BACKGROUND: Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan give their counter-narcotics efforts a high public profile, partly in response to international pressure that has also furnished them with a national DCA each. This has added to the number of agencies responsible for drug control in each country, all of which are represented every ‘reporting season’ when they detail their recent successes in terms of such things as traffickers arrested and volumes of drugs seized. Overall, each of these agencies has significantly different functions but in the field of counter-narcotics their responsibilities overlap. For example, with its far superior manpower, the Ministries of Interior are able to duplicate the full range of DCA responsibilities, although the general knowledge of their staff on drug control issues is usually inferior. There are therefore numerous formal inter-agency agreements between Customs, Border Guards, MoI, DCA and the Ministries of National Security that commit them to cooperation in, for example, facility-sharing and the sharing of both general and operational intelligence. The majority of senior officials in these agencies profess themselves satisfied with these agreements and believe that the systems they have devised to implement them work well. Particularly on the Tajik-Afghan border, inter-agency cooperation is regularly showcased in joint operations. Usually, the Border Guards execute a seizure on intelligence provided by another agency, such as that received from the MoI and which led to the seizure of 23kg of various opiates on September 7. However, that border is exceptional as a counter-narcotics arena because of its militarization and because of the frequent exchange of gunfire. This encourages cooperation between the domestic surveillance capability of the Tajik MoI and the military muscle of the country’s Border Guards. Nationally and regionally, such regular use of synergies is less common.

IMPLICATIONS: In the words of the Director of the Tajik DCA, “there are destructive attitudes” present in some inter-agency relationships. This is most obviously the case between the DCA and the MoI, whose roles are very similar in terms of gathering intelligence on upcoming drug shipments and in arresting the perpetrators. Despite the designation of the countries’ respective DCAs as the lead coordinator of counter-narcotics efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the effect that this has had on inter-agency cooperation within each country is small. Although it should be helpful that most DCA officers are drawn from police ranks, institutional divisions clearly develop. Thus, while a Tajik MoI official asserts that his officers do not interfere with other agencies because they trust them, information-sharing was problematic because “intelligence can’t be spread” for fear of leakage. The DCA in Bishkek gives the same reason for hoarding intelligence unless there is a pressing need to share. While the level of corruption remains high in these countries, there is undoubtedly some sense in limiting the number of people with access to operational intelligence. The Customs departments are systematically corrupt, for example, and it would therefore be risky to inform them of upcoming operations or enlist their help in executing these. Similarly, the number of police officers whose applications to the Kyrgyz DCA are rejected after polygraph failures is only one hint that the sprawling Interior Ministries are susceptible to penetration by organized crime. There are nevertheless significant risks in the barriers to cooperation between what should be complementary agencies. While there are reasons to protect operational intelligence, holding on to information of any sort compromises the overall picture that might be built up as to links within and between organized crime groups, both domestically and internationally. For example, it is conceivable that in a meeting between two criminals, the Ministry of Interior recognises one of the participants and the DCA recognises the other, without the two agencies being aware of each other’s information. Even at a high level within each agency, officials remain unaware of pieces of intelligence that are considered crucial by an official in a different agency and happily discussed with foreign visitors. There is therefore a trade-off of intelligence divisions between organizations and the efficiency/accuracy of national drug control efforts. More worringly, fear of corruption does not seem to be the only or even major concern in hoarding information. It is striking that many senior officials prefer cooperation with their counterparts in other countries rather than with their countrymen in other agencies. This is naturally necessary on occasions when there are controlled deliveries or other international operations. There are also problems with legal frameworks in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that sometimes make it simpler to carry out cross-border operations rather than internal joint operations. However, the desire to enhance institutional prestige domestically also serves as an impetus to hoard intelligence. In the case of the DCA a financial incentive might also be an influence, since officers receive US-funded bonuses for the seizures they execute.

CONCLUSIONS: Inter-agency counter-narcotics cooperation in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is sub-optimal. There are sensible reasons to limit intelligence-sharing for fear of corruption but an unhealthy concern for enhancing agency prestige is also present. All counter-narcotics officers are conscious of their agencies’ standing and aware of their efficiency in executing seizures, which can serve as healthy motivation. Currently, however, competition is negatively affecting cooperation and compromising mid-level analytical capacity in both countries. The consequences of this are felt both at the higher level in broader national and regional understandings of the drug trade and organized crime; and downwards because these analyses guide operations and operational priorities. The prospects for improving this situation are not good. While most officials are aware of competitive relations with other agencies the Tajik DCA Director is in a minority of those who see it as a problem. International donors are in a poor position to induce changes to this culture and focus mainly on cross-border cooperation. Improvement in the situation awaits a general increase in law enforcement professionalism.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jacob Townsend is a Junior Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program project on Narcotics and Organized Crime in Eurasia. He is currently serving as a guest researcher with the UNODC offices in Central Asia. This article is based on extensive field research in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.