BACKGROUND: Following the sudden and unexpected change of power in Kyrgyzstan on March 24, 2005, a split occurred in the victorious camp on the country’s further development. One of the points of discord has been the question of urgent constitutional reforms, which were advocated by democratic civil society groups, as well as representatives of Parliament and political parties. Such a reform would review the Constitution in order to strengthen checks and balances between the branches of power. The absence of such balances in the Constitution, in the view of the opposition, led to the restoration of an authoritarian regime, and what is often termed ‘family’ management of the country. In its response to civil society’s initiative, the Jogorku Kenesh called for a constitutional meeting that according to the Venice Commission carried out serious work and developed an acceptable version of constitutional changes. After the election of the new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in July 2005, he came to head the Constitutional Council ex officio. Since then, the Council’s work has remained unfinished. The opposition alleges that the President has been delaying and disrupting the work of the Constitutional Council due to a lack of will to follow through with constitutional reforms. In autumn 2005, the President published a version of his own of possible constitutional amendments. This was considered to include only cosmetic amendments to Akayev’s Constitution, thus increasing the opposition’s suspicions. Later on, under pressure from the opposition, he disavowed this version and in January 2006 had to issue a decree on preparation of a referendum on constitutional changes, and its conduct before the end of 2006. Nevertheless, opposition politicians do not believe in the sincerity of his intentions to follow this matter through. The vague position of the country’s new leadership in terms of constitutional reform aroused concerns in democratic circles from the very beginning, resulting in the unification this year of a number of political parties and civil society organizations into the People’s Coalition of Democratic Powers, later renamed the movement “For Reforms”. Omurbek Tekebaev, the Jogorku Kenesh’s ex-speaker and chairman of the “Ata Meken” party, became its co-chairman. In April and June 2006, this opposition bloc conducted two mass meetings in Bishkek’s central square with demands for political reforms. In case these demands are not fulfilled, the opposition threatens to organize large demonstration to demand the dismissal of the Bakiyev-Kulov tandem. Tekebayev is well-known throughout the country, having been elected to Parliament four times. He ran for President twice, in 1995 and 2000. He came in second in 2000, as evident falsifications in favor of Akayev marred the vote, officially gathering about 15 percent. After the events of March 24, he was elected Speaker of Parliament and carried out a policy independent from the President. His harsh statements addressed to the President led to renewed political crisis, and his resignation from the Speaker’s post. The President attempted to have him unseated by the use of significant “administrative resources”, yet the President’s followers failed to collect the required number of votes. After two unsuccessful attempts to dismiss him, Tekebaev resigned voluntarily to avoid the premature dissolution of the parliament. At the moment, he is not hiding his political ambitions and declares that he will run for president in order “to return power to the people and parliament”.

IMPLICATIONS: On September 5, 2006, during a business trip to an Economic Forum in Poland, Tekebaev was arrested in Warsaw airport accused of drug trafficking, following information received from the Kazakh Interpol center. The Astana Interpol center had posted information that a group of alleged activists of the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement traveled from Istanbul to Warsaw with narcotics, and could have Kyrgyz, Uzbek or Kazakh passports. Among those named was Omurbek Tekebaev. It was also mentioned that he was a Member and former speaker of the Parliament, something that later shocked Polish authorities. On September 8, the Warsaw district court, having examined the “Tekebaev case”, passed a verdict of “not guilty” and presented its apologies to the Kyrgyz politician. Meanwhile in Kyrgyzstan, a special Parliamentary commission was established, headed by Vice-Speaker Tairbek Sarpashev, which presented convincing evidence (including video materials) that a special operation was carried out against Tekebaev in Bishkek’s Manas airport as a result of which a matryoshka doll with heroin was discovered in the politician’s luggage. Early in the investigation, two officials voluntarily resigned: the Chairman of the National Security Service, Busurmankul Tabaldiev and his first deputy, Janysh Bakiyev, the President’s brother. During the investigation, deputies started demanding the resignation of both the President and Government. President Bakiyev had to come personally to the Parliament, where he provided explanations and promised to investigate objectively the incident, and to punish everyone guilty irrespective of their posts. Nevertheless, a group of opposition deputies ensured a resolution was adopted that assessed the events harshly and demanded serious punishment of the guilty. The parliamentary investigation continued, and on September 21 adopted a resolution, from which radical demands were produced, such as the resignation of the President and Government. What lay behind the matryoshka incident, and who is taking advantage of this fuel added to the already burning fire that is the political situation in Kyrgyzstan? First, there are obviously forces that strive for pushing, by any means, the scale of political stability off balance for their own benefit. One example is the militant wing of the ruling administration. These could also be the so-called political flunkeys who are trying to please the higher echelons at their own risk. These could also be deeply conspiratorial operations of the special services, but it is highly unlikely that the head of the main special service agency would be unaware of the planned operation. Secondly, it is possible that a so-called “third force” is involved, something often referred to by politicians from all sides. As it turns out, the destabilization of Kyrgyzstan is profitable for many people – apologists of the former regime, “imperialists”, religious fundamentalists, and many others.

CONCLUSIONS: The matryoshka scandal showed four things. Firstly, this type of simple provocation did not work in Kyrgyz society. Secondly, those who initiated the action were either unaware of or reckless about the volatility of the Kyrgyz situation and the growing risk of another social explosion. Thirdly, the authorities demonstrated their continuing inability to control the socio-political situation in the country to the extent of avoiding or preventing such provocations. Fourth, it is obvious that the opposition has become a hostage to its own initiatives, implying that retreating would mean a political fiasco. It is most likely that this argument has become key for the opposition, which publicly declared that on November 2 it intends to carry out the next, third national demonstration in Bishkek to demand the resignation of the President and Prime minister. In case this action is successful, the first step, according to the opposition, will be the creation of a coalition government with the participation of all political forces, the introduction of radical changes to the Constitution, and the transition to a parliamentary form of government.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Talaibek Koichumanov is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. He is a former Minister of Economy and Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan. Zainidin Kurmanov is Professor of History and was a member o the Kyrgyz Parliament in 2000-2005. He is the leader of the center-right party “Moya strana” (My Country).