Wednesday, 23 February 2005

INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS HARDLINERS REMAINS IN AFGHANISTAN

Published in Field Reports

By Daan van der Schriek (2/23/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

In January, Afghan president Hamid Karzai reappointed eight of the nine judges of the country’s Supreme Court, although they have the reputation of being fundamentalist and most of them apparently fall short of the minimum education standards set down for Supreme Court judges in the constitution that was approved in January. The court’s deputy head Fazal Ahmad Manawi was the only member to be replaced, by Ayatollah Mohammad Hashim Salehi – the first Shia to be appointed to the court in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan.

Members of the court are prohibited from being involved in politics.

In January, Afghan president Hamid Karzai reappointed eight of the nine judges of the country’s Supreme Court, although they have the reputation of being fundamentalist and most of them apparently fall short of the minimum education standards set down for Supreme Court judges in the constitution that was approved in January. The court’s deputy head Fazal Ahmad Manawi was the only member to be replaced, by Ayatollah Mohammad Hashim Salehi – the first Shia to be appointed to the court in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan.

Members of the court are prohibited from being involved in politics. But most of its current judges, including Chief Justice Fazal Hadi Shinwari, are close to the leader of the conservative Ittehad-e-Islami party of the former mujahedin Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who holds Wahhabist views. It is believed that Sayyaf was promised continuing influence over the court in a political deal before the October presidential election. Manawi, the dismissed judge, recently stated that appointments to the Supreme Court are based on politics and tribal interests rather than merit. “There is no real judicial system [in Afghanistan] because it serves the government and powerful figures rather than the people,” he said. Apart from Sayyaf, there are other fundamentalist former mujahedin – such as ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ismail Khan – that now support Karzai and who ultimately have to get something in return for their continued support.

The Supreme Court has made several controversial decisions in the past bearing witness of its orthodox views that should have appealed to the fundamentalists in Karzai’s camp: it recommended death sentences for two journalists that would have insulted Islamic principles by criticizing mujahedin; it tried to bar a candidate from running for president after questioning polygamy; it wanted to bar women singers from television; it condemned a “Miss Afghanistan” for appearing in a beauty contest in bikini.

However, the court’s ruling was ignored in all these cases. But it has had more success with other attempts. A first ban on cable television – that conservatives believe is exposing Afghans to Western obscenities – imposed in January 2003 was revoked the following April. But on November 12th 2004, on the heels of Karzai’s election as president, the ban was reinstated. This showed the continuing influence of conservatives also with the new administration. Although the ban on cable television was subsequently eased, the available amount of channels went from some 60 before November to 20 now.

In the last week of January, police started raiding bars and restaurants (as well as illegal brothels) in Kabul, closing down the brothels and establishments selling alcohol without valid licenses. This, although perfectly legal, is interpreted by observers in Kabul as another move to “sweeten” hardliners as the bars are mainly frequented by foreigners (Afghan nationals are prohibited from consuming alcohol) and don’t seem to constitute the country’s biggest problem.

But fighting against alcohol and cable television appeals to all conservatives and gives them a common cause. It should also appeal to religious conservatives currently outside the government, more of whom seem steadily to be won over for Kabul. On January 16th a group of 81 Taliban was released from U.S. custody in Afghanistan. Chief Justice Fazal Hadi Shinwari said at the occasion that the U.S. had agreed to release the remaining 400 Taliban prisoners in Afghanistan also – and that the Afghan government would give those Taliban willing to “come back” the opportunity to do so. Subsequently, on February 20th, four ex-Taliban officials led by their former envoy to the UN, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, claimed they had reached reconciliation with Kabul. It is possible that another fundamentalist warlord still battling the Karzai government, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, might soon turn “wholly political” as well, according to the Peshawar bureau chief of the Pakistani daily The News, Behroz Khan. It is unlikely that these defections from the insurgents will end guerrilla attacks in Afghanistan. But it will add to the strength of fundamentalists with the authorities in Kabul.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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