While Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to reduce spiraling East-West tensions by proposing that the U.S. and Russia jointly operate a radar at Gabala that Russia leases from Azerbaijan, his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, called for a halt to the plans for missile defenses in Europe and urged restudy of the entire proposal. Several commentators considered Putin’s proposal to be a good idea or even a masterstroke. But when considered in all its dimensions, the Gabala gambit has many more sides to it then appears at first glance and that need to be factored into any analysis of its viability or suitability.

BACKGROUND: Putin’s initiative in many ways vindicates Washington’s refusal beforehand to back down in the face of escalating Russian threats about retargeting Europe with Russian missiles. Russian spokesmen had prominently argued, as Lavrov still does, that there is no justification for missile defenses because Iran cannot and does not pose a threat. Therefore the only plausible real rationale for these defenses is to threaten the Russian deterrent and Russia with the threat of negating Russia’s retaliatory strike capability, or in the future developing a ramified attack infrastructure comprising both conventional and nuclear weapons. None of this rhetoric had, however, stopped Rusisa from complaining in private and more recently in public, as Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov’s speeches show, that in fact Russia is threatened by the growth of Iran’s and China’s missile capabilities and wants to respond by leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and building more missiles to deter them. Putin’s statement should put an end to that, because the acceptance of missile defense in Azerbaijan explicitly invokes a potential Iranian threat. It is not by accident that the Iranian Parliament reacted angrily to the Russian attempt to make a deal with Washington at Iran’s expense and over its head. Thus the statement shows that Putin is more willing than before to acknowledge the potential of an Iranian nuclear and missile threat, particularly in the light of Tehran’s recent deals with North Korea.

Russian military and political leaders, including Putin, had also stated that the projected European system threatened Russia because it could provide complete coverage up to the Urals. Thus America could monitor and then even target any Russian nuclear or missile activity throughout that region, giving it a capability for a first-strike attack upon Russia. In Putin’s own words, the Gabala radar would give even more coverage of Europe and of Russia. Thus here too Putin knocked the props out from under his own inflated threat assessment and confirmed that the Russian military threat assessment upon which he relied is groundless. Since Putin had earlier virtually invited the General Staff and military experts to provide such an assessment, and indicated that it would guide his response to missile defenses, he thus revealed the inherent tension of unresolved civil-military issues in defense policymaking in Russia.

Putin’s call for locating interceptors in Turkey, Iraq, or at Sea, indicate again that he probably received misleading briefings from his advisors. The absurdity of locating interceptors in Iraq needs no comment. Moreover, basing them at sea leaves them vulnerable to Iranian anti-ship missiles, liberally supplied by Moscow, and would not provide insurance against debris from the ensuing interception falling over Russian territory since the trajectory of Iranian missiles to Europe and America would pass over or near Russia.

Several commentators have noted that there are enormous technical and operational difficulties with joint control of the radar. The existing Russian radar has different and lower capability than does the American one and melding the two together would be a considerably difficult affair. There is also reason to believe that a key Russian interest in this proposal is to get technological intelligence from the U.S. and exploit it for Moscow’s own purposes. Obviously, Russia cannot rely on missile defenses against the growing Iranian or Chinese threat and must rely upon deterrence by the threat of retaliation up to the point of leaving the INF treaty. Until and unless its technological capabilities improve, e.g. by acquiring missile defense secrets, it must remain in this posture which always implies a presupposition of multiple enemies and threats. Especially in view of the mutual mistrust of the militaries, which is particularly strong among Russia’s military leadership, it is unlikely that an easy or smooth cooperation between Russia and America, particularly as the Russian military not only regards America as enemy number one, but has made clear on innumerable occasions that it really does not want deep cooperation with the U.S. military.

IMPLICATIONS: This mistrust and the political divergence of the two states concerning Iran have serious operational implications for use of the Gabala radar. If the radar is to be effective against Iranian missiles, it will have to detect them and be on virtually from the moment of the missile’s launch given Gabala’s proximity to Iran. Then it will have to report instantaneously to the interceptors wherever they are located. Under a condition of dual command and control where Moscow deprecates the Iranian threat, it may not be possible to use the radars in this way and they may be blocked for a time from transmitting data to interceptors as Moscow might be in a position to withhold consent for such transmissions. The Czech and Polish system, on the other hand, lie astride the polar route for all launches to both Europe and the United States and would have the time to react and give appropriate commands to the interceptors. As Secretary of State Rice observed, these sites for missile defense were not chosen out of the blue. Thus there are serious operational and command issues that must be worked out in advance.

But matters do not end here. Iran has long let it be known to Azerbaijan that if it hosted American bases, as the Pentagon had earlier wanted, “bad things” could happen to it. This led Baku to reiterate its unwillingness to host such a base. While it is a major link in the air bridge to Afghanistan and an Azerbaijani air base is being converted into a state of readiness for use by NATO in that campaign, Baku has always understood that indicating a willingness to host US bases would bring down upon it the wrath of both Moscow and Tehran, something it could not tolerate. Therefore it refused such offers. A joint U.S.-Russian base, on the other hand, obviously undermines that possible threat, so it is not surprising that Azerbaijani officials cautiously welcomed Putin’s initiative. This initiative actually reflects Baku’s growing independence and freedom of action as a major energy producer and exporter, a situation that leads others to court it and that creates more room for it to maneuver in its foreign and defense policies. While it may not directly imply a possibility of recovering sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, it does indicate Azerbaijan’s ability to make itself valuable to both Moscow and Washington and reap the benefits of that capability.

CONCLUSIONS: Undoubtedly, bilateral discussions between Washington and Moscow should continue, but it is not desirable that Washington listen to Lavrov and stops working on its proposal, as it has been extensively briefed to Moscow since 2005 and has solid strategic and operational logic behind the idea of placing defense sites at these European locations. While Putin’s initiative reveals both the groundless nature of Moscow’s attacks and the dangers that accrue to it from its failure to reform its defense structures; it also highlights some other key trends in the vicinity of Iran and Azerbaijan. First, Moscow continues its slow but so far steady drift away from Iran and is more willing than ever before to acknowledge the reality of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Second, it may be willing to cooperate with Washington in some form for the defense of the Caucasus against that threat, particularly insofar as Azerbaijan is at risk. This would be a particularly significant policy step and merits intensive exploration in these discussions, because it could reduce bilateral tensions to a considerable degree while strengthening possibilities for a joint approach to Iran. Third, the Putin gambit reflects Azerbaijan’s heightened importance and standing thanks to its energy capabilities and its adroit handling of its relationships with Moscow and Washington. It also is increasingly important to the EU by virtue of its energy capabilities which have recently been found to be larger than expected.

There is more to the Gabala gambit than is to be found merely in operational issues, important as they may be. It could provide a bridge for improving cooperation on several issues, and not just those pertaining to missile defense. This is why the bilateral discussions and the original proposal should move forward together. Bilateral cooperation with Moscow should not be rejected out of hand, but it should not entail surrender to the phantoms of Moscow’s imagination. Rather, that cooperation should act, wherever possible, against real challenges and real threats.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the US Government.