BACKGROUND: Although these were ostensibly anti-terrorist exercises, Chinese Chief of Staff Liang Guanglie stated that they were directed against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. While the operations conducted here clearly represent the kinds of operations China might conduct against Taiwan which it regards as a separatist province, China also regards the threat posed by Muslim insurgents in Xinjiang as separatism and extremism based on religion and quite clearly regards those who conduct these ”separatist” operations as terrorists. Nevertheless these exercises’ scale and scope suggest a large-scale conventional operation rather than an anti-terrorist mission. The participating land, sea, and air forces conducted live-fire exercises, tactical and long-range air strikes using nuclear capable TU-22M heavy bombers, airborne landings, naval blockades, amphibious landings, and ground assaults. These exercises also clearly possessed considerable political significance for both parties. Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuang stated that they represented Russia and China’s ”key, strategic decision” to strengthen bilateral defense partnership amid changing international conditions and to meet new threats. One might regard these new threats and changing conditions as representing terrorism and separatism as in Chechnya or Xinjiang, but these code words also clearly point to what both governments regard as American hegemonism and unilateralism to the point of trying, or so they believe, to promote democracy in their own countries and spheres of influence. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov also stated that he looked forward to more such exercises in the future. In other words, these exercises represented a military extension of the alliance that took shape at the foreign ministers’ meetings and at the SCO’s July summit in Astana, and that is frankly directed against America and its policies in Central Asia. Foreign and Russo-Chinese observers quickly discerned this political dimension, ascribing the following motives to these exercises: first, an attempt to consolidate if not extend Sino-Russian partnership, if not alliance, against American power and policy in Central and possibly East Asia, to the military dimension. Second, both states’ shared desire to assert their military prowess particularly against American policy and defense capability. They also probably intended to show Central Asian governments how they could stand up to terrorist and separatist threats in Central Asia. Third, Moscow’s interest in showcasing its top of the line and most recent defense technologies and weapons systems for possible future sale to China. Fourth, Russia’s interest in the context of its program of concurrent exercises comprising virtually every branch of Russia’s armed forces, to revive those forces and demonstrate their capabilities to domestic and foreign audiences. Fifth, China’s continuing rehearsals of possible options against Taiwan, e.g. amphibious landings, airborne descents, long-range strikes, naval blockades, etc.

IMPLICATIONS: Certainly Ivanov’s and Cao’s words suggest the shared desire for continued and deeper partnership to confront changes in world affairs, i.e. the various ”colored” revolutions in CIS countries, and American hegemonism and unilateralism. In Central Asia, the increasing clarification of a coherent multi-dimensional strategy to constrain U.S. options in Central Asia and beyond can be discerned. Essentially the combined challenge of U.S. economic assistance, military bases and assistance, and now support for democracy has galvanized both Moscow and Beijing while Washington’s support for democracy has equally galvanized Central Asian governments, notably Uzbekistan, but even Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, either to evict U.S. forces from local bases or to warn in not so veiled terms against efforts to ”impose” democracy in Central Asia. Russia and China have employed intense pressure, large-scale financial and even energy assistance and probably deals regarding succession to support or establish favorable and anti-democratic policies and governments in Central Asia and to increase their military presence there. In the latter instance, we see the expansion of Russia’s base in Kyrgyzstan, a new one in Tajikistan, and numerous rumors of its interest in acquiring new bases in Uzbekistan. China has not only stepped up its defense diplomacy with other SCO members but is also wielding economic power increasingly overtly. It loaned or gave Uzbekistan $1.5 billion in assistance right after the Andizhan violence and signed a $600 million energy deal with it as well. Both governments also relentlessly support Karimov’s anti-democratic measures and the diminution of America’s regional presence there. As such, just as China does in Southeast Asia and both China and Russia do in Northeast Asia, they seek to use formal multilateralism as a cover by which to pursue a strategy of leveraging regional associations and states against American policy and power. Multilateralism, real or feigned, is the weapon of choice here and this conforms to both China’s and Russia\'s long-standing demands for multipolarity in global politics. Through this strategy of leveraging regional blocs against Washington, they hope not only to solidify spheres of influence in vital areas but also to force Washington to come to terms with them both regionally and globally and act only with their consent or prior consultation. They thereby hope to effectuate a steady constriction of America’s geographical and political space or scope for action and secure greater influence, if not control, over ever larger parts of Asia. These exercises aim to show that the two powers can and will wield substantive and effective military power in critical zones of Asia and that, at least in the SCO multilateralism, also has a military dimension. China has steadily pushed since 2002 for an invigoration of the SCO as an all purpose or full-service security organization comprising anti-terrorism, trade, investment, and now defense cooperation. It will not stop here especially as China has long touted the SCO as the model for other such associations in Asia. Thus this regional strategy is merely the latest round of a broader continental strategy that China hopes to implement phase by phase or step by step and as regionally appropriate in Southeast and Northeast Asia. What is particularly intriguing here is that Moscow now accedes to this. It must realize that it cannot compete economically with China and maybe not even militarily though Beijing has made no effort to supplant it. But the reality of China’s capabilities as seen in its offers to Karimov has caught Moscow’s eye as noted by Russian analyst Vilya Gelbras. Thus the SCO may also become Russia’s eye on China as much as it is what Russian scholars believe to be a purely Chinese initiative that Russia must join to prevent being excluded from the area. Certainly, Russia opposes any Chinese military presence there. In other words, membership in the SCO compels Moscow to keep up with China and thus adopt stances it might not otherwise take, even as it allows it to leverage Chinese power temporarily for its own behalf in Central Asia even if the price is being swept along on the current of grander and broader Chinese agendas on world politics.

CONCLUSIONS: What we now see in Central Asia is hardly the final act of the drama, merely one more scene in an evolving multidimensional spectacle. But its consequences far transcend Central Asia to encompass Southeast, South and Northeast Asia. We can also expect that within the SCO, either Russia and China will display considerable if muted friction and/or that Central Asian states’ suspicions of their power will inhibit its effectiveness, especially if Chinese power keeps growing. That will give Washington future avenues for again returning more strongly to the area. But this time it must show greater sensitivity to regional needs and interests for added to the structural pathologies making for insecurity in this region there is now a clear strategic and ideological bipolarity that it must now surmount. While the eviction of U.S. forces from Karshi Khanabad represents an unmitigated setback for Washington, it is unlikely that Beijing and Moscow can keep a lid on Central Asia sufficient to exclude America from any meaningful presence there. While these exercises show a consolidated strategic and ideological bloc for now, Washington may still find the intelligence and capability to restore its influence and exploit what will be the inevitable next act of the drama now taking place in Central Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense or the Government.