BACKGROUND: In December 1991, the CIS was created to help manage the collapse of the Soviet Union and resulting economic and political instability. The Kremlin hoped to maintain Russian leadership and supremacy in Eurasia by turning the CIS into a tightly knit economic union and collective security arrangement. After 14 years, a collection of ineffectual summits, unimplemented treaties and unfulfilled promises has highlighted the slow death of the CIS. President Putin recently asserted that “It has become obvious that its mission today and its current objectives have started to rely on obsolete forms and methods of work.” Putin also failed to list any concrete proposals at the August 26th Summit in Kazan, Tatarstan (save in cultural and educational realms). All that was mustered was a reference to a possible “High-level group” of wise men tasked with developing new models of integration. The impending dissolution of the CIS as a stable organizational mechanism comes at a trying time for Eurasian security and stability, as corruption, rapid political change and increased geopolitical competition has placed the international spotlight on the region. “Colored revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan create an environment of distrust and antipathy between Russia and the West. These events undermined Russia’s influence and control, instilling a traditional sense of siege mentality in the country’s political elites. As a result, Russia’s political elite lays claim to the belief that these revolutions were orchestrated by outside forces, and have called for an end to the “forcible democratization” of the post-Soviet space. The United States has felt the sting of Russian pressure in Central Asia. To counter the unwelcome trend of revolutions in its backyard, Russia no doubt believed that it could balance its recent misfortunes by pressing to remove the United States’ military footprint in Central Asia. In July, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – led by Russia and China – openly called for the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Central Asia. Due to U.S. pressure for democratic change and investigations of the Andijan violence, President Karimov of Uzbekistan followed up the SCO declaration by calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. military base at Karshi-Khanabad within 180 days. This environment of tactical competition and instability, however, may have finally instilled a change in the minds of Russia’s geopolitical strategists. As Russia grudgingly accepts the demise of the CIS, leaks from the Kremlin are being released to gauge reactions in Russia and the West to a new course in Russian thinking. Recent statements by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and a so far unnamed high-level source in the Presidential Administration indicate that a new sense of pragmatism may be creeping inside the walls of the Kremlin. The unnamed advisor stated that Moscow would like to set up “civilized” rules for managing the ongoing geopolitical competition in Eurasia between Russia, the United States and the EU. Karasin went on to state that Russia was interested in creating a more effective and predictable relationship in Eurasia between Russia and the West. “We should find a balance, which would renew the atmosphere and our relations here with our western partners.”

IMPLICATIONS: The Borjomi Declaration signed on August 12 by the Presidents of Ukraine and Georgia – to create a Community of Democratic Choice which will span the entire “Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian” area – is a step which formalizes the increasing Western tilt of a contingent of CIS states. This declaration was no doubt on the minds of those who made statements on the demise of the CIS and the need for “civilized rules of the game” in Eurasia. Whether or not by intent, the declaration is a challenge to Russia’s ambitions of leveraging a united CIS as an integrated ideological, economic and political force in Eurasia. Russia’s leaders have begun to more coherently take into account the geopolitical realities of the Eurasian space. Instead of placing itself in opposition to Western influence in the region, there are those in the Kremlin arguing for a new and more “realistic” approach. This approach sees it in the interest of Russia to channel and accommodate U.S. influence in a more pragmatic fashion. Overall, however, Russian calls for open and frank discussion with the West on political order and stability in Eurasia will likely be seen as a veiled attempt at admitting past Russian mistakes. Aside from seeking to uphold democratic values and free market principles, the United States and the West will not find it in their interests, nor value systems, to reach any sort of mutual agreement with Russia which seeks to carve out new spheres of influence in the region. Entering into so-called “civilized” rules of the game over the heads of the political leaders, institutions and populations of the countries in the former Soviet space would ultimately diminish respect for Western power and influence, providing Russia an opportunity to continue to hold an exclusive sphere of influence in the region. If Russia actually does wish to help transform Eurasia into “an arena of mutually respectful and predictable partnership”, it will have to come to grips with a lingering zero-sum mentality among its political elite. It will also have to decide on which civilized rules it wants to play by, as behavior surrounding the “colored revolutions” has shown that the West and Russia continue to uphold contrasting ideological visions. Specifically, Russia’s double standard in the South Caucasus – clamping down on separatism in the North Caucasus while deepening patronage in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – questions whether Moscow will adhere to the same type rules the West will be interested in promoting.

CONCLUSIONS: Irrespective of a possible warming and pragmatic tilt in Russian policy, the Kremlin’s commitment to seek cooperation and a more even-handed approach to CIS states is anything but certain. When Russia calls for “civilized rules of the game,” Western policymakers will be greatly interested in seeing what these rules entail. Russia’s strategy may be to try and constrict U.S. and Western interests by shifting Eurasian initiatives through a U.S.-Russian dialogue which would flow through the Kremlin. Clinging to isolated statements of Russian officials will not obscure the fact that Russia is no longer the unifying force in the Eurasian space. Tactically trying to subvert Western influence in its former sphere of influence has been an exercise in futility for Russia. It has become clear that the most important force for change in the region will continue to be the dissatisfaction of populations and political elites with the static post-Soviet political regimes. How the West and Russia seek to deal with this reality will determine whether confrontation or cooperation is the dominating geopolitical trend in Eurasia. In the past, Russia had great difficulty managing its day-day relationship with its “near abroad” and formulating a strategic vision for the region. The death-knell of the CIS provides the West with a chance to get in on the ground floor of a new strategic framework for Eurasia. As the U.S.-Russian relationship has suffered as of late, cooperation on Eurasia may set the stage for a more mature and pragmatic relationship. It might just be the time to focus and develop what Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin calls “a fair competition of ideas and concepts, not power” between all countries and great powers interested in Eurasia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Mark Simakovsky is a recent graduate of the Master of Science in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University. He is currently a Fulbright Research Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (GFSIS) in Tbilisi, Georgia.