BACKGROUND: Historically the original Great Game came about due to Russian penetration and conquest of Central Asia, a process that alarmed the British Empire because it could discern no end to Moscow’s or St. Petersburg’s appetites. Hence in modern times, and in spite of the division of the Raj into India and Pakistan, Central Asia has been an important factor in regional security. If anything, its importance grew first after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then once the USSR collapsed and the Central Asian states emerged for the first time in history. As a result of these events Pakistan leapt into the fray trying to convert the area into its ‘strategic hinterland” and attempting to compete with other governments through the employment of its economic and political instruments. When that did not work Pakistan exploited the opportunity to secure its own position in Afghanistan through the Taliban. These events, along with China’s inroads into Central Asia as Russia’s hold on the area slackened, galvanized Indian efforts to obtain a strong position in Central Asia. But it was not just the threat of terrorism or the need for reliable energy supplies that drove New Delhi. Instead it was the realization held by recent governments that India had to break out of a purely South Asian position and frustrate what it discerned as joint Sino-Pakistani efforts to encircle and threaten it, not least in Central Asia. In this respect, mindful of threats occurring to its North and Northwest, India’s governments began to update the security thinking that had animated the rulers of the Raj and now sought to project Indian power and influence into Central Asia and thwart Pakistan and China’s plans there. Since 2000, India has substantially upgraded Central Asia’s place in its foreign policy and defense priorities and resolved to deploy all the instruments of power available to it there. Thus it has steadily sought access to Central Asian energy projects and to major trade programs like the projected North-South corridor linking Russia, Central Asia and Iran with India.

IMPLICATIONS: But beyond purely economic and political links, India has also upgraded its strategic and military profile in Central Asia. It has now openly confirmed the presence of an air base at Ayni in Tajikistan. This is only the second Indian air base beyond India’s frontiers (the first is in Sri Lanka), but it testifies to India’s new interest in and capability for power projection missions as well as its ability to threaten Pakistan from the rear and deny it a strategic hinterland. Indian officials are also busily negotiating deals with Central Asian governments like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan whereby India will either buy Soviet era military equipment like Ilyushin-76 transport aircraft (suitable for transporting troops or for mounting an aerial AWCS-like radar that it obtained from Israel, the Phalcon) or sell weapons to local governments. India is also discussing joint training, research and development initiatives with those states. But beyond obtaining access to energy projects, increased trade access through greater trade and participation in infrastructure projects and these military deals, the overarching Indian objective is quite clear and was summed up by an Indian official at the Ministry of Defense who commented on Defense Minister George Fernandes’ recent visits to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan. “The visit is not that significant in terms of defense procurement. The accent is on building strategic space for India in the region and to encircle Pakistan.” These words speak for themselves. Central Asia has now become an important theater in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry that endangers the security of South Asia, making each region’s security in some measure contingent upon the developments in the other region. Central Asia is thus a prominent element in both those countries’ quest for greater strategic space, a phenomenon with particular significance for India. This is because New Delhi is clearly embarked upon a strategic quest for influence throughout Asia, and religious issues are not standing in the way of its rather successful quest for enhanced standing, prestige, presence, and influence from the Middle East to the Straits of Malacca. India’s multi-dimensional approach to Central Asia resembles its approach to these other areas as well since in all cases economics and defense issues are combined, if not intertwined.

CONCLUSIONS: In this respect India’s rising profile in Central Asia confirms the predictions made over a decade ago in many quarters that by the beginning of the twenty-first century India would be a major power to reckon with in Asia beyond South Asia and a force capable of projecting power far beyond its formal borders. Those prophecies are now coming true. Consequently not only must any analysis or assessment of security trends in Central Asia take India into account, but India’s presence in this area is likely to rise and probably come into political and economic rivalry with that of other major Asian players like China. Inasmuch as most governments’ quest for influence here is predicated upon an effort to thwart other rivals’ designs upon Central Asia, the addition of India to the mix will surely make the new great game still more complex. That multi-state rivalry embracing regional governments and distant powers like the United States will surely continue to be and become even more complex as time passes, a rivalry that encompasses all the traditional dimensions of statecraft. Similarly, it is also clear that as far as Central Asia’s future is concerned, India will not only play the game vigorously but that it is there to stay.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.