BACKGROUND: EU peacekeepers could be deployed to Georgia\'s breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, EU foreign policy Chief Javier Solana said after meeting with the Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili in Brussels on February 28. He added that the EU is ready to participate in missions “as long as those missions have a clear objective …[that] can be achieved.” Behind this cryptic comment might lie an EU intention to seek to modify the peacekeeping format with Russia’s consent and participation. Over the past years, as it expanded eastwards, the EU has grown increasingly conscious of the former Soviet space. After the first EU enlargement that brought in ten countries, including many from the former Soviet bloc, there is an increased knowledge about the region in the EU, but also increased suspicion about Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 10 speech at the Munich conference on Security Policy also made many western governments uneasy about the way Russia is throwing its weight around in the former Soviet space. Albeit with its trademark hesitancy, the EU has been gradually trying to upgrade its cooperation with the South Caucasus countries in general, and with Georgia in particular. After Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, the whole South Caucasus region was included into the European Neighborhood Policy. In October 2006, the EU adopted five-year Action Plans with the three countries of the South Caucasus that are laying out the strategic objectives of cooperation. In the case of Georgia, the objective to support Georgia’s further integration into European economic and social structures is clearly spelled out. This upgrade of EU cooperation with Georgia foresees much closer economic cooperation and discusses ways to ease visa requirements. The attention to post-Soviet conflicts has also increased. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in January 2007, the Transnistria conflict gained a higher profile on the EU agenda. For the first time in its history, the EU in November 2005 launched a border assistance monitoring mission to work with Moldova and Ukraine to harmonize their border management standards and procedures with those prevalent in EU member states. So far, the EU has rejected calls for sending a similar mission to Georgia, where the OSCE border monitoring mission has been scrapped due to Russian objections. However, through its Special Representative Peter Semneby, the EU tries to find itself a niche in resolving Georgia’s conflicts. Speaking to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 17 January, German Chancellor Angel Merkel said that “Russia\'s conflicts with its neighbors must not be taboo” in a dialogue between the EU and Russia. Importantly, some EU members – Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Greece – have expressed a willingness to consider sending peacekeepers to Georgia. Turkey and Ukraine also said they would consider doing so. This growing attention was echoed in December 2006 by a surprisingly forward-looking EU Commission Communication on strengthening the ENP, which included mention of the possibility of involvement in “civil or military monitoring or peacekeeping operations”. IMPLICATIONS: Solana’s statement is a major change in the EU rhetoric about conflicts in Georgia, though the real change of EU policies is not quite palpable yet. Previously, the EU has followed NATO’s line which supports Georgia in resolving the conflicts, but has no interest in sending peacekeepers to the region. The change in the EU rhetoric is symptomatic of several underlying shifts in EU relations with the South Caucasus and Russia. Russian policies towards Georgia over the past year, including a trade embargo and the suspension of diplomatic relations, made EU officials conscious of the extent of the problem. EU Special Representative Peter Semneby commented in October 2006 that Russia’s actions “have added weight to the Georgian argument that Russia is not a neutral participant in the peacekeeping arrangements and negotiation formats… that the current status quo is not tenable, that in fact it is not a status quo but is gradually deteriorating.” Several high-level EU delegations, including the Troika, have visited Georgia and met with the leaders of the breakaway provinces since then. While the EU increasingly appreciates the Georgian position on the need to change the Russia-dominated peacekeeping format, Russia poses problems in another painful area. President Putin has been vocal in tying the Kosovo agenda to the post-Soviet conflicts resolution threatening Georgia and Moldova with recognizing Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria should Kosovo become independent. The EU, and its foreign policy chief personally, have been closely involved in the Kosovo issue. The EU is wary about the Kosovo potential to destabilize the Balkans and the EU leadership is compelled to prevent political fallout in yet another sensitive region of the world – the Caucasus. In this context, Solana’s statement keeping an option of the EU peacekeeping at the Russian border open might be seen as a deterrent to Russia’s overzealous attempts to influence the outcome of the Kosovo status negotiations. There are also other long-term considerations. For several years, the EU tries to reduce its dependency on suppliers such as Russia and the Middle East. In this context, Georgia’s importance has been raising due to two major projects - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which is operating since summer 2006 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which is currently under construction and will be transporting gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Europe. All of these considerations compel the EU to move. But inherent disagreements within have long prevented it from formulating a clear policy. While trying to maneuver between the incentives of France and Germany to keep as good relations with Russia as possible, and new members’ drive to stop what they see as Russian expansionism, the EU’s bureaucrats are prone to choose the middle way. CONCLUSIONS: The EU seems to be trying to cajole Russia into accepting a change in the negotiating formats in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, keeping Russia’s participation but diluting it with an EU component. Georgia’s Foreign Minister, Gela Bezhuashvili, in his recent statements stressed that Tbilisi does not intend to bring about the cessation of Russian participation in peacekeeping forces or in the political format of negotiations, but wants a modification of these formats to include Europe. Although such a solution may constitute progress for Georgia, its benefits are far from clear and are beset with potential pitfalls. Russia might agree to EU participation in a political format, but keep its exclusive – and possibly this time EU-blessed – role in the military component of peacekeeping. This would correspond well to the war-wariness of many EU countries. However, following Putin’s Munich speech which openly stated resentment towards all foreign influence in what Putin considers Russia’s backyard, even such a scenario is far from certain. The EU has compelling reasons to engage in finding solution to frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space. The EU is prone to take mild, conciliatory approach towards Russia and to try to persuade Moscow to agree to a gradual modification of the peacekeeping formats in the post-Soviet conflicts. While this is a step forward an might be a good way to deal with a newly assertive Russia, the risks are high. In this new game, Georgia and Moldova are likely to become the grounds for some precarious experimentation. AUTHORS’ BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and works at the OSCE mission in Belgrade. Blanka Hancilova, Ph.D., specializes in international development. The article reflects the opinion of the authors only.