BACKGROUND: Tehran’s capabilities for mischief-making include its ability to sponsor terrorist or insurgent forces throughout the Caspian littoral. Iran’s attitude toward the groups that it sponsors is wholly instrumental. Although they are maintained and kept on hand for when they may be needed, they are not activated until and unless Iran’s relationship with one of the neighboring states, either in the Middle East or in the former Soviet Union, deteriorates. The closer a country is to Iran’s borders, the less likely is Iran to let its hand be seen in fomenting insurgency, particularly if Russia is on the other side of that country’s borders. Thus if covert or overt support for such groups jeopardizes critical security relationships like that of Tehran with Moscow, then those groups are shelved as happened in Tajikistan in the 1990s. Iran thus needs not activate its capabilities in order to secure tangible benefits in its diplomacy and defense policy. The combination of Iran’s conventional and unconventional capabilities represent a formidable regional deterrent against American or NATO interests in placing their forces in and around the Caspian littoral. However, Iran’s ability to influence its Caspian neighbors does not depend exclusively on its ability or willingness to threaten their vital interests. Since 2001, a ‘smile offensive’ has been the order of the day in Iranian strategy. That strategy concentrates on instituting a comprehensive program of high-level exchanges with its South Caucasian and Central Asian neighbors, including Afghanistan, and the invocation of major trade, transportation, and energy deals in order to create allies for Iran there. These deals encompass oil, gas, and electricity because not only do some of those states depend on imports; Iran too faces an energy crisis due to its lack of refining capacity. Thus, while Iran subsidizes its domestic consumption, it must also import energy products from neighbors like Turkmenistan even as it exports to states like Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia who all depend on foreign energy sources. The point of this strategy is to create enduring political and economic ties so that its northern neighbors, including Turkey, will think twice before allowing America to deploy any form of military power to the Caspian region lest those states lose valuable political and economic ties with Iran. Meanwhile these ties include talk of joint cooperation against terrorism with Turkey, provision of energy to Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan (including electricity) and importing of energy from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The fact that Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have plentiful uranium sources is also a matter of concern to Western intelligence sources. Indeed, there have been reports that Iran is using middlemen in Armenia and Azerbaijan to gather expertise in nuclear and missile technology throughout the former Soviet Union. This effort allegedly comprises over 200 front companies, government offices, and academic institutions that supposedly engage in “weapons research.” In the meantime, these negotiations or deals with regional governments also can involve calls for defense cooperation with Azerbaijan, or for creation of regional security blocs with all of the South Caucasian states, including Turkey and Russia, as a way of excluding U.S. influence from the area or enhancing regional security with states like Tajikistan. IMPLICATIONSThese diplomatic and economic initiatives must be seen as key elements of a strategy which has successfully deterred local governments (with considerable assistance from Russia) from thinking of allowing U.S. forces to use their lands in the event of a military contingency against Iran. Iran’s policy towards Turkmenistan must be understood within this policy framework. In July 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Ashgabat and negotiated a series of agreements with Turkmenistan and President Saparmurad Niyazov. The most important of these deals centered on security, natural gas trade and economic partnership. Both sides paid special attention to the issue of delimiting the Caspian Sea in order to develop its hydrocarbon resources. And they also discussed selling gas to Europe. In their communiqué, the two states called for a new summit of Caspian littoral states in Tehran to boost, trade, economic, and energy cooperation. They affirmed mutual support for peace, stability, and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and of most importance to Iran, they stated that “The sides will not allow [anyone] to use their territories against each other.” Undoubtedly, Iran’s interests in the Turkmen succession are going to be directed towards consolidating and preserving the gains which it had made with Niyazov and continuing to ensure that no American presence emerges that can threaten its security. And it will also seek advantageous energy deals with Turkmenistan to facilitate its own energy security and that of Turkmenistan. Although Iran has not had much to say publicly about the succession in Turkmenistan, Iranian Radio has warned against both Russian and American objectives there, and Tehran should not be expected to be silent either privately or publicly. Iran is likely to back those forces in Turkmenistan who will continue the agreements reached in July 2006, continue to oppose support for American pressure against Iran, and try to gain support for its position on Caspian delimitation, giving it and Turkmenistan large shares of the Sea in which to conduct energy exploration. It should not be assumed that the struggle for influence over Turkmenistan’s energy holdings, policy, and pipelines will be confined to Russia, China, and America. Iran’s interests in Central Asia go beyond the desire for stable governance that Russia and China share for the entire region, i.e. a continuation of the domestic status quo in each country. Iran’s interests also encompass vital strategic issues to which it displays unremitting attention and it should be expected to weigh in both privately and publicly on the new Turkmen leadership during the current period of consolidation, but not on the side of liberalization. CONCLUSIONS: Given Russian, Chinese, and Iranian hostility to American policy, it is likely that concerted efforts by these powers will be seen to prevent the emergence of a pro-Western leadership that could undermine their security and economic interests. Indeed, at Niyazov’s funeral, Russian and Chinese officials were already corodinating strategy. The two key interests here are the continuation of Turkmenistan’s pipeline dependence upon Moscow and refusal to allow American military presence. Their efforts to uphold those objectives will include weapons exports and military training, side payments in the form of bribes, the use of political subversion and intelligence penetration carried out in tandem with the Russian security organizations, government, and energy firms; and a willingness, if necessary, to dispatch military force in return for adhesion to Russian-sponsored defense and security organizations in Central Asia. But most of all, these states will show their continued willingness to back the new incumbent leadership, anoint it with their blessing, and confer legitimacy and power upon it by signing or continuing energy deals, even if they must pay more for the gas than before. These “side payments” not just to the successor but to his retinue are likely to include Russian promises of regime protection. In return, the Turkmen leadership will be expected to reject new pipeline alternatives that do not go through Russia exept possibly for existing contracts with China. These would include the “TAP line” from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, supported by Washington. It will also be expected to renounce its neutrality and join the panoply of Russian security organizations such as the CIS, Eurasec (Eurasian Economic Community), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Moscow’s defense alliance), the Russian sponsored CASFOR (Caspian Force), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and reject any idea of a U.S. military presence in Turkmenistan or assistance to its naval and ground forces as regards the Caspian Sea. These are the vital stakes for Iran and Russia in the Turkmen succession and their importance goes beyond regional concern and show that despite Niyazov’s best efforts, Turkmenistan’s and Central Asia’s security cannot be isolated from the contemporary global agenda. AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.