The death of Abu Hafs Al-Urdani, the Jordanian ‘Amir’ of the Arab fighters in Chechnya, points towards a series of further questions about foreign influence and radicalisation of elements of the Chechen separatist movement. The death of Abu Hafs seems to indicate the success that pro-Kremlin forces are having isolating and eliminating foreign fighters in so-called ‘special operations’. Indeed, Hafs was one in a succession of figures that pro-Kremlin forces have targeted and ‘liquidated’ over the last six years. Nevertheless, analysis of the Chechen resistance reveals a complex network of groups which continues to evolve, as it seeks to counter the emergence of a pro-Kremlin Chechen authority.

BACKGROUND: In April 2004, Abu Walid, the then leader of the Arab fighters in Chechnya, was killed in a ‘special operation’. Abu Walid, a Saudi national, had taken over as ‘Amir’ of the Arab fighters in Chechnya, following the death of Amir Khattab in 2002. From late 2001 a number of affiliates, be they foreign fighters, mercenaries or ideologues, including Bilal Al-Qaiseri, Mokhled al-Utaibi, Yusef Said Saudani and Abu Omar al-Saif, are said to have been arrested or killed by pro-Kremlin groups. By December 2005, the Kadyrovtsy (forces under the control of pro-Russian Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov) had claimed responsibility for killing Abu Jafar al-Yemeni. Meanwhile, another foreign ideologue, Abu Omar al-Kuwaiti, otherwise known as Abu Zaid, had been cornered and killed earlier that year. According to Russian press releases, both Abu Jafar and Abu Zaid had played a role financing and orchestrating terror attacks across Russia, including the Beslan school siege.

Elements in the Chechen separatist movement have done much to use new operational environments. In particular, the use of co-ordinated mass hostage-taking in the first conflict (in Trabzon and in Chechnya itself, coinciding with the 1996 raid on the Dagestani town of Kizlyar) and in the Swisshotel Siege in Istanbul in the second conflict, points towards the role of the “Abkhaz battalion”, a group of fighters allegedly trained by the Russian military who served in Abkhazia in 1993. Allegedly, the battalion included a number of fighters from the Diaspora community, such as Turkish citizen Muhammed Tokcan, highlighting the capacity of elements in the separatist movement to forge links with sympathisers across the Caucasus. In the first conflict, press reports indicated that a small number of mercenaries and one or two Arab fighters were involved in events such as the raid on Kizlyar.

As their names indicate, foreign fighters and ideologues such as Hakim al-Medani, Abu Jafar al-Yemeni, Yaqub al-Ghamidi, Abu Bakr Aqeedah and Mohammed Hinnawi are a diverse set of foreign volunteers who traveled to the North Caucasus in the mid-1990s. It must be emphasized that these fighters had a small influence on the second conflict, and had little, if anything, to do with the first war. In this regard, as some specialists have noted, it is perhaps the Yemeni connection which requires further analysis. In contrast to work on Arab fighters, it is clear that a number of volunteers did arrive in the region from North African states, and became involved in the second conflict.

Ruslan Khamzat Gelayev commanded a group of fighters which included a number of North Africans, a small number of whom may have been jihadis from Algeria. In recent years, a series of arrests and trials in France have focused on figures from the network of the international mujahideen who served in Chechnya. Yet, Gelayev was often said to be in conflict with other warlords who fought under the banner of Islam. For example, he supported former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov in his confrontation with Islamists in 1998, and, following his retreat from Grozny, Gelayev’s men were surrounded in his native village of Komsomolskoye. According to reports, Gelayev’s unit may have been betrayed by Arbi Barayev. If true, Barayev, the head of al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah, popularly known as the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, may well, at the least, have been in rivalry with Gelayev, highlighting a schism between Chechen warlords. After his uncle’s Arbi’s death, Movsar Barayev took over as leader of al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah, until his death in the Moscow Theatre Siege of 2002. The brigade was then controlled by Khamzat Tazabayev, otherwise known as Abu Sabur, until he was killed in February 2004.

In effect, therefore, the notion of a coherent body of radicalized fighters within the Chechen resistance, under the command of Khattab, Basayev, or even Gelayev seems, at best, to be problematic. Instead, prior to the outbreak of the second war, it seems that Basayev hosted Khattab, and, over a period of time, a form of Salafi-Jihadism emerged that Basayev and others labeled as Khattabism, and which provided an umbrella for a diverse set of fighters and financiers to integrate into the indigenous resistance movement.

At present, however, the separatist movement appears to be evolving, focusing on developing a regional strategy to destabilize areas outside of Chechnya, to maintain a military capacity and coherence following the death of key field commanders, and to attack pro-Kremlin Chechen groups loyal to President Putin.

