BACKGROUND: Before resigning in November, Georgian President President Eduard Shevardnadze sought to isolate the opposition triumvirate of Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze by sending his envoy Aslan Abashidze to Baku and Yerevan in order to paint the opposition as a dangerous nationalist clique which could endanger the Armenian and Azeri minorities in Georgia and the stability of the South Caucasus as a whole. Following Shevardnadze’s resignation, the new Georgian leadership first sought to sooth Georgian relations with Russia. On December 28 – 29, State Minister Zurab Zhvania embarked on a trip to Baku and Yerevan. The meetings were held behind the closed doors, but one of the main aims of the visit was to reassure the respective leaderships about the constructive attitude of the new Georgian leadership towards the Armenian and Azeri minorities in Georgia, and about the continuation of good neighborly relations with both South Caucasus countries. The precedent of change in the top leadership triggered by public protest against rigged elections in Georgia’s has been worrying for the incumbent leaderships in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both parliamentary elections in Armenia and the presidential elections in Azerbaijan were contested by the local opposition and attracted rather strong criticism of the International Community. Whether realistic or not in its ambitions, the Azerbaijani opposition has been particularly upbeat about what they saw as the “victory of democracy” in Georgia. Hence, the official evaluation of Azerbaijani officials has been quite reserved, with foreign minister Vilayet Kuliyev saying the change of guard in Georgia was received “normally” by Azerbaijan. In Armenia, where the seasoned Kocharyan government seems to be confident of its control over the country, foreign ministry spokesmen spoke about the possibility of opening “a new page” of relations with Georgia.

IMPLICATIONS: Zhvania has done his best to reassure neighboring governments that Georgia does not intend to ‘export’ its revolution. He also covered the big points of relations with the neighboring countries. With Armenia, he negotiated discounts on the rates of transit of Armenian cargo via Georgia. In Azerbaijan, he assured Ilham Aliyev that Georgia continues to place top priority on the timely completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a project which exemplifies the coinciding interests of Tbilisi and Baku. It was also clear that representatives of both the Armenian and Azeri minorities were reported to have overwhelmingly voted for Mikheil Saakashvili on January 4. The first visit was a gesture of good-neighborly relations, but the new Georgian leadership and Zurab Zhvania in particular are not likely to stop there. Georgia can be expected to conduct an increasingly active South Caucasus policy, attempting to bridge the differences among the three South Caucasus countries. As Armenia continues to be under economic embargo by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Georgia is the only reliable transport route for Armenia – hence the Armenian government has a long-term vested interest in Georgia’s stability. The positive reaction of the Armenian government to changes in Georgia’s leadership can also be traced to initial conciliatory remarks of the new leaders towards Russia. Armenia is seen as a primary security ally of Russia in the region, however the Kocharyan government has recently flirted with the idea of fostering relations with the West. Predictable Russo-Georgian relations could allow for joint Georgian-Armenian initiatives in the European format, which are likely to be well received in Brussels and EU capitals. The Azerbaijani leadership may be slightly more concerned in the short term with the recent changes in Georgia. Ilham Aliyev still has a relatively fragile position and the potential awakening of the opposition to the Georgian tune would be a nightmare scenario for him. It is nevertheless unlikely in the short term given the weakness and poor popular standing of the Azerbaijani opposition. The Armenian opposition may in fact even be more likely to benefit from the ‘Georgia wind’. The pragmatism of the Georgian leadership, moreover, is good news for Azerbaijan. Georgia is interested in Azerbaijan’s stability, as it hinges its hopes both for integration in the western economy and for strengthening western-led security frameworks to the transport of oil and gas from Azerbaijan and the Caspian region. President-elect Saakashvili in his first statements emphasized European integration over bilateral relations with Russia and the United States. If this emphasis becomes firmly entrenched in the country’s foreign policy, both Armenia and Azerbaijan could benefit from the current enchantment of the western powers with Georgia’s “rose revolution”. Deeper integration into the European structures is presently, however, a tune of the future. Though the outcome of the January 4 Georgian presidential elections increases the likelihood of the EU offering Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan membership in its so-called “Wider Europe” initiative, the EU decision could take months and would amount to only a symbolic political declaration.

CONCLUSIONS: Importantly, the development of the South Caucasus tier of the Georgian foreign policy would largely depend on its ability to normalize relations with Russia. Negotiations over the withdrawal of Russian military bases in Georgia, one of which is located in the Armenian-populated province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, or a relaxation of Russia’s visa regime with Georgia would be closely watched both in Yerevan and Baku. Kocharyan especially is more likely to seek active ties with Georgia if he would not feel that this could cause reprisals from the Russian side. The new Georgian leadership currently commands the sympathies of the Western powers, and has some experience of lobbying for the regional interests of the South Caucasus in European institutions. Zhvania, in the capacity of the Parliamentary Speaker, was the initiator of the inter-parliamentary consultations between the three South Caucasus countries. He is also known to have lobbied for the admission of Armenia and Azerbaijan into the Council of Europe in 2001. A pragmatic course of the new Georgian leadership vis-à-vis Russia and South Caucasus may position Georgia as an active and welcome player for its two immediate neighbors. By declaring the European integration vector as a primary direction of its foreign policy, the Georgian leadership can create a constructive platform of cooperation in the South Caucasus, without alienating regional powers such as Russia and Turkey. The feasibility of this policy would largely depend on the perceived capability of the new Georgian government to undertake reforms within the country, as well as on some level of normalization in its relations with Russia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Blanka Hancilova holds a doctoral degree from Charles University, and now serves with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jaba Devdariani is an analyst of South Caucasus affairs and founder of the internet magazine Civil Georgia (www.civil.ge)