As Armenia’s parliamentary elections were held, a period dating back to late 2005 ended without the much-expected achievements in the peace process in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Both Presidents continue to remain hostage to their nationalistic crowds at home, which refuse to accept any serious concessions. The public is unprepared for the compromises that will be actualized in 2009, when the peace process is likely to pick up speed after presidential elections are held in both countries. Unless work with public opinion is undertaken, both countries’ leadership risk becoming increasingly dependent on their domestic audience, thus further reducing the likelihood of a peaceful settlement.

BACKGROUND: Despite great hopes put on the year 2006 both by the international community and local analysts, direct talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian Presidents did not produce a major breakthrough in the negotiation process over the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the beginning of the year, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, responsible for seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, stated that 2006 would be a “window of opportunity” for the settlement of the conflict since neither conflicting countries nor major regional powers had domestic elections scheduled, thus allowing the leadership of these countries to focus on the conflict. This period effectively ended with the Armenian parliamentary elections, which spark a long election cycle including presidential elections in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Russia and the United States, and parliamentary elections in both Turkey and Russia.

Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan met three times both tete-a-tete and in the presence of the Minsk group co-chairs. Some progress was achieved: in the words of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, “only one of the nine points on the negotiation table remains unresolved.” Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev also expressed a rather high degree of optimism, saying following his latest meeting with President Kocharyan in Minsk that “we are approaching the last stage of talks.”

Yet many people in both countries continue to believe that the peace talks have no promising future and that the recent statements by politicians on both sides are only aimed at deceiving the public and prolonging the status quo. Indeed, thirteen years have passed since the cease-fire was established in the conflict zone and peace talks started, yet no agreement between the warring sides has been achieved. Sporadic boosts in optimistic comments from both sides did not see any real-life effects, and in fact led to increased frustration among the public.

Although both OSCE officials and representatives of the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have pledged to continue the peace talks throughout 2007 and showed a never-ending sense of optimism for the resolution of the conflict, it is clear that the deadlock will continue at least till 2009. Indeed, Armenian President Kocharyan stated openly that the recently held elections in Armenia would put a freeze on the negotiation process, a statement that seems to have been to the point. The election cycles in regional powers and the U.S. ensures that the external focus on the conflict is likely to be limited. Indeed, domestic and regional elections look set to preoccupy the minds of politicians in all countries and leave very small room for maneuvers and compromises on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.

IMPLICATIONS: For many local political experts, the two coming years are considered a likely waste of time. Patience is running out and most of the surveys conducted in Azerbaijan show that the public is increasingly favoring a military resolution to the conflict. Thus, the prolongation of the peace talks until 2009 will only further increase these trends and strengthen the general mood of distrust and skepticism in the peace process.

But these two years are also a time of opportunity, opportunity for the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments to engage in a real dialogue with civil society, scale back the “scapegoating” of the other side, minimize the enemy-making propaganda machine and prepare their societies for the painful, but much needed concessions that will be key to achieving a long-lasting compromise.

Over the past decade, one of the major obstacles to the peace process and the eventual solution of the conflict was the high level of nationalism and patriotism among the public on both sides, the low level of knowledge of the positions and feelings of the other side, the near lack of public diplomacy and contacts between ordinary citizens, NGOs and media, the lack of media coverage of the other side’s story, as well as the establishment and development of an enemy image through stereotypes in the media. This, in turn, led to public distrust of the other side, feelings of victimization, hatred and unwillingness to make compromises and build peace with the “evil enemy”.

Both Presidents, although realizing this obstacle, have so far been unable to deal with the problem and offer the other side a compromise that would be likely to be accepted at home. In many ways, they have sacrificed the peace deal for the sake of their internal power and stability. They appear to know that any concession that they make on the negotiation table will be utilized by the domestic opposition to mobilize a nationalistically driven but otherwise politically passive public. This could seriously destabilize the situation inside their countries.

The Azerbaijani government has thus been forced to follow the suit of the nationalistic public and play the nationalistic card as well. Contacts with Armenian NGOs and media were strongly discouraged, and economic ties were prohibited until “occupied lands are freed.” This, in turn, created a vicious circle, because the absence of public diplomacy has augmented distrust between the two sides and thus hindered the achievement of the breakthrough in the peace process.

CONCLUSIONS: For these obstacles to be mitigated, a serious change of tactics is needed on the part of both governments and the international community during the next two years, in order to prepare the public for a possible peace deal in 2009. These changes would include the active encouragement by both governments of direct citizen-to-citizen contacts, which could help break public distrust and enemy stereotypes. NGO contacts, media exchanges and TV or Radio programs are important components of such efforts, as are educational conferences and seminars between the youth of both countries.

Only an intensive, planned and comprehensive set of activities could lead to changing the “cold war” attitude between the peoples on both sides of the border. It will be much easier for these nations to accept painful compromises if the current mutual hatred is mitigated and replaced by understanding and tolerance.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the bloodiest and most complicated ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space. It has become even more complicated in the last 15 years as the media in both countries strengthened stereotypical enemy images, while public diplomacy has not been allowed to break these stereotypes. This problem seriously hinders the peace process as both Presidents, fearing the domestic instability, do not want to make concessions and reach painful, but necessary compromise. Only changing this situation and engaging the public into the contacts with the other side could lower this sense of nationalism and reduce this very important barrier to the peace process.