always having assumed that all Uyghurs spoke Mandarin, she was shocked to discover how few people understood her. Despite Chinese friends’ warnings not to venture alone into Uyghur areas, she was surprised by the friendliness and hospitality she met. “We are always told to stay away from Uyghurs,” she said. “But I felt no fear among them at all.”

But despite her foray into “Uyghuristan”, she continues to regard Uyghurs as little more than a tourist attraction in “her China.” Like most Chinese women, she remain oblivious to the offence caused in Uyghur areas by her scanty summer clothing, her diet of pork, and love of beer. She is confused by the Uyghur insistence to live by “Xinjiang time” two hours behind Beijing time and makes no concessions to their hopes and dreams for “their” country.

Chinese and Uyghur live parallel lives in Xinjiang. Even those whose mastery of the language bridges the physical gulf find that Uyghurs are reluctant to confide in them the true nature of their feelings and the hatred that simmers beneath the surface.

Very soon, the Uyghurs will be a minority in Xinjiang and attempts to dilute them will have succeeded. Assimilation, however, will be slower in coming. Propaganda posters and slogans merely highlight the problems; they do nothing to solve them. There is a bottom line that no amount of campaigns will ever address, or indeed dare to address. The Chinese are taking over Xinjiang and will continue to do so with a vengeance. The Uyghurs wish they did not and want them to leave. In the end, Chinese indifference may hurt the Uyghur people, but the Uyghur reaction to it hurts no one but themselves.