Since early 2007, the number of suicide bombings, political assassinations, and armed clashes has risen in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, which indicates a gradual deterioration of the situation in this relatively peaceful part of the country. While the Afghan government and NATO forces have focused on the insurgent-infested territories of southern and eastern Afghanistan, anti-government elements have become increasingly active in the northern and western provinces.

BACKGROUND: The Afghan government and NATO countries have spent most of their energy on reacting to the insurgency in the south, but have failed to put forward a clear vision to bring good governance and economic development to the relatively peaceful northern provinces. The growing public resentment, due to the perceived lack of progress in these provinces, does not appear to be taken seriously by the Afghan central government. The tragic incident of May 28, when the Afghan police shot dead 13 demonstrators in the town of Sheberghan, might be used as a prelude for further tension and clashes between the government forces and local population.

Contrary to the natural make-up of the Taliban, which is generally an exclusive movement of the Pashtun tribes of southwestern Afghanistan, ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks from the northern provinces of Afghanistan have also been active in their ranks. During the years of the resistance against the Soviet occupation, a considerable number of young Afghan refugees from the northern provinces had entered Pakistani madrassas. From 1996-2001, a sizeable number of young fighters from theses provinces had been active in the Taliban. For instance, more than 2,000 fighters from the province of Badakhshan alone were actively fighting the former Northern Alliance forces in the front lines north of Kabul. Presently, a significant number of the young madrassa graduates are ready to take arms against the Afghan government and NATO forces in the northern part of the country.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a close ally of Al-Qaeda and leader of Hezb-e-Islami, is originally from the province of Kunduz and still enjoys considerable influence in a number of northern provinces. He consistently sends messages to influential former mujahideen commanders in these provinces, inviting them to join him as the followers of late Ahmad Shah Massoud in the struggle against the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. The potential for Hezb-e-Islami to recruit among religious zealots and the disenchanted former mujahideen commanders is considerable. A further deterioration of the situation in the northern provinces would allow Hezb-e-Islami sympathizers to vigorously reactivate their network of terror and anti-government propaganda.

Privileged relations with foreign countries has become the norm for the majority of Afghan politicians. The continued conflict in Afghanistan has provided an implicit legitimacy for the neighboring and regional countries to interfere directly in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Most Afghan leaders are on the payroll of these countries, and have become tools in the geopolitical game in Afghanistan. Sadly, leaders such as the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, who refused to be dictated by foreign countries, did not survive the conflict.

IMPLICATIONS: Growing public frustration provides an opportunity for anti-government forces to thrive and recruit among the population. The Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have been able to reactivate their network of sympathizers in the northern provinces, where regional and neighboring countries have also re-established their covert activities. These provinces now risk slipping from the control of Afghan government as well.

For one, the Taliban’s supporters in Pakistan allegedly seek to spread the conflict to the northern provinces of Afghanistan for two reasons. First, they want to prove to the rest of the world that the conflict in Afghanistan is not uniquely limited to the provinces bordering Pakistan. Secondly, the much publicized Taliban spring offensive did not take effect. Instead, the Taliban have been receiving severe blows at the hands of Afghan and NATO forces. The potential for eventual military conflict in northern Afghanistan would certainly take a considerable number of Afghan and NATO forces away from the insurgent battlegrounds of the southern and eastern provinces, where Pakistan prefers to dominate through its violent proxies.

Moreover, Afghanistan has become a proxy war between Iran and the West. The Iranian intelligence services have been particularly active in the western and northern parts of the country. Recently, American and British authorities have accused Iran of supporting the insurgents in Afghanistan with Iranian-made arms, ammunitions, and sophisticated explosive devices. Also, the massive expulsion of Afghan refugees from Iran is meant to create additional social and economic burdens on the Afghan government.

Iran has become the alternative for some of the local Afghan leaders against the Taliban movement and its backers and financiers in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Since the long-term presence of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan appears improbable, Iranian authorities are willing to use their influence in northern and western Afghanistan to send a warning to the West that Iran’s lack of cooperation in Afghanistan would cost the West dearly.

Of all the Afghan neighbors, the Central Asian regimes have the largest stake in Afghanistan’s stability – but they remain under direct influence of Russia. A deterioration of the situation in northern Afghanistan would mean that their Islamist opposition, now based in Pakistan, could move their operational bases from the tribal areas of Pakistan to the mountains of northern Afghanistan and to the shores of the Oxus River. But the latest deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO will certainly have an impact in Afghanistan. Russia’s lack of cooperation could seriously undermine NATO’s stabilizing efforts in northern Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS: The majority of Afghans support the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan, but since most of them are illiterate, they remain vulnerable to anti-Western propaganda and conspiracy theories that circulate throughout the country. The government and its NATO allies have had ample time in the past five years to promote honest and moderate interlocutors from the local population through traditional social and political mechanisms as government institutions have not yet gained their trust.

The main cause of conflict in Afghanistan has always been foreign interference. Despite the presence of major NATO forces in Afghanistan, the country remains vulnerable to the policies of its neighboring countries. The only way for the Afghan government to cut off the interference of its neighbors in Afghan internal affairs is to reach out to ordinary Afghans. If the local population were to trust the central government, there would be less opportunity for the neighboring and regional countries to take advantage of the poor and downtrodden in Afghanistan. Regaining that trust will not be an easy task – but it is essential if any other, future efforts in Afghanistan are to lead to stability and peace.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroun Mir served over five years as an aide to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan’s former defense minister. He works as a consultant in Kabul and is a Policy Analyst for the International Affairs Forum.