BACKGROUND: The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent in May 1992 and entered into force in 1994. Uzbekistan was one of the founding members of the organization, along with Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan later also adhered to it. The CST was originally envisaged as an institutional framework to ensure collective security in a moment when the former Soviet states were still in the process of establishing their own separate armies and defense structures. It soon became apparent, however, that grandiose rhetoric was not followed by actual policy moves and the treaty became one among many void post-Soviet institutional frameworks. Uzbekistan’s gradual distancing from Russia and re-alignment towards Western organizations was marked by Tashkent’s withdrawal from the CST in April 1999 and the country’s entry three months later into GUAM, the organization including Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM after Uzbekistan entered the organization), commonly perceived as a more pro-Western (or anti-Russian) organization. Post-9/11 developments brought Uzbekistan and the West even closer, and Tashkent and Washington signed a Strategic Partnership in June 2002. In the meantime, the CST had evolved into a proper military-political organization changing its name to CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) in May 2002. The revitalized organization posed increased emphasis on cooperation in the field of regional security, particularly with regard to combating the spread of radical Islamism, trafficking in narcotics, and arms smuggling. Interestingly, unlike Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from GU(U)AM, where Tashkent denounced the organization’s document, in the case of the CST(O) Uzbekistan had simply called for a moratorium on the country’s active membership, as it was pointed out in Sochi. By revoking the moratorium and expressing the intention to regain full membership, Uzbekistan was merely ‘catching up’ after a pause. As the Uzbek news agency Uzreport reported on 16 August, President Karimov referred to the CSTO as a ‘much needed structure’. He followed this up by emphasizing how the improvement of economy and security are closely connected, hence hinting at the possible future integration of the Eurasian Economic Community, which Uzbekistan joined earlier this year, and the CSTO.

IMPLICATIONS: The ‘Andijan events’ (where security forces fired at a large crowd of protesters, killing a number of them) brought Uzbekistan’s relations with the West to an unprecedented low level. As western human rights organizations and Western governments criticized Tashkent’s handling of the events, President Karimov made the point loud and clear that despite Western criticism, ‘Uzbekistan was not alone’. Indeed it was not, as the wide backing received by Russia, China, Pakistan and other Asian countries testifies. What seems contradictory, however, is that Uzbekistan’s increasing and seemingly limitless coziness to Moscow runs against President Karimov’s own thesis, proposed in his latest literary fatigue, entitled ‘The Uzbek will not depend on anything or anyone”. So, has President Karimov simply contradicted himself and fifteen years of Uzbekistani foreign policy? While Tashkent has certainly sought to maintain good relations with other countries, it is with Moscow that Tashkent has chosen to align itself very closely. It is all too easy to point to regime survival as the driving force behind Tashkent’s realignment. Less straightforward are the implications of such a move. In particular, questions arise as to the margins of political autonomy left to Uzbekistan after yet another move towards a closer embrace with the Kremlin. Over the past year, Uzbekistan has signed an alliance treaty with Russia, entered the Eurasian Economic Community, and re-joined the CSTO. On top of all this, extensive investments have been made in the country by Russian companies, particularly in the gas and oil sectors. It is not just regarding Tashkent’s margins of autonomy that questions arise. If on the one hand Moscow’s attempt to bring most of Central Asia back under its sphere of influence is well motivated by President Putin’s renewed attempt to make Russia count internationally, and rather effectively so at least as far as post-communist Eurasia is concerned, on the other hand the ever closer Russian-Uzbek relationship restricts not only Tashkent’s options, but Moscow’s too. Continuous security guarantees, sanctioned by the alliance treaty and now restated in the Uzbek recent membership in the CSTO, essentially make Russian security entrenched in the Uzbek domestic situation. Should the country be further destabilized, it would not be inconceivable to expect a Russian military involvement. The problem is that Moscow’s widely perceived close association with the current administration in Tashkent would not allow the Kremlin to appear as a broker or neutral player, and hence an attack against the ruling elites and possibly a replacement of them could damage Russia’s interests there in the long run.

CONCLUSIONS: Sovereignty and independence have traditionally been the pillars in Uzbekistan’s state-building efforts and by extension, in its foreign policy-making. At the same time, the ruling elites have also kept an eye on how to retain political autonomy, that is, to avoid entrapment in one or the other alliance system. As domestic turmoil became more frequent and combined with new perceptions of externally-driven threats, President Karimov seems to have contradicted his own foreign policy rationale. Uzbekistan gets ever cozier and closer with Russia, but however much they may share goals in the short term, this will lead to less space for autonomous decisions for both Tashkent and Moscow. Mutual entrapment can be the unintended consequence of the current alliance.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Matteo Fumagalli is lecturer at the School of Politics and International Relations in University College Dublin, National University of Ireland.