IMPLICATIONS: In late July 2006, barely two weeks after the death of Shamil Basayev, the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), published a press release in praise of the role Basayev had played fighting Russian forces in Chechnya. The eulogy praised the role of Basayev as a jihadi fighter. The GSPC is a splinter group of the GIA, (Groupes Islamiques Armés or Armed Muslim Groups) that was involved in the Algerian civil war which erupted in 1991. While the links between North African groups –specifically the GSPC – and small elements of the Chechen resistance remain unsubstantiated, this press release does point toward an interesting association between fighters from North African states and Chechnya.

The implications of these events can be seen in at least three points. First, it appears that the death of each of the foreign fighters highlights the success of pro-Kremlin forces in targeting and eliminating specific figures, but also of curbing the movement of such figures, even within Chechnya proper. Abu Hafs was killed in Dagestan, Abu Zaid and Shamil Basayev in Ingushetia, though it is unclear whether Basayev’s death was accidental. In effect, therefore, elements in the separatist movement have also attempted to strengthen links with regional groups through, amongst other strategies, the establishment of military jamaats. In the North Caucasus, jamaats were generally viewed as communal organizations, often based around tribal communities associated with local Muslim groups. More often than not, jammats were associated with politics and economics in villages, but, over time, they assumed a military role, often to facilitate mobilization and enable the defense of villages.

Second, it provides evidence not only of radicalization, as some commentators have mistakenly noted, but of a much more complicated picture, in which some elements of the Chechen separatist movement actively fostered links with Middle Eastern sponsors. The figures mentioned all played a peripheral role, militarily and even financially, in the first war. Nevertheless, the Algerian connection has, in recent years, been brought into focus. In a series of press releases, Russian authorities have pointed towards Kamel Rabat Bouralha, an Algerian, as a key aide of Basayev. Bouralha was arrested in Russia en route to Azerbaijan in September 2004. News reports also noted that a suspected mercenary, Yusuf Said Sudani, tried in Dagestan in 2002, and a suspected terrorist, Merouane Benhamed, arrested in France in late 2002, were both said to be of Algerian descent, while it was alleged by some commentators that Abu Walid had connections to the GIA.

Third, influential foreign figures involved in the second conflict have common backgrounds, which may have impacted upon internal radicalization, in parts of the Chechen separatist movement. While Khattab, Abu Walid and Abu Hafs had a common background in Tajikistan’s civil war in the early 1990s, other foreign fighters were linked via the North African channel and the Diaspora communities in Kazakhstan and Turkey. The North African channel facilitated the movement of disenfranchised former Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) members such Mohammed Hinnawi, and others from North African states like Morocco, to Chechnya. The Arab channel led the likes of Sheik Fathi, Abu Omar al-Saif and Abu Zaid and Abu Jafar al-Yemeni to Chechnya. Thus, rather than the development of a radicalized group of Wahhabi fighters shaping the resistance, a much more complex interweaving of networks and individuals, some with financial backing, others with ethnic links, were involved in the second Chechen conflict. Of course, this is not to say that particular individuals did not draw on Wahhabism. However, unpacking their role as individuals and as part of differing social networks highlights how some readings of transnational Wahhabism may be misplaced, precisely because the term has been appropriated by the Russian authorities and employed derogatively, to describe extremist versions of Islamic revivalism. Instead, these combatants may be viewed through the lens of a larger Salafi-Jihadist movement, insofar as this term is used to highlight connections with Diaspora communities, alongside Islam’s universality and purity.

Similarly, it was acknowledged that the some figures involved in the Moroccan bombings in 2003, had fought in Chechnya in the late 1990s. Legal documents issued by the Spanish government in 2003 highlighted the role of Salaheddine Benyaich, a key financier and recruiter for jihadi groups, who has since been convicted and imprisoned as a result of his links to terrorist organizations. But the role of these figures, or others such as Menad Benchellali in France, were focused on sending volunteers and organizing logistical support. These figures seem to have commanded small groups of foreign fighters and been linked to the Chechen separatist movement through Khattab. Thus, rather than an integral role, many foreign volunteers did not radicalize the whole of the Chechen separatist movement. Instead, they played a role on the periphery of the movement or were subservient to known Chechen field commanders. Nonetheless, it also appears that the role of North African volunteers has been largely underplayed.

CONCLUSIONS: Little is know about the current leader of the Arab fighters in Chechnya, known as Muhannad. Of Middle Eastern origin, he fought alongside Khattab in 2002. But his influence may be in the establishment of new links between the Chechen resistance and Middle Eastern beneficiaries, with a small group of other foreign fighters such as Abu Abdullah al-Turki, playing a more significant role shaping attacks. Nevertheless, the death of significant figures in the Chechen foreign fighter movement, presents Russian authorities with a problem; how to justify continued human rights abuses as part of the ‘war against terror’. Indeed if key figures, said to be emissaries of Al Qaeda, have now been eliminated, does the ongoing fighting stem from indigenous discontent, as opposed to radicalization stemming from foreign influence?

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Cerwyn Moore is currently a lecturer in International Relations, in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham.