Recently, important international and local players in the Afghan political arena have brought up the prospect of talks with moderate Taliban leaders. President Hamid Karzai has publicly announced that he has been in contact for some time with Taliban representatives. Also, a number of political and military experts from NATO countries are increasingly favoring dialogue with moderate Taliban figures. The growing Taliban resurgence and the unwillingness of the majority of NATO countries to lose troops have contributed to this development. The government of Pakistan has also provided incentives to the Taliban to enter into political negotiations to revamp its international image.

BACKGROUND: The idea of negotiations with moderate Taliban leaders is not new. Indeed, the exclusion of moderate Taliban figures from the Bonn negotiation following the collapse of their regime in 2001 is now considered a mistake. In fact, the quick and easy victory of coalition forces over the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters blinded Western decision makers about the reality of political and tribal issues in Afghanistan, which are the direct result of almost three decades of conflict in the country. While all other Afghan political and ethnic groups were represented in Bonn, the moderate Taliban leaders, who were willing to cooperate with the coalition forces, were sidelined from the negotiations. They could have participated not in the name of the Taliban movement but as local leaders of the Greater Kandahar region, which includes all Pashtun-dominated provinces of the southwest of Afghanistan. In fact, the Bonn negotiations alienated Pashtun tribes that had ruled Afghanistan for over 200 years.

Indeed, the lack of representation of moderate Taliban leaders in the Bonn process as well as in the transitional government headed by Mr. Karzai forced a considerable number of them to seek refuge in Pakistan. This promoted the agenda of the hard-line Taliban leadership to impose its vision of military resistance on the moderate ones who had been in favor of a settlement with Karzai. In early 2002-2003, the hard-line Taliban led by Mullah Omar coerced a number of moderate local tribal leaders to cease cooperation with Mr. Karzai, and did not hesitate to assassinate those who rejected Omar’s leadership. The latest of such assassination attempts was the recent attack against Mullah Naqibullah, a former prominent mujahideen commander and chieftain from the Arghandab district of Kandahar.

Unlike what is commonly assumed in the West, the Taliban movement is not a political or ideological movement. It is primarily a predominantly Pashtun movement from the Greater Kandahar area. For instance, other Pashtun opposition leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (the leader of Hezb-e-Islami) and Mawlawi Jalaludin Haqqani (a former mujahideen commander from Paktia province) are not considered the integral part of the Taliban movement because they do not belong to the tribes of Greater Kandahar. Despite being a close ally of al-Qaeda, Hekmatyar does not enjoy a close relationship with the Taliban. The most loyal units of the Taliban forces have always been a core of young fighters from the main tribes of Greater Kandahar.

The late Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former Afghan defense minister, recognized much earlier the importance of legitimate interlocutors in the Pashtun-dominated region of Afghanistan. He understood that Pashtun leaders from the South and East of the country, who enjoyed a friendly relationship with Pakistani authorities, could not represent the dominant tribes of Greater Kandahar. He had tried to promote some of the Durrani leaders who had deliberately been kept isolated by Pakistani military authorities. Once the Taliban movement emerged in early 1994 in Kandahar, Massoud promoted leaders in the Durrani-dominated area with whom he could share political power. For instance, when the Taliban reached the southern doors of Kabul, he went to negotiate with Mullah Omar’s deputy, Mullah Rabbani in their stronghold of Maidan-Shar in the west of Kabul. Massoud went alone with several bodyguards to a meeting surrounded by Taliban fighters. He was convinced that in the Afghan traditions of Pashtunwali code of conduct, he would never be harmed as a guest even by his enemies.

The making and unraveling of alliances between belligerent groups has been the norm in Afghan politics since the communist coup in 1978. Those very close collaborators of Massoud who criticize Karzai for negotiating with the Taliban, ignore the fact that Massoud never closed the door to negotiations with any of his enemies. When Hekmatyar lost his stronghold in the South of the country to Taliban forces, he sought Massoud’s protection in Kabul. He was safely escorted from Kabul to Kunduz and from there to Iran. In 1997, Massoud twice conducted long conversations via satellite phone with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Each time, he invited him to negotiations and to accept the will of people through a Loya Jirga (Traditional council). Unfortunately, Taliban leaders such as Mullah Rabbani and Mullah Burjan who favored negotiations with Massoud were marginalized or eliminated by hard-line elements inside the Taliban movement.

Indeed, the initiative to negotiate with moderate Taliban leaders holds promise for the long-term stability of Afghanistan. All of the Taliban are not terrorists or backers of al-Qaeda. People have joined the Taliban movement for various reasons, including economic and social ones. Initiating talks with the Taliban is not a difficult enterprise, but finding legitimate and representative leaders is more difficult. Only Pakistani authorities could help NATO and Afghan government in facilitating negotiations with moderate Taliban leaders, because the majority of them live in or maintain lose ties to Pakistan.

IMPLICATIONS: Extending an olive branch to the Taliban is the most cost-effective way to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. If American and NATO military expenses in Afghanistan were to be spent for the reconstruction of the country, electricity, paved roads, water, schools, and hospitals would have been brought to much greater parts of Afghanistan’s population. In fact, many teenagers join the Taliban as fighters because they lack alternatives or prospects of a normal life.

Appointing a number of influential people from the tribes of Greater Kandahar to key government positions, even though they have collaborated with the Taliban, would legitimize the Afghan government in the trouble spots in the southwest. In fact, current Afghan ministers are not the best and the brightest, and some of them lack serious credentials. Replacing a few of them with traditional Pashtun leaders accompanied with good advisors could be a better solution to the current governance issues.

Narcotics producers are taking advantage of the precarious and unstable situation in the southwest of Afghanistan. The issue of poppy cultivation can only be resolved if the Taliban abandon their fight against Afghan government and coalition forces. In the past, the Taliban have shown their capacity to eradicate poppy cultivation from Afghanistan. If they are provided the right incentives, they could become an asset in forcing drug traffickers out of their area.

Pakistan is under increasing international pressure over its ties with the Taliban. The initiative of talks with moderate Taliban leaders might provide an opportunity for the Pakistani authorities to save face and to play a positive mediation role to facilitate such negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In addition, this could be considered as the right step to improve bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Every military expert knows that an insurgency in Afghanistan’s southwest could last over a decade, and the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan is still alive in the memory of people. In fact, NATO countries that have a military mission in Afghanistan do not have the will to commit their forces for unforeseeable future, as their public opinion has become increasingly critical to the loss of soldiers. Past experience of conflict resolution throughout the world has shown that political stability cannot be achieved through guns alone but through political compromise and economic development. Ultimately, the initiation of dialogue with the Taliban through the mediation of Pakistani authorities would improve ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is critical to reduce the grasp of international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda, in the tribal zone bordering the two countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroun Mir served over five years as an aide to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan's former defense minister. He works as a policy analyst in Kabul.