BACKGROUND: Since the dissolution of the former Soviet super-state, the newly independent Central Asian states have undertaken different attempts to strengthen their independence by means of modeling integration. The first name of the model was the Central Asian Commonwealth, which in the mid-1990s was changed to the Central Asian Economic Community. In 2001, the name was changed to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). All these steps reflected a real, albeit modest, movement forward. It should be recognized that there were backward movements and stagnation periods as well, but these periods were caused mostly by destructive external geopolitics. Indeed, even the common threat of insurgency and terrorism –phenomena that were supposed to lead to unprecedented regional cooperation – in reality had the opposite effect. They led to increased mistrust and mutual incriminations among Central Asian states, the tightening of their borders, and the mining of some border sections. However, some recall that these negative consequences of the terrorist threat were produced to a great extent by the actions of some external forces, which tried to use the terrorist incursions of 1999 and 2000 for their own benefits. Another factor is that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have remained under strong Russian influence since 1991, while Uzbekistan insisted on its real independence. Moreover, while the United States has always officially emphasized its intention to support regional integration in the region and strengthen the independence of the Central Asian states, the Russian Federation never announced a similar official strategy with respect to this region. As a result, geopolitical games yielded split among Central Asian governments. It deserves mention that in spite of massive geopolitical stakes, Central Asian leaders never ceased their forum. Four, sometimes five, leaders of these states regularly met at summits to push forward the integration process. Moreover, this process reflected the serious intention of these leaders to strengthen the independence of their respective countries.

IMPLICATIONS: Surprisingly, on October 6, the four Central Asian leaders (except Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov) suddenly sacrificed all the assets of their regional integration efforts collected since independence. In fact, it was not so much a merger of two organizations as rather simply the entrance of Uzbekistan into the Eurasian Economic Community. By this move of great geopolitical importance, Tashkent unexpectedly recognized an organization to which it has always been critical. This swift but fundamental decision was adopted without serious political debate on the national level. Therefore, the new developing structure is a creation of the Presidents, rather than a will of the people of the participant states. It is reminiscent of the creation of the CIS itself, that is a decision made very rapidly, in fact overnight. Indeed, such a fundamental decision – the sacrifice of the very concept of Central Asia for the sake of a looser cooperative concept – might be widely discussed publicly in the mass media, among experts and analysts, and in the respective parliaments. Taking into account the recent trends, the parliament of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian parliaments will most likely accept this presidents’ surprise and ratify the St. Petersburg agreement. Integration or reintegration within the CIS is not something impossible or undesirable, if it amounts to integration among equals. Yet the six states concerned can hardly be considered as equals and the structure can only be characterized as inadequate. On the one hand, Russia will always remain the dominant power or even the hegemon. On the other hand, the EEC includes a proto-federation, the Russia-Belarus Union. Hence in this new structure, the four Central Asian states will see their role diluted. At the same time, it seems very likely that recently increased western pressure on Uzbekistan after the Andijan tragedy of 13-14 May this year was one of the main reasons determining Uzbekistan’s entrance in the EEC. Uzbekistan’s refusal of the American and European demand for an international investigation of the Andijan events led to sanctions being imposed on Uzbekistan. The recent events are Tashkent’s response to international isolation. The increasing concentration of the CIS into effectively six post-Soviet republics (of the original 12) is taking place against the background of the general failure of the Commonwealth’s integration. Paradoxically, the “reintegration” of half of the Commonwealth was achieved at the expense of the factual disintegration of a third of its part – that is Central Asia. At the last CACO, summit President Islam Karimov did not make a secret of his sympathy for Russia, which, according to him, is a reliable strong leader and a central country in the post-Soviet space. The question that arises is whether Central Asians, who mistrusted each other so much while in a regional organization, will trust each other more under Russian patronage? In fact, the October 6 event was the third strike on Central Asian regional unity since independence. The first strike took place when the Russian Federation became a full fledged member of CACO in 2004, since that membership distorted the geographical configuration and natural political composition of Central Asia’s attempts at regional organization. The second strike took place with the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization ultimatum to the West, primarily the U.S., to shut down military bases in Central Asia, followed by Uzbekistan’s direct demand for the withdrawal of these contingents. The third strike – merging CACO with EEC – threatens the self-value and independent existence of Central Asia. It raises the question whether this third strike on Central Asia means the genuine end of its independent history.

CONCLUSIONS: As a as a quasi-political structure and an institutionalized region, Central Asia no longer exists. But it remains a region with peoples that share a common history, origin, territory, as well as common challenges to their security that predetermine their own integration. For instance, the security threats that Central Asia faces, diverge from those faced by Belarus and Russia. For example, Central Asia was proclaimed in 1997 by all its five states as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, but the EEC can never be that. Once, when three presidents decided at Byelovezho to shut down the USSR and create the CIS, they stated: “From now on the Soviet Union no longer exists as a state and as a geopolitical reality”. This meant that the geopolitical integrity of the post-Soviet states was officially sentenced to disappear. Unless Russia, the creator of the CIS, denounces that geopolitical reality, the CIS will remain all but genuine integration. Any pro-unification experiment within the CIS will depend primarily on two factors – Russia’s foreign policy and the development of the newly independent states as independent political actors in the international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov, PhD in Political Science, Independent Researcher, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